श्रीमद्गोस्वामिकुलचूडामणि तीलकायत श्रीगोवर्धनलालजी ।



प्राकट्य संवत् १९१७ श्रावण कृष्ण १

Discuss how far Sankaracharya truly represents the view of the author of the Brahmasutras.

BY

M. T. TELIVALA, B A LL B
VAKIL, HIGH COURT

WITH A SHORT SKETCH OF HIS LIFE

Motto: "प्राणा एवं सदा निरत्याहरन सर्वं परं पीवरि."

SECOND EDITION



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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

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15-4-18.

M. T. TELIVALA.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

This is a reprint of the first Edition. A short sketch of the life of the departed scholar has been added and proofs corrected by his colleagues and friends Messrs. Dhirajlal Sankalia, Vadilal Shah, Jamnadas Morporia, Gordhandas Pragji, Hiralal Mulji and Purushottam Morporia.

Bombay,
20-7-1928.

RANCHHODDAS VARJIWANDAS.

"धाम्ना स्वेन सदा निरस्तकुहकं सत्यं परं धीमहि".

"Discuss how far S'aṇkarâchârya truly represents the view of the author of Brahmasutras."

The Sujna Gokulji Zala Vedanta Prize

Essay for the Year 1915.

Before taking up the main subject, let us advert to some preliminary points, which are worked out by commentators of the Brahma-sûtras. The first of these is:-*who is the Adhikârin of this S'âstra? In the* S'ugâdhikarana (1-3-34-38, B. S.), the Sûtrakâra declares that, among mortals, S'ûdras have no Adhikâra in this Vedic S'âstra, though a god has. *Among* the members of the first three castes who is the Adhikârin? Of course the Traivarṇika must be learned in the Vedas, he must be capable of undertaking *Sravana, manana* etc., he must be possessed of some desire for spiritual elevation. These requirements are necessary, they are suggested, *arthâkshipta*, but beyond this, in the whole of the Brahma-mîmâṃsâ, the Sûtrakâra does not consider the question of Adhikâra. However, Śaṇkara maintains that before one undertakes Brahma-Jijnâsâ, he ought to be possessed of the four requirements, viz. (1) नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक, (2) इहामुत्रार्थ-भोगविराग, (3) शमदमादिसाधनसम्पत्, and (4) मुमुक्षुत्व. These four requirements are, according to Śaṇkara, *sine qua non* to the inquiry of Brahman, and these are, he thinks, suggested by the Sûtrakâra by the word 'अथ' in the 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा'. This 'अथ' is used in the sense of आनन्तर्य, and

presupposes the existence of the four requirements mentioned above, and not a कर्मावबोध.. A knowledge of the Karma-mimânsâ is no condition precedent to the study of Brahma-mimânsa. This is the view of S'aṇkarâchârya as regards अधिकार.

Bhâskara[1] and Râmâuuja[2] both maintain धर्मानन्तर्य, and reject the आनन्तर्य of the above-mentioned four requirements.

It appears that the Sûtrakâra has in his mind neither of the two views. The 'अथ' suggests neither this nor that. 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' is the first Sûtra of the Brahmamîmânsâ introducing the reader to the S'âstra. S'aṇkarâchârya rejects धर्मानन्तर्य on the grounds that ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा may precede धर्मजिज्ञासा of one who has studied Vedânta, and that there is nothing to establish the custom that धर्ममीमांसा must be studied before ब्रह्ममीमांसा. By similar arguments Vallabha[3] also comes to the same conclusion. To add to this, Bâdarâyaṇa and Jaimini are opposed in their views on this point, and as Prof. A. B. Dhruva remarked in his recent University lectures, a reader cannot be expected to study the works of the opponent before he studies his own, so a student of ब्रह्ममीमांसा does not necessarily need study धर्ममीमांसा before ब्रह्ममीमांसा. It is not disputed that some of the पूर्वमीमांसान्यायs are referred to here, bnt that does not compel us to come to the conclusion that a knowledge of धर्ममीमांसा is a condition precedent. Bhâskara accepts ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चय, and says that this is the view of Bâdarâyaṇa expressed in 'सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादि

1. 'नित्यानित्यविवेकादयः अन्तःकरणधर्माः पूर्वमप्रकृताः स्वशब्देन चानिर्दिष्टाः कथमिव सूत्रकारस्य विवक्षिता इति प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यते' भा. भा. p. 4.

2. 'अपि च नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकादय: मीमांसाश्रवणमन्तरेण न संपत्स्यन्ते, फलकरणेतिकर्तव्यताधिकारिविशेषनिश्चयादृते कर्मस्वरूपतत्फलतस्थिरत्वास्थिरत्वात्मनित्यत्वादीनां दुरवबोधत्वात्' श्रीभाष्य. p. 13.

3. 'न तावद्धर्मानन्तर्यम्, विपर्ययसंभवात्, न च पाठतो नियमः, तत्रापि तथा, न च आचाराद् व्यवस्था, तत्रापि अनियमसंभवात्, प्रत्यवायाश्रवणात्' A. B. pp, 26-27.

Brahman seem to be *sine qua non* to the study of ब्रह्ममीमांसा. A Nimbârka writer comes very near this view when he says:—'किं तद्वस्तु यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा विधीयते इत्यपेक्षायां मुमुक्षेति तत्सहकारीणि च श्रद्धोपपत्तिपूर्वकगुरूपसत्त्यादीनीति' (परपक्षगिरिवज्र p. 18). Hence if the आनन्तर्यार्थ is insisted upon, we cannot go further than the suggestion made above. Vallabha seems to be driving at the truth when he accepts अधिकारार्थ after examining and rejecting the आनन्तर्यार्थ, saying that it is full of objections 'अतोऽनेकदोषदुष्टत्वादधिकारार्थ एव श्रेयान्' (अ. भा. B. S. S. p. 33.).

The Veda.

The method of composition adopted by Bâdarâyaṇa leads one to suppose that the Sûtrakâra had a double object in view, viz. to remove doubts, and at the same time to summarise the teachings of the Upanishads. It is therefore necessary to consider in what light he views the Vedas. After undertaking an inquiry of Brahman in 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' 1-1-1, and giving the definition of Brahman in 'जन्माद्यस्य यत', he goes on to say that Brahman is revealed from the S'âstra *i. e.* Veda. He means thereby to say that his conception of Brahman is based on Veda alone. Śaṇkara says in शास्त्रयोनित्वात् 1-1-3, that this Sûtra has been written with a view to emphasize the omniscience of Brahman, which has been suggested in the definition of Brahman in 'जन्माद्यस्य यत.'. This may be as Śaṇkara says, or may not be as Jayatîrtha says. It is clear that when once Brahman is defined to be one from which origination, existence and absorption take place, when it is said to be कर्तृ the creator of the universe, its omniscience is established, and no further Sûtra is needed to repeat it. Whatever it may be, this Sûtra 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' gives us an opportunity

to consider the attitude of the Sûtrakâra and S'ankara towards the Veda. By declaring the शास्त्रयोनित्व of Brahman, the Sûtrakâra declares that his conception of Brahman is entirely based on Veda He further on declares that तर्क is अप्रतिष्ठ Independent reasoning has nothing to do with his conception of Brahman All contradictions are removed by taking shelter in the word of the श्रुति Sankara's attitude on the whole is undetermined Once he says आगममात्रसमधिगम्य एव त्वयमर्थे धर्मवत् । 2 1 6 B S but on good many occasions he departs from this rule In 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2 1 27, we have a very clear instance. Bâdarâyana removes the difficulty raised by Sânkhya in his usual way, viz taking shelter in the text of the श्रुति, but Śankara goes further and says 'ननु शब्देनापि न शक्यते विरुद्ध अर्थ प्रतिपत्तुम्' Sankara's shelter is अविद्या (अविद्याकल्पितभेदाभ्युपगमात्) Throughout the whole of the Brahma mîmânsa the Sûtrakâra never resorts to any other authority except प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान which respectively mean श्रुति and स्मृति which is श्रुत्यनुसारिणी Independent ratiocination has no place in his system. S'ankara fails very badly in representing the view of the Sûtrakâra in not submitting himself to the ideal of the Sûtrakâra Even if Sankara's attitude may be justified on philosophical grounds independent of श्रुति, the fact remains that, that is not the way in which the Sûtrakara would look at it, and so long as he would not, it is useless to discuss that question here To the Sûtrakâra, any reasoning, not in strict harmony with the letter of the Veda, is useless (तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमपि अविमोक्षप्रसंग 12 1 11) To the Sûtrakâra, Veda is eternal (अत एव च नित्यत्वम् 1 3 29). From the words of the Sûtra we do not learn much further than this, but it is quite clear that the *attitude* of the Sûtrakâra is very devout. Like S'ankara he has no courage to say —'अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मण शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, न,

अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य, न हि शास्त्रं इदंतया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति, किं तर्हि, प्रत्यगात्मत्वेन अविषयतया प्रतिपादयदविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभेदमपनयति' 1-1-4. V. S. From the very undertaking of investigation and definition of Brahman by the Sûtrakâra, it is quite clear that S'aṇkara is not justified in making the above remark. Bâdarâyaṇa's whole system is entirely based on the words of श्रुति, so the duty of his commentator is not to modify or correct his statements, but simply to put them in their true light. The aim of the S'âstra is not merely the removal of अविद्याकल्पितभेद but the relisation of Brahman. Except श्रुति, and तदनुसारिस्मृति, the Sûtrakâra does not take the aid of any other प्रमाण in support of his system. S'aṇkara also does not say that he accept any more प्रमाणs. The later S'ânkara writers accept six Pramâṇas, but with that we are not concerned. If S'aṇkara had maintained the position as declared[1] by him in दृश्यते तु। (2-1-6) throughout, we should have seen him entirely at one with the Sûtrakâra. Looking at S'ankara's Bhâshya as a whole, one sees a sort of contradiction running throughout, so far as his attitude to the S'âstra is concerned, While meeting the Mîmâṃsakas, he draws a distinction[2] between पुरुषतन्त्रत्व and वस्तुतन्त्रत्व. धर्म is पुरुषतन्त्र, and as such does not admit of any reasoning independent of Veda, while Brahman is वस्तुतन्त्र, and as such, admits the claims of reasoning, But when the Sankhya opposes him, he declares, as is said above, that the conception of Brahman like धर्म is based on Scripture alone, and does not admit of any प्रमाण independent of Veda (2-1-6). If S'aṇkara had

1. 'वस्तुके परिनिष्पन्नत्वाद् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि, संभवेयुरिति, तदपि मनोरथमात्रम्, रूपाद्यभावाद् हि नायं अर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः, लिंगाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनाम्, आगममात्रसमधिगम्य एव तु अयमर्थो धर्मवत् ××× श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुभवाङ्गत्वेन आश्रीयते।' 2—1. 6.

2. अतो न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या, किं तर्हि, प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयवस्तुज्ञानवद् वस्तुतन्त्रा एव। 1-1-4-S. B.

avoided this contradiction, and adhered to the view expressed in 2-1-6, his faithfulness to the Sûtrakâra would have been greatly enhanced.

Bâdarâyaṇa's attitude towards his opponents, though queer, is justified on the ground that it is consistent. When difficulties are raised against his system by a Sâṅkhya or a Vaiśeshika, he says his system is based on श्रुति alone, and as such has nothing to do with reasoning, 2-1-29. But his opponents, as they accept तर्क, cannot take advantage of this position. As they resort to तर्क, he challenges their position by तर्क. S'aṅkara fitly remarks on this point thus:—'अपि च आगमबलेन ब्रह्मवादी कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतीति नावश्यं तस्य यथादृष्टमेव सर्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति नियमोऽस्ति, परस्य तु दृष्टान्तबलेन कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतो यथादृष्टमेव सर्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यमित्यस्त्यतिशयः 2-2-38. This is a very faithful way of expressing the Sûtrakâra's view, and had S'aṅkara followed the same, he would not have embodied two contradictory interpretations as in 1-1-11-18, 2-1-27, 2-1-29, etc. etc.

Brahman.

Brahman is the centre round which the whole philosophy and theology of the Upanishads turn. In the first Sûtra, 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा', the Sûtrakâra undertakes an investigation of Brahman, and then immediately in the next Sûtra gives the definition of Brahman, 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः', as that in which the world has origination, existence and absorption. It is worthy of note that the Sûtrakâra, instead of defining Brahman as 'सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं ब्रह्म' 'सत्यं ज्ञानं आनन्दं ब्रह्म,' instead of giving स्वरूपलक्षण, gives कार्यलक्षण, by declaring that the Brahman of which he has undertaken investigation, is the creator of the Universe. In 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्', he declares further that his definition of Brahman is

entirely based on Scripture. Brahman is शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्य. The Sûtra 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' is very important. S'aṇkara also says that it gives the definition of Brahman. This *लक्षण must* be referred to the Brahman whose जिज्ञासा has been undertaken in the first Sûtra. Instead of defining Brahman as 'सच्चिदानन्द', Bâdarayaṇa declares Brahman as that which creates, sustains and absorbs the universe, the reason for this being that the Sûtrakâra has not in his mind only the summary of the leading tenets of the Upanishads, but a desire to clear every Vedic passage of importance of any doubt or difficulty by giving its interpretation. To the mind of the Sûtrakara, the tenets of the Sâṇkhyas' were most prominent. This fact can be inferred from the boundless zeal with which he refutes the principal dogmas of the Sâṇkhyas. On every occasion, he makes a polemic remark against the Sâṇkhya. Now these Sâṇkhyas attributed activity not to Brahman - or more correctly to Purusha, but to *jada* प्रकृति, while the पुरुष was *chetana* but निष्क्रिय etc., Many of the Vedic thinkers themselves were under the spell of the Sâṇkhyas. Thus, *this was the crucial point, on* which it was essential for the Sûtrakâra, interpreter as he was of the Upanishads, to pronounce a very definite *opinion*, and this the Sûtrakâra has done by declaring that Brahman is that which creates, sustains, and resolves the world in itself, thereby tacitly rejecting the Sâṇkhya *doctrines of पुरुष's being निष्क्रिय and प्रकृति's being कर्तृ*. Similarly, by writing the Sûtra 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्', he boldly declares that his definition of Brahman is entirely based on scripture, *meaning thereby that the S'âstra teaches the कर्तृत्व of* Brahman and nôt of प्रकृति. Thus it appears that the learned Sûtrakâra at one stroke achieves two objects, viz. he *sets aside the doubts of the Vedic* passages, and then with it pronounces a definite view that, Brahman, the

highest entity of the Upanishads, is possessed of activity, and therefore of knowledge also. Thus in "जन्माद्यस्य यतः," Brahman as *sad* is shown to be the cause. In ईक्षत्यधिकरण, Brahman, as *chetana*, is shown to be the cause of the universe. In आनन्दमयाधिकरण, the same Brahman, as *Ânanda-maya*, is declared to be the cause. In जन्माधिकरण Brahman as *sad*, in ईक्षत्यधिकरण as *chetana*, and in आनन्दमयाधिकरण as *ânanda*, is declared to be the cause of the universe. *Îkshati* and *kâma* being the attributes of *chetana* something, the causality of the non-intelligent *prakṛity* etc., is out of question. Similarly 'नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः' sets aside the causality of the human soul, though he is *chetana*. Thus, the learned Sûtrakâra, while setting aside the doubt as to कर्तृत्व and कारणत्व of the universe, suggests and establishes that the same *Kartṛi* and *Kârana* Brahman is सच्चिदानन्द. In other words, सच्चिदानन्द Brahman as सत्, चित् and आनन्द is the material and efficient cause of the universe, and not *jada Prakṛity* nor *chetana jîva*. Thus by showing the causality of Brahman alone, and suggesting thereby Brahman's unfettered activity, the Sûtrakâra has established that the same Brahman is सच्चिदानन्द. After once declaring in brief his conception of Brahman, the Sûtrakâra proceeds to show that, words bearing other senses elsewhere, refer to Brahman alone in the Upanishads, and even while doing so, he does bring out some essential characteristics of Brahman. With this double end in view, he seems to arrange his latter portion of the first chapter. Hence, आनन्दमय, अन्तर आदित्य, आकाश, प्राण, परो दिवो ज्योतिः, प्राण, मनोमय प्राणशरीर, अत्ता, अन्तर, अन्तर्यामिन्, अदृश्य, वैश्वानर, द्युभ्वाद्यायतन, भूमन्, अक्षर, दहर, अंगुष्ठमात्र, प्राण, ज्योतिः, आकाश and विज्ञानमय are all Brahman. 'गुहां प्रविष्टौ' refers to Brahman and jîvâtman, *Samprasâda* refers to Brahman. One clearly sees here that the aim of the Sûtrakâra is not only to say that these words refer to Brahman, but that they do

individually bring out a certain attribute of Brahman. The Sûtrakâra, by following this method, develops, and perfects his conception of Brahman, the investigation of which he has *proposed to undertake in* 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा,' and whose definition he has given in 'जन्माद्यस्य यत'.

Śankara in 'जन्माद्यस्य यत' 1-1-2. observes as follows — 'यत इति कारणनिर्देश , अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभङ्ग यत सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्ते कारणाद् भवति तद् ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेष'. From this it can be seen that Brahman which is being investigated by the Sûtrakâra is *sarvajna*, *sarvashaktimat*, and, therefore, *kartri* also according to his view as interpreted by S'ankara here The Sûtrakâra's *jijnâsâ thus refers to Brahman* which is सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत्, कर्तृ etc., and शास्त्रसमन्वय, established in the following Sûtras, refers to the same Brahman; while *according to* S'ankara, the जिज्ञासा and the समन्वय both refer to निर्विशेष Brahman. In "तत् समन्वयात्' (1-1-4), S'ankara observes —'इद तु पारमार्थिक कूटस्थ नित्य व्योमवत् सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहित नित्यतृप्त निरवयव स्वयंज्योति स्वभाव × × × अतस्तद् ब्रह्म यस्य जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता' In 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य' (2 1-14), S'ankara labours to show that, in adopting the ideal of अत्यन्त निर्विशेष Brahman, he does not violate the *pratijna* of the Sûtrakâra expressed in 'जन्माद्यस्य यत' 1-1-2. The fact that throughout the latter portion of the Brahmamîmânsâ, Brahman is described as possessed of some attributes, confirms the view that the Sûtrakâra has not in his mind the जिज्ञासा *and* शास्त्रसमन्वय *that* S'ankara *wants to* impose upon him in the समन्वयसूत्र, 1-1-4. Vallabha also says, 'न च येन रूपेण समन्वयो मतान्तरस्थै विचारित. तथात्रे सूत्रेषु निर्णयोऽस्ति,' 1-1-4 p. 115 Kes'ava Bhatta Kâs'mirin, after showing the contradiction between the views of the Sûtrakâra and S'ankara, observes that, according to the reasoning of S'ankara, there can neither be anything like जिज्ञास्यब्रह्मन्, nor even शास्त्रारम्भ 'परमते तु जिज्ञास्यो दुरुपपाद × × × परमते तु

विषयस्य दुर्निरूपत्वेन शास्त्रारम्भोऽसम्भव एव × × विकल्पासहत्वात्' etc, 1 1 1, ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्ति, pp. 22, 23, निम्बार्कभाष्य Thus the ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा of the Sûtrakâra, and that of S'ankara are different. S'ankara's ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा does not refer to Sûtrakâra's Brahman strictly speaking S'ankara tries to bridge over this difficulty by splitting the Sûtrakâra's conception of one Brahman into twofold S'ankara's introduction to आनन्दमयाधिकरण *gives a very clear insight into his view of* two Brahmans According to S ankara's own statement, the first ten Sûtras of Bâdarâyana refer to Brahman which is सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत्, ईश्वर and जन्मस्थितिलयकारण of जगत्, and that it is *chetana*, and not *jada prakriti* The scope of the Vedânta sûtras then following is thus explained by him — 'द्विरूप हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते, नामरूपविकारभेदोपाधिविशिष्ट, तद्विपरीतं च सर्वोपाधिविवर्जित × × × एवमेकमपि ब्रह्म अपेक्षितोपाधिसबद्ध निरस्तोपाधिसबद्ध चोपास्यत्वेन ज्ञेयत्वेन च वेदान्तेषूपदिश्यते इति प्रदर्शयितु परो ग्रन्थ आरभ्यते Again in the next *adhikarana*–'अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात्, he says — अपि च यत्र तु निरस्तसर्वविशेष पारमेश्वर रूप उपदिश्यते भवति तत्र शास्त्रम्, 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययमित्यादि, सर्वकारणत्वात्तु विकारधर्मैरपि कैश्चिद्विशिष्ट परमेश्वर उपास्यत्वेन निर्दिश्यते सर्वकर्मा सर्वकाम सर्वगन्ध सर्वरस इत्यादिना This is how S ankara draws a distinction between निर्गुण ब्रह्मन् and सगुण ब्रह्मन् So far as his निर्विशेष ब्रह्मन् is concerned, the lakshana of Brâhman, given by the Sûtrakâra in 'जन्माद्यस्य यत ,' has no bearing whatever In आरम्भणाधिकरण, S ankara says that जन्माद्यस्य यत ' etc , has been written by the Sûtrakâra to refute the Sânkhyas and others, but that definition has only reference to the सगुण Brahman Its ईश्वरत्व सर्वज्ञत्व, सर्वशक्तिमत्त्व etc , are not to be attributed to Brahman in the highest sense (परमार्थत) Brahman is called ईश्वर, सर्वज्ञ सर्वशक्तिमत्, so far as there is अविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेद 'तदेव अविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्व सर्वज्ञत्व सर्वशक्तिमत्त्व च, न परमार्थतो विद्ययापास्तसर्वोपाधिस्वरूपे आत्मनि ईशित्रीशितव्यसर्वज्ञत्वादिव्यवहार उपपद्यत' 2 1·14 Thus according to Śankara's view, the Brahman, whose definition is given by the Sûtrakâra, refers only to the सगुण ब्रह्मन्, and the

concluding Sûtra, 'अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्,' teaching the non-return of those who have reached Brahman, would, by a parity of reasoning, refer to the lower or *saguṇa* Brahman, a creature of *avidyâ*. We fail to trace this view to any Sûtra, neither does Śaṇkara support it by any Sûtra, hence, in the absence of any convincing proof, we cannot take this to be the view of the Sûtrakâra. Looking at the Vedânta Mîmâṃsâ as a whole, one sees that, in 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा', the Sûtrakâra undertakes the investigation of the Brahman, in जन्माद्यस्य यतः, etc., declares that जगत्कारणत्व is Brahman's असाधारणलक्षण, in Sûtras like 'ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्', 'कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा,' he removes the प्रकृतिकारणता of जगत्, and in Sûtras like 'नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः,' he removes the कर्तृत्व of jîvâtman; in the second chapter, the Sûtrakâra declares that even though Brahman Jîvâtman are *ananya*, still Brahman is *adhika*, this being the reason why unlike Brahman he does sometimes *ahita* to himself; that Jîvâtman is the *anśa* of Brahman, that his Brahmanhood, omnipresence, etc., are through his relation with Brahman, that the Jîvâtman is a *kartṛi* under the control and guidance of *para* Brahman; in the third chapter, the Sûtrakâra teaches how निष्कामकर्मिs secure a body fit for the acquirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान, and in the fourth chapter, this Jîvâtman, by the aid of ससाधन ब्रह्मज्ञान, reaches Brahman by अर्चिरादिमार्ग from where he does not return; vide Aṇubhashya 2-3-29. Dr. Deussen, in his 'System of the Vedânta', on pp. 98-99, thus summarises the teachings of the Brahmasûtras:—The first part contains, in Adhyâya I, the theology, which, on the basis of seven times four passages of the Upanishads, discusses the essence of the Brahman, its relation to the world as creator, ruler, destroyer, its relation to the soul, and its various names and attributes. This is followed, in Adhyâya II, by cosmology which is concerned with the relation of the

world to the Brahman as cause, its gradual evolution from and reabsorption in it, and, from II-3-15 on, the psychology, in which are thoroughly discussed the nature of the soul and its organs, its relation to God, to the body, and to its own deeds. In Adhyaya III, comes first the doctrine of transmigration, then a supplement to psychology (III, 2, 1–10), another to the theology (III, 2, 11-41); the rest of the Adhyâya contains a miscellaneous assemblage of discussions, for the most part exegetic in character, as the chief content of which we can, in any case, with Śankara, consider the teaching of the means (साधन) to attain the higher and lower doctrine, that is the knowledge and worship of the Brahman. For the most part these discussions deal with the strange question whether certain passages of the Veda are to be comprehended in one Vidyâ or to be separated, a question which has a meaning only for the lower doctrine, with its aim of worship. Finally, the conclusion of the work, Adhyâya IV contains eschatology; it sketches in detail the departure of the soul after death, and how some souls follow the way of the Fathers (पितृयान) to a new incarnation, while, on the contrary, others, the worshippers of the Brahman, are led along the way of gods (देवयान) higher and higher upwards to the Brahman, 'whence there is no return' according to the Upanishads.

After thus summarising the system, he goes on to say 'but not without further conditions, according to the reasoning of our (Śankara's) system, for this Brahman is only the 'lower' Brahman, that is, as considered as possessing attributes 'guna', it is the object of worship, and not of 'perfect knowledge' 'सम्यग्दर्शनम्'; only after this latter, that is, the esoteric doctrine is imparted to the pious in the world of Brahman, is he also liberated; until then, although he is in the world of Brahman, and a partaker of

Lordship 'ऐश्वर्यम्' 'his darkness is not yet driven away', 'his ignorance not yet destroyed', that is, he possesses only the lower doctrine 'अपरा विद्या', whose content consists of all that has hitherto been mentioned, not the opposed higher doctrine, the परा विद्या or सम्यग्दर्शनम्, that is, the pure philosophic, esoteric doctrine, which, in every part of this picture of the world with its empiric colouring, crops up in contradiction with it, and whose results, according to the metaphysical standpoint which we occupy, we may find strange, or admirable.' Thus Dr. Deussen says that there is a contradiction between the system which is deduced from the express Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa, and the esoteric doctrine of Śaṇkara, and *then proceeds thus to explain Śaṇkara's esoteric doctrine*:—'In the department of Theology it teaches that the Brahman is not thus or thus, but altogether without attributes 'गुण,' distinctions 'विशेष' and limitations 'उपाधि,' and *therefore in no way capable of being defined or conceived*. And this Brahman, devoid of all limitations, is only being, outside which nothing is; therefore in the department of cosmology, there can be as little question of the origin of the world as of its existence, but only of there being neither anything different "नाना' from the Brahman, nor any plurality of things 'प्रपञ्च', and that the world extended *in names and forms is non-existent* 'अवस्तु', is only a glamour 'माया' which Brahman of course 'सगुण', as master-magician 'मायाविन्, projects 'प्रसारयति,' as the dreamer projects dream-forms. In the same way all further Psychology falls away after the saying 'तत् त्वम् असि', 'that thou art' is comprehended, according to which the soul of each human being is not an emanation, not a part of the Brahman, but fully and completely the Brahman. For him who knows this, there is no more migration for the soul, nor even liberation; for he is already liberated; the con-

tinued existence of the world and of his own body appears to him only as an illusion, the appearance of which he cannot remove, but which cannot further deceive him, till the time when, after the decease of the body, he wanders not forth, as the others but remains where he is and what he is and eternally was the first principle of all things, 'the originally eternal pure, free, Brahman'

This is a very fairly accurate view of S'ankara as laid down by Dr Deussen Śaṅkara's views about cosmology, psychology and eschatology are examined in the sections of Jagat, Jivâtman and Moksha respectively, and have been shown not to flow naturally from the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana as they stand at present. Here we are concerned with the consideration of Brahman, so we shall examine here his view as to whether Śaṅkara's distinction of higher and lower Brahman can naturally be worked out from the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana It has been suggested above that so far as our casual survey of the Brahmasûtras is concerned, Śaṅkara's distinction, between the higher निर्विशेष निर्गुण निरुपाधि and the lower, सविशेष सगुण सोपाधिक Brahman, is not found to be countenanced by the Sûtras of Bâdarayana

The most important Sûtras, on this point, are to be found in the second pâda of the third *Adhyâya* The adhikarana, beginning with न स्थानतोऽपि परस्य उभयलिंग सर्वत्र हि,' and ending with the sûtra 'दर्शनाच्च (3 2 11 21) deals with the question, whether Brahman is सविशेष or निर्विशेष or both The next adhikarana, beginning with प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूय' and ending with the Sûtra प्रतिषेधाच्च(3 2 23 30), deals with the question of निषेध which refers to the रूपद्वय of Brahman, and not to Brahman itself, or in the words of Deussen, deals with the question of the possibility of *knowing the निर्विशेष Brahman or esoteric Brahman* This is the scope of these sûtras as stated by Śaṅkara.

At the outset, it may be remarked that it is rather somewhat strange to find these Sûtras (3-2, 11 30) in the third chapter, which, as its very name suggests, purports to deal with the question of sâdhanas. But as none of the Vedanta doctors have questioned their legitimacy, we shall deal with them as they are to be seen at present. These Sûtras seem to be rather obscure, and this seems to account for the vast divergence to be noticed in the existing Bhâshyas regarding the sense of these Sûtras, as well as the arrangement of them into the adhikaraṇas.

From the first adhikaraṇa (3-2 11-21), Saṅkara thus works out the निर्विशेषत्व of his Brahman. According to Śaṅkara, the human soul, *when freed from all* उपाधिs, *becomes* identical with Brahman in stages like dreamless sleep. In his Bhâshya on the Chhândogya also, Śankara says that by the word 'स्व' the श्रुति suggests the identity of the jivâtman and Brahman. The Swarûpa of this Brahman is being investigated in this section by the aid of the Vedic passages. Concerning Brahman, says S'aṅkara, there are Vedic passages of two kinds. One set of Vedic passages like 'सर्वकर्मा, सर्वकाम·, सर्वगन्ध., सर्वरसः' teaches that Brahman is सविशेष, while another set of Vedic passages like 'अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घम्' teaches the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman. Now the Brahman in itself, continues S'aṅkara, cannot be both, for it is not possible that one and the same thing in itself should be सविशेष and निर्विशेष. It is true that we might think that Brahman in itself is निर्विशेष, and becomes सविशेष by उपाधिs. But one thing cannot become another by the fact that it appears to be connected with limitations (उपाधिs); the crystal remains clear even when it has अलक्ताद्युपाधियोग; as it is an error to take it red in itself, so in case of Brahman also, the सविशेषत्व is due to limitations etc., and rests only on Ignorance (उपाधीनामविद्याकल्पितत्वात्). Therefore S'aṅkara *concludes* that Brahman is free from

all differences and perfectly unchangeable, and not the contrary, 'अतश्चान्यतरलिङ्गपरिग्रहेऽपि समस्तविशेषरहितं निर्विकल्पकमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तव्यं न तद्विपरीतम्,' the reason being that in all the passages like 'अशब्दम्' etc., where the swarūpa of Brahman is taught, it is declared to be devoid of all limitations etc., 'अपास्तसमस्तविशेष' Having worked out the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman thus, in the next Sūtra, 'न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात्' 3-2-12, S'ankara further elaborates the same by declaring that Brahman is निराकार How does it happen then that in many passages of scripture, manifold forms are attributed to Brahman? Should we not admit that by such passages a difference of form is actually brought out? 'तस्मात् सविशेषत्वमपि ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यम्' For otherwise what is the purpose of the passages of scripture which attribute 'भेद' differentiation to Brahman? To this it is replied that in every passage where limitations appear, it is further said that Brahman is not affected by them, 'प्रत्युपाधिभेद त्वभेदमेव ब्रह्मण बोधयति शास्त्रम' Having thus emphasised the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman, Sankara remarks, 'अतश्च न भिन्नाकारयोगो ब्रह्मण शास्त्रीय इति शक्यते वक्तुम्, भेदस्योपासनार्थत्वादभेदे तात्पर्यात्.' The next Sūtra, 'अपि चैवमेके,' has been written to teach the cognition of *abheda* which is preceded by a censure of the perception of *bheda* How is it that only the अनाकार Brahman is insisted upon when the Vedic passages describe Brahman as both? To this question, an answer is furnished by 'अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् 3 2 14 Brahman is not रूपादिमत्, because Vedic passages like अस्थूलम् etc., expressly declare that निर्विशेष Brahman is प्रधान Then what about the Vedic passages teaching Brahman as आकारवद्? To this an answer is given in प्रकाशवच्चावैयर्थ्यात्' 2 3 15. As the *light of the sun and the moon*, when it falls on the finger, shares in the finger's limitations, and in conformity with it, seems crooked, when it is crooked, straight, when it is straight, so also Brahman, when it is united with पृथ्व्याद्युपाधि

assumes its forms. Such an 'आकारविशेषोपदेश' is not विरुद्ध, for it is taught for the purpose of उपासना. It is therefore by no means purposeless. All the words of the Upanishads have a purpose, and are authoritative, but this does not prevent this view of Brahman's सविशेषत्व etc., from resting on Ignorance all the same, for on inborn Ignorance depends worldly action as well as those prescribed by the Veda. The Sûtra, 'आह च तन्मात्रम्' 3-2-16, also teaches the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman. The Sûtra 'दर्शयति चाथोऽपि स्मर्यते' 3·2·17, emphasises the *निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman by quotations* from श्रुति and स्मृति. After explaining the Sûtras, 'अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत्', and 'अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम् 3-2-18-19, in the same strain, Śankara remarks in 'वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयसामञ्जस्यादेवम्' 3-2-20 :—Just as the जलगतसूर्यप्रतिबिम्ब increases with the increase of water, moves with its motion, is जलधर्मानुविधायि, in the same way, the one अविकृतमद् Brahman assumes the धर्म्स of उपाधि. In the last Sûtra, 'दर्शनाच' 3-2-21, Śankara concludes again emphasising the same view on the authority of certain passages of the Veda. In the end, Śankara gives it as his opinion that Brahman is *निर्विकल्पक. 'तस्मात् निर्विकल्पकैकलिङ्गमेव ब्रह्म न उभयलिंगं, न* विपरीतलिंगं चेति सिद्धम्' 3-2-21.

The interpretation of these Sûtras by Śankara cannot be taken to be convincing, because it is not consistent with what the Sûtrakâra has said before, and even if we do not mind this inconsistency with the previous Sûtras, the interpretation of the Sûtras and Vedic passages cannot be denied to be very forced. In 'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिंगं सर्वत्र हि,' S'ankara explains the words 'सर्वत्र हि' by 'ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरेषु अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययमित्यादिषु निर्विशेषस्यैवोपदेशात्.' The wording of the Sûtra does not in the least suggest this meaning, nor is it to be found in this third chapter, nor in the whole of the Mîmânsâ Śâstra. The word *Sarvatra* is

once found before in 'सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात 1-2-1, and there also, no suggestion is to be found in favour of S'aṇkara's interpretation Hence that explanation owes its existence to S'aṇkara's zeal for the *Nirviśesha* Brahman Even the latter halves of the sentences, quoted by S ankara in support of *Nirviśesha* Brahman, do not support his view, but go against him The first sentence quoted is this—'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत्। अनाद्यनन्तं महत परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात प्रमुच्यते कठ० 3-15 In this passage the same *Brahman* which is *Aśabdam* etc is described to be *Anâdyananta, mahatah para* and *dhruva*, which, in their turn, imply the *saviśeshatva* of Brahman Moreover, when it is established here, that Brahman is *Nirviśesha*, the following Sûtra, 'अरूपवत तत्प्रधानत्वात,' becomes redundant. To consider that this doctrine, which is to be proved there, is proved here, is also rather incongruous Again, the interpretation of the Sûtra, 'अरूपवत तत्प्रधानत्वात does not appear to be supported by the very texts, which S'aṇkara, quotes in his support The first text, quoted by S'aṇkara, is 'अस्थूलमनणु' etc , बृह० 3 8 8. This sentence has been spoken by the sage Yâjnavalkya to explain to Gârgi the nature of Brahman, so first he says *Asthûlam etc* , and then at once teaches the *praśâsitritva, ambarântadhârakatva*, beginning with *drashtritva*, and ending with *âkâśopâdânatva*. Hence to lay unnecessary stress on the negative words like *asthûlam* etc , and to say that the *nirviśesha* Brahman alone is taught, and to disregard completely the context teaching divine attributes of Brahman like *praśâsitritva* etc , is not fair *Asthûlam* etc , can be reconciled by saying that the *nishedha*, there referred to, is only the negation of what is to be found in the world of prakriti, it is only a *nishedha* of *prâkrita* or *laukika* things,'and not a wholesale negation of everything including even attributes divine like *praśâsitritva* etc The second *kâthaka*

sentence 'अशब्दमस्पर्शम्' etc., does not, as already shown above, support S'ankara's contention that Brahman is absolutely devoid of any attributes, 'केवलनिर्विशेषाग्रह'. The third quotation is from the Chhândogya, 'आकाशो वै नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म,' 8-14-1. This sentence is very clear. It distinctly teaches that the revelation of names and forms is an (नामरूपनिर्वाहकत्त्व) attribute of Brahman. It teaches Brahman as possessed of attributes, *saviśesha*, and it is rather strange to find Śankara quoting it in his support. The fourth is quoted from Mundaka 'दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स बाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः' (2-1-12). That also cannot be taken to teach the out and out *nirviśeshatva* of Brahman. By calling the *purusha amûrta*, it does not deny *mûrti* absolutely, it may be *iyattá-parimâna, for it, at the same time,* says that *purusha* Brahman is *divine-divya*, बाह्याभ्यन्तरसाहित्य or बाह्याभ्यन्तररूप. But the passage quoted goes further, and declares that the *purusha* is greater than the great *akshara* Brahman, 'अक्षरात्परत परः'. Thus this passage also goes against the *nirviśeshatva* of Brahman. The last sentence quoted by S'ankara is from the Brihadâranyaka 'तदेतद्ब्रह्म अपूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः' 2-5-19.' Even when we consider this sentence without any reference to the context, the very word *sarvânubhûh* suggests an inference against S'ankara's absolute negation of any attributes in Brahman. If there was no *sarva*, how was Brahman to be *sarvânubhûh?* 'सर्वसत्त्वे एव सर्वानुभवितृत्वसम्भवात्'. Taken with the context it further goes against S'ankara's view. This quotation is at the end of the *Madhu-Brahmana*. In the beginning of the *Madhu vidya* 'अयमेव स योऽयमात्मेदममृतमिदं ब्रह्मेदं सर्वम्' is repeated fourteen times in order to teach the *sarvatva* of Brahman. Then there is further taught the 'सर्वभूताधिपतित्व,' then as an explanation to 'रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव' is added 'अयं हरयोऽयं वै दश च सहस्राणि च बहूनि च

अनन्तानि' which directly declares not the absolute negation in Sankara's sense, but the *anantarûpatâ* or *sarvatva* of Brahman. Hence the so-called prominence-*pradhânatâ* of *nirviśesha* Brahman, according to Śankara, cannot be fairly worked out here. Śaṇkara's very appropriate remark 'नहि वेदवाक्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं, प्रमाणत्वाविशेषात' loses much of its force, when he says that the आकारविशेषोपदेश of Brahman is due to उपाधि, because according to him, what is due to उपाधि, cannot be said to belong to the thing itself, and also because all the उपाधिs are आविद्यक, 'उपाधिनिमित्तस्य वस्तुधर्मत्वानुपपत्ते.' 'उपाधीनामाविद्यकत्वात.' Even Vedic passages like 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कुतश्चन' at best teach the वाङ्मनसातीतत्व and Brahmavid's भयाभाव and not its अत्यन्तनिर्विशेषत्व. The quotation from *Geeta* 'ज्ञेयं यत् तत्प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वाऽमृतमश्नुते, अनादिमत्परं ब्रह्म न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते' 13-12, refers to व्याकृत and अव्याकृत stages of Brahman on the authority of 2-1-17-B. S. Moreover this conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the Geeta further describes Brahman as सर्वत· पाणिपादान्तम् etc. Attributes like 'सर्वतःपाणिपादान्तत्व' etc., cannot be *prâkṛita laukika, heya.* The illustrations given in the 'वृद्धिह्रास' Sûtra 3-2-20, can be explained by the fact that there is no difference in the प्रतिबिंब either in less or more water. भाष्यप्रकाश. pp. 945-946. B. S. S.

Thus it has been shown that so far as the Sûtras and the texts of the Upanishads are concerned, Śaṇkara's effort to work out the absolute निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman in this अधिकरण (3-2-11-21) cannot be justified. Now in the next अधिकरण (3-2-22-30 he works out his interpretation in the same strain, and concludes:—'तस्माद् ब्रह्मावसानोऽयं प्रतिषेध', न अभावावसान इत्यध्यवस्यामः' (3-2-22). The Sutra 'प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः' 3-2-22 is thus explained by Śaṇkara. The विषयवाक्य 'नेति नेति' etc., here chosen, is from the बृहदारण्यक.

In the passage in question, 'नेति नेति' follows a statement of the two rûpas of Brahman viz. मूर्त and अमूर्त. Both these forms, according to Śaṇkara, are denied of Brahman by 'नेति नेति.' It is by the aid of this Sûtra that Śaṇkara establishes his strict अद्वैतवाद. By denying everything except Brahman which is 'केवल चैतन्य,' he distinguishes his system from the शून्यवाद of the Bauddhas. Everything except the Brahman is to be denied, and the Brahman itself is to be, if at all, described by all negations. This is the essence of the Vedânta according to him. Thus his system should be very aptly called, not the 'अद्वैतवाद,' the doctrine of non-duality, but 'एकवाद' or 'singularism' in the words of Sir Ramkṛishṇa Bhandarkar.

Thus there are two sorts of passages to be found in the Upanishads, one teaching the Brahman as सविशेष, and the other teaching it as निर्विशेष. Śaṇkara subordinates, nay rejects, the Vedic passages teaching Brahman as सविशेष, as shown above, calling them useful only in उपासनाs, which in their turn, are products of अविद्या; according to him. On what authority Śaṇkara bases this theory of his, we are unable to *trace*. No Sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa can with certainty be taken as an authority for drawing this distinction. In doing so, he, it appears, departs from the lines of the Sûtrakâra. In (3-2-15), he remarks 'न हि वेदवाक्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं प्रमाणत्वाविशेषाद.' Thus according to the principle laid down by Śaṇkara himself (and this seems to be the view of the Sûtrakâra who, as a true Vaidika, has undertaken to set aside विरोध, and to work out harmony of the conflicting Vedic passages) the विरोध would not be set aside, if some passages are subordinated or deprived, as is done by him of their primary importance and significance. Being passages of the Veda, their authoritativeness is equal, and

they deserve to be equally respected. The difficulty of contradiction should have been set aside on the principle laid down by Bâdarâyaṇa in 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्,' 2-1-27. This seems to be a very strong piece of argument to refute S'ankara's theory of अत्यन्त निर्विशेष Brahman. The argument that, because the 'एकवाक्यता' is to be worked out, S'ankara is justified in subordinating, or rather rejecting सविशेष Vedic passages to निर्विशेष ones, and thereby removing the विरोध between them, would not stand a moment's consideration; the hollowness of this argument is not difficult to be seen. The विरोध as such, can rightly be said to be reconciled, when both sorts of Vedic passages deserving of equal weight as they are, are given their due and equal weight and scope. S'ankara's way of looking at the श्रुतिs, one must admit, not only subordinates the सविशेष श्रुतिs, but renders them meaningless ultimately. What prevented S'ankara from an unqualified submission to the letter of the Veda, in complete disregard of the so-called युक्तिविरोध, as was done by the learned Sûtrakâra in 2-1-26-27, is a question, which cannot be satisfactorily solved. S'ankara ought to have accepted the principle, which he himself expresses so very tersely in 2-1-27. 'शब्दमूलं च ब्रह्म, शब्दप्रमाणकं, नेन्द्रियप्रमाणकं, तद् यथाशब्दमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, शब्दश्च उभयमपि ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादयति, अकृत्स्नप्रसक्तिं निरवयवत्वं च, लौकिकानामपि मणिमन्त्रौषधिप्रभृतीनां देशकालनिमित्तवैचित्र्यवशात् शक्तयो विरुद्धानेककार्यविषया दृश्यन्ते, ता अपि तावन्नोपदेशमन्तरेण केवलेन तर्केणावगन्तुं शक्यन्ते, अस्य वस्तुन एतावत्य एतत्सहाया एतद्विषया एतत्प्रयोजनाश्च शक्तय इति, किमुताचिन्त्यस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं विना शब्देन न निरूप्येत, तथा चाहु: पौराणिकाः 'अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत्, प्रकृतिभ्यः परं यच्च तदचिन्त्यस्य लक्षणम्' इति, तस्मात् शब्दमूल एव अतीन्द्रियार्थयाथात्म्याधिगमः' Thus Brahman's स्वरूप being अचिन्त्यस्वभावयुक्त there is no विरोध. What seems impossible to us becomes possible in the case of Brahman. Thus has the Sûtrakâra set aside कार्यकारणविरोध; so, follow-

This view, thus it appears, is in perfect harmony with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. Nimbârka and Râmânuja also favour this view. S'aṇkara's निर्विशेषाग्रह does not seem to have any connection with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. This view is supported by the fact that none of the Vedânta writers accept S'aṇkara's view of निर्विशेष Brahman to be the view of the Sûtrakâra.

Thus, according to Bâdarâyaṇa, the same Brahman is both निर्विशेष and सर्वधर्मयुक्त. Sankara's theory of निर्गुण पर and सगुण अपर Brahman is further shaken off by Bâdarâyaṇa in 3-2-21, and the Sûtras following. There the question is raised whether there is any पर greater Brahman than which has been described before. The answer given to this question in the following Sûtras is in the negative. Not only is this Brahman the highest, but another its equal is prohibited. Thus the same Brahman which is उभयलिंग is the highest. 'परमतः सेतून्मानसम्बन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्य' × × सामान्यात्तु' × × 'उपपत्तेश्च' 'तथान्यप्रतिषेधात्' 3-2-31,32,33,34 35,36. Dr. Thibaut[1] agrees with the view that S'aṇkara's theory of Saguna and Nirguṇa Brahman is not recognized by the Sûtrakâra, but he thinks that S'aṇkara by recognizing Saguṇa and Nirguṇa Brahmans gives scope to all sorts of divergently conflicting श्रुति texts. But this sounds rather strange. To say that S'aṇkara understood or harmonised the Upanishads better than Bâdarâyaṇa is placing the cart before the horse. S'aṇkara's lower Brahman being a creature of nescience, a non-entity in the highest sense, the scope given to सविशेष श्रुतिs is also illusive. Bâdarâyaṇa does not even dream of such a method, a fact evidenced by the absence of any Sûtra quoted by S'aṇkara in support of this theory. If in

1. *Vide* Vedanta Sûtra I. Introduction. p. 128. Sacred Books of the East.

numerous places the Upanishads describe Brahman by contrary attributes, Bâdarâyana like a true Vaidic, with the great regard that he had for the letter of the Veda, without subjecting one set to another, or accepting one set and rejecting another, refers both the sets to the same Brahman, and says that it is the highest When the विरोध is pressed against him, he falls back on the letter of the Veda as in 2-1 27, 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्,' saying that Brahman is to be learnt only from scriptures, and that independent reasoning as such has nothing to do with it. Thus it will be seen that Dr. Thibaut's claim for S'ankara that he gives scope to all the श्रुतिs is very weak. Bâdarâyana decidedly has done better justice to all the श्रुतिs by referring them to one and the same Brahman, while S'ankara's insistence on the निर्विशेष श्रुतिs alone has rendered his conception of Brahman open to the charge that it owes its origin not to Veda or Sûtras of Bâdarâyana but to Buddhism (*Vide* Bhaskara's भाष्य p. 124)

Thus it will be seen that the investigation of the Sûtrakâra refers to Brahman which is सर्वधर्मयुक्त and सर्वशक्त्युपेत and therefore कर्तृ, but not to निर्विशेष Brahman as S'ankara repeatedly says Except Bhâskara, all the Bhâshyakâras are almost agreed with the view expressed above, and even Bhâskara's निर्विकल्पकाग्रह is very mild as compared to that of S'ankara. Vallabha's commentator truly remarks — 'अतोऽन्यनिषेधो यो वर्तते स सर्वं मप्रगोऽन्तर्निवेश्येतर निषेधति, न तु सर्वं मिथ्यात्वस्येति सुधीभिरवधेयम्,' p. 953. Anu Bhâshya Prakâsa B. S S.

Bâdarâyana has established that Brahman whose investigation he has undertaken, and whose definition he has given in 'जन्माद्यस्य यत' is possessed of wonderful powers, creates the universe etc, for its sport, is कर्तृ S'ankara wants to refer the कर्तृत्व not to Brahman but to अविद्या, the

reasons for this being विषमता and निर्घृणता Here also he departs from the lines of the Sutrakara The Sûtrakâra considers this question in 'वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात् तथाहि दर्शयति' 3 2 27 Bâdârayana says that Brahman is not to be charged with partiality or cruelty, for it allots fruits according to धर्माधर्म, Brahman is कर्मसापेक्ष, Veda teaches so Though here the Sûtrakâra gives धर्माधर्मसापेक्षत्व as the reason why Brahman is neither विषम nor निर्घृण, he feels conscious of the difficulty that if Brahman were to *allot fruits according to* धर्माधर्म *its* स्वातन्त्र्य *would to that* extent be controlled by it and so far its ईश्वरत्व 'सर्वस्य वशी, सर्वस्येशान etc, would be limited Hence to avoid this objection he says in फलमत उपपत्ते that Brahman alone allots fruits and not धर्माधर्म *Giving fruits according to* धर्माधर्मs Brahman is not controlled by them This seems to be the reasoning of Bâdarayana Of course he says जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, and hence it is possible for Brahman to allot fruits according to कर्मs but then the difficulty arises-if the जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि how is Brahman to create it ? To this his reply is that श्रुति and स्मृति teach both After removing this doubt, he cuts short the argument by the Sûtra सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च meaning thereby that Brahman is possessed of all धर्मs, and that is in fitness of things श्रुति word is Bâdarâyana s shelter in case of difficulty, while S'ankara's is अविद्या S ankara's interpretation of these Sûtras is correct, though according to the reasoning of S ankara's system the answer would be different According to S ankara's reasoning there is no question of वैषम्य and नैघृण्य Brahman's कर्तृत्व is आविद्यक hence its फलदातृत्व much more so, happiness and misery are आविद्यक, and the human soul is also a creature of nescience How does Brahman become joined with अविद्या? Of this the Sûtras give no trace Even S ankara does not give any reason for this, as is remarked by Dr Deussen —"In reality (परमार्थेन,) there is

nothing else besides Brahman alone If we imagine we perceive a transformation (विकार) of Him into the world, a division (भेद) of Him into a plurality of individual souls, this depends on अविद्या But how does this happen? How do we manage to deceive ourselves into seeing a transformation and a plurality, where in reality Brahman alone is? On this question our authors give us no information ' System of Vedanta p 302 Bādarāyana does not give any information on this point, because as shown above, he does not hold this view, and S'aṅkara does not give any reason because it is not possible to do so Hence Dr Deussen's remark 'But the system gives no real ground for this assumption' (S V. p 303) can be applicable only to S'ankara's reasoning When Jiva's कर्तृत्व is due to Brahman (परात्तु तच्छ्रुते) when Brahman is itself the source from which all activities flow, how can Brahman be अकर्तृ? Since Brahman is unfettered by anything like अविद्या, माया, प्रकृति etc , at will it becomes कर्तृ or अकर्तृ Hence Bādarāyaṇa's system is not to be charged with अनिर्मोक्षप्रसंग neither his Brahman is to be charged with partiality or cruelty, for Brahman's creation is आत्मसृष्टि आत्मकृति or लीलासृष्टि One can not be unjust to one's self one cannot be said to be unjust or cruel, if one were to do anything for the sake of fun, लीला, similarly Brahman cannot be said to be unjust or cruel towards its own creation created for the sake of लीला only

Thus the Brahman whose investigation Bādarāyana has undertaken is—possessed of all धर्म [1] all wonderful powers,[2] it is independent doer,[3] attā,[4] it is untouched[5] by the short-comings of the Jivātman, it resides in the heart,[6]

1 सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च 2-1-37 2 सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात् 2-1-30 3 जन्माद्यस्य यतः 1-1 2 4 अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् 1 2 9 5 संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात् 1 2 21 6 गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात् 1 2 11

it is अदृश्यत्वादिगुणक,[1] it is रूपवत्;[2] it is अन्तर्यामिन्,[3] it is भूमन्,[4] it is अङ्गुष्ठमात्र,[5] it is वैश्वानर,[6] it is प्रादेशमात्र[7] and व्यापक, it is दहर,[8] it is सत्[9] चिद्,[10] आनन्द[11] It is everything[12] It is[13] beyond प्रकृति, माया, अविद्या, शरीर, शक्ति, etc Gunas of प्रकृति,[14] etc, have *no* सम्बन्ध *with it, hence it is* निर्गुण It is जगत्स्वप्नकर्तृ,[15] it is आनन्दमय,[11] it is the support[16] of heaven and earth, these attributes are divine The subject[14] of negative श्रुतिस has reference to attributes of प्रकृति etc The negative श्रुतिस do not deny the divine attributes of Brahman spoken of in other Vedic passages.

This Brahman whose investigation Bâdarâyana has undertaken, and in whom harmony of all the Vedic passages (समन्वय[17]) has been worked out by him, for its own sport,[18] develops[19] itself into Jadajivâtmaka universe, without undergoing the least change,[20] and without ceasing to be निरवयव It alone shapes,[21] and names the Jadajivâtmaka universe making it Nâmarupâtmaka also Just as Brahman, by its mysterious powers, makes सदश and चिदंश *perceptible, while* आनन्दांश *imperceptible, thus* developing itself into जडजीवात्मकप्रपञ्च, similarly by making

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1 अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः 1 2 21 2 रूपोपन्यासाच्च 1 2 23 3 अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् 1 2·18 4 भूमा सम्प्रसादादध्युपदेशात् 1 3 8 5 शब्दादेव प्रमित 1 3 24 6 वैश्वानर साधारणशब्दविशेषात् 1 2 24 7 आमनन्ति चैनमस्मिन् 1 2 32 8 दहर उत्तरेभ्य 1 3 14 9 जन्माद्यस्य यत 1 1 2 10 ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् 1 1 5 11 आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् 1 1 11 12 सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् 1 2·1 13 गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् 1 1 7 14 प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूय 3 2 22 15 कम्पनात् 1 3 39 16 द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् 1 3 1 In वैश्वानराधिकरण, वैश्वानर is described as प्रादेशमात्र and अभिविमान according to scripture 1 2 32 This also goes to show that there is no विरोध in Brahman if the contradictions are sanctioned by Veda because the स्वरूप of Brahman *is* शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्य *Sankara s interpretation of these two words is forced* and consequently is rejected by Ramanuja Bhaskara Vallabha Madhva Deussen and others 17 तत्तु समन्वयात् 1 1 4 18 लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम् 2 1 33 19 आत्मकृतेः परिणामात् 1 4 26 20 श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् 2 1 27 21 संज्ञामूर्तिक्लृप्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात् 2 4 20

imperceptible the सर्वरूपत्व and सर्वनामत्व, develops एकरूपत्व and एकनामत्व producing thus an infinite beautiful variety. Giving fruits to Jîvas according to their कर्म, Brahman is not controlled by them. In becoming ईश्वर, it does not become partial or cruel. Brahman is शब्दमूल. Ratiocination has nothing to do with it. On the strength of the letter of the Veda, this Brahman, all-pervading[1] as it is, is to be reached from whence there is no return. It is one and infinite. It is everything. S'ankara's theory negativing everything in Brahman cannot be supported by any of the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. Bâdarâyana's view seems to be to affirm that Brahman is everything, rather than to deny everything of Brahman.

HUMAN SOUL.

It has been shown that so far as the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana are concerned, one fails to find any trace of the theory of 'निर्विशेष' higher Brahman and सविशेष lower सगुण Brahman, that all the passages of the Upanishads describing Brahman as 'नेति नेति' or 'सर्वकर्मा,' etc., refer to the same Brahman, and the विरोध between these two sets of Vedic passages, transforms itself into a विरोधाभास the moment तर्क as such is dismissed from our consideration, and the letter of the Veda is with implicit faith (श्रद्धा) followed, without the least attempt to better or modify its natural significance, and thereby accepting Brahman to be possessed of wonderful powers विचित्र शक्ति and all attributes 'सर्वधर्म's; or if one fails to see his way to अचिन्त्यैश्वर्ययुक्त ब्रह्मन्, then he may set aside the विरोध by referring the negative Vedic passages to 'प्राकृत' or 'लौकिक' पदार्थs and the affirmative to 'दिव्य' divine ones, as is suggested by Râmânuja, Nimbârka, or even by Vallabha in 'प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूय.' 3-2-22. V. S., thus giving equal

1. अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् 4-4-22.

scope to both sets of Vedic passages without following Sankara's method of subordinating the affirmative to the negative ones, a method which on its face is not justified by the fact that the Vaidikas like Bâdarâyaṇa are always anxious to revere all the Vedic passages whether like नेति नेति or like 'सत्य' with the same reverence

Now let us take up the consideration of the human soul-Jivâtman. The whole body of the Vedânta Sûtras dealing with the nature of the Jivâtman, is to be found in the third pâda of the second chapter of the Brahmamîmâṁsâ (2 3-16 53) Bâdarâyaṇa begins thus —In चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात् तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्त तद्भावभावित्वात् 2 3 16, it is said that birth, death etc , refer to the body of the human soul In 'नात्माऽश्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्य', it is taught that Jivâtman has no उत्पत्ति Vedic passages deny the 'उत्पत्ति of Jivâtman, they on the contrary teach the नित्यत्व of Jiva In 'ज्ञोऽत एव' 2 3-18, it is taught that Jiva, though by nature चेतन, is a 'ज्ञाता,' on the authority of the Veda. Sankara's insistence that Jiva is only 'चैतन्यस्वरूप' and not a knower goes directly against the wording of the Sûtra. In Sûtras 2-3 19 28, it is taught that Jivâtman is of the size of an atom, because 'उत्क्रान्ति, गति and आगति' are spoken of him in the Veda even if उत्क्रान्ति be otherwise explained, the गति and आगति do refer to Jivâtman as such, that श्रुति passages describing Jivâtman as non-Aṇu describe him as such in his capacity of Brahman, where Jivâtman's Brahmanhood is to be emphasized, there only he is described as non anu विभु Vedic passages do teach Aṇutva of Jivâtman as well as suggest it, the objection that the चैतन्य of Jivâtman as he is atomic cannot be 'सर्वशरीरव्यापि' pervading the whole body, does not stand Just as चन्दन though applied to one part produces coolness in the whole body, similarly the चैतन्य of Jivâtman, atomic as he is, spreads over the whole body, like chandana, Jivâtman has his abode—in the heart, the Vedic passages

teach the same thing On the analogy of the diamond or the lamp, also the Jîvâtman's चैतन्य spreads over the whole body These latter instances seem to be given because some one might urge that minute particles produce coolness in the case of chandana, and that the Jîvâtman has no particles, hence just as the light of a diamond spreads over a wider space than is occupied by the diamond, in the same way even though the Jîvâtman resides in the heart, his chaitanya spreads over the whole body 'गुण cannot exist without द्रव्य, hence, if the Jîvâtman resides in the heart, and is of the size of an atom, his chaitanya would not be सर्वशरीरव्यापि, this objection is set aside by Bâdarâyana on the analogy of गन्ध [1] Vedic passages also teach the aṇutva of the Jîvâtman The श्रुति passage, प्रज्ञया शरीरं समारुह्य' teaches that by चैतन्यगुण the Jîvâtman pervades the whole body Hence the conclusion is that the Jîvâtman is of the size of an atom Why is the Jîvâtman then said to be विभु, etc, if it is reallyaṇu? If the Jîvâtman is really different from Brahman, why is तत् त्वमसि etc, taught by the Vedic passages'? These questions the author of the Sûtras answers in 'तद्गुणसारत्वात् तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्' 2 3-29 The Jîvâtman is described as विभु Brahman, etc because he derives these attributes from Brahman on the analogy of the प्राज्ञ Just as the प्राज्ञ, though a सुषुप्तिसाक्षिन्, is, in Brihadâraṇyaka, described as possessing the attributes like अपहतपाप्मत्व, etc, which are Brahman's असाधारणधर्मs, similarly when the महत्त्व of the Jîvâtman is to be emphasised, he is described as विभु etc This is the interpretation favoured by Nimbârka and Vallabha, and it is strengthened by the preceding Sûtra 'नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात्' 2 3 23, where विभुत्व, etc, are said

1 Modern science may detect a flaw in this reasoning but Bâdarayana's view is clear He wants to say that the Jîvâtman's residence in the heart, his aṇutva and his सर्वशरीरव्यापि चैतन्य are all possible



to be attributed to the Jîvâtman to declare his Brahmanhood. Hence, according to Bâdarâyana, the Jîvâtman is *anu*, when in Brahmabhâva he experiences विभुत्व, etc, on account of his Brahmanhood Râmânuja, Madhva, Nimbârka and S'reekantha all accept the Jîvâtman to be *anu*

S'ankara interprets the Sûtras 2 3-19-28 as belonging to पूर्वपक्ष, and 2-3 29 — 'तद्गुणसारत्वात् तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्' as a सिद्धान्त सूत्र refuting and rejecting the Jîvâtman's *anutva* and accepting his विभुत्व With some reservation, Bhâskara follows S ankara and Vijnana Bhikshu, though breaking the adhikarana from पृथगुपदेशात्', says that Jiva's *anutva* is due to उपाधि S ankara explains the Sûtra thus —the first 'तद्' of the Sûtra 2 3 29 refers to 'बुद्धि उपाधि,' etc, and the second 'तद्' to अणुत्व, etc, that the Jîvatman through the adjuncts of बुद्धि उपाधि, etc, is described as *anu*, just as the 'प्राज्ञ', the supreme soul, though devoid of any विशेषs, is described as possessed of all धर्मs, and called सर्वज्ञ सर्वशक्तिमत्, etc, which are ब्रह्मलिङ्गs S ankara's interpretation has one advantage over that of Râmânuja Madhva, and S reekantha in the fact that he explains the instance of 'प्राज्ञ' somehow, while the other writers fail to make out much of it In fact, they seem to have lost sight of its importance Dr Thibaut has also neglected to consider its importance But Vallabha manages to interpret it, in an exactly opposite way, by showing the appropriateness of the instance He says, just as प्राज्ञ who is merely a सुषुप्ताभिमानिन्, who is not Brahman, is attributed ब्रह्मधर्मs on account of his Brahmanhood, so the Jîvatman on account of his Brahmanhood is described as विभु etc, though he is अणु Vallabha's explanation has this advantage that he has not to add words like बुद्धि or उपाधि which are never suggested in any of the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana either preceding or following this Sûtra. Bhâskara's reference to 'विज्ञानमनसी'

2 3 15, in support of his reference of first 'तद्' to उपाधि, does *not improve the case by the absence of any reason for* translating 'विज्ञानमनसी' not as इन्द्रियs but बुद्धि and उपाधि The distance between the two Sûtras suggests an inference against Bhâskara

But S'ankara's arguments in favour of विभुत्व deserve to be considered independently He observes in 2 3 29, 'नैतदस्ति अणुरात्मेति, उत्पत्त्यश्रवणात्, परस्यैव तु ब्रह्मण प्रवेशश्रवणात्, तादात्म्योपदेशाच्च परमेव ब्रह्म जीव इत्युक्तम्, परमेव चेद् ब्रह्म जीवस्तस्माद् यावत्पर ब्रह्म, तावानेव जीवो भवितुमर्हति, परस्य च ब्रह्मण विभुत्वमाम्नातम्, तस्माद् विभु जीव' S'ankara thus advances three arguments in favour of the Jivâtman's विभुत्व, *viz*, (1) उत्पत्त्यश्रवण, (2) परस्यैव ब्रह्मण प्रवेश, (3) तादात्म्योपदेश It is worthy of note that none of these arguments *find any support from the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana* The first argument, which S'ankara gives, in favour of the विभुत्व of the Jivâtman, has been used by Bâdarâyana to establish the eternity of the human soul, hence it cannot be taken to be conclusive The denial of उत्पत्ति does not conclusively prove that the Jivâtman is विभु It cannot be said because Jiva's उत्पत्ति has been denied, it is Brahman, and hence विभु, The very argument goes against S'ankara's view of अविद्या which he accepts to be without उत्पत्ति—अनादि It cannot be said because अविद्या has no उत्पत्ति it is ब्रह्मन् To this, it may be urged on behalf of S'ankara that the acceptance of any duality being opposed to the प्रतिज्ञा of 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्वं, विज्ञानम्, the नित्यत्व suggested by the denial of उत्पत्ति, results in अभेद—ब्रह्मन्, while अनादित्व alone suggests मिथ्यात्व as in the case of अविद्या, that is, there cannot be two things eternal hence the नित्यत्व of Jiva, taught by the Sûtrakâra, teaches that Jiva is Brahman, and hence विभु while अविद्या though अनादि has an end, hence it is मिथ्या

To this argument, an answer is furnished from the Sutras of Bâdarâyana. Even accepting the Jivâtman to

be नित्य and अणु there is no विरोध of the प्रतिज्ञा of 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्' This प्रतिज्ञा can be fulfilled by accepting the Jivâtman to be an अंश of Brahman, as taught by Bâdarâyana later on in अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्, etc, or by taking the human soul to be a शक्ति of Brahman as done by Nimbârka or प्रकार or विशेषण by Râmânuja, and by taking the अंश jiva to be अनन्य with Brahman on the principle laid down by the Sûtrakâra in 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य 2 1-14 The अंश according to Badarâyana, is अनन्य with अंशिन् Brahman, the शक्ति is अनन्य with शक्तिमत् Brahman, the विशेषण is अनन्य with विशेष्य Brahman, hence the knowledge of अंशिन् Brahman includes the knowledge of अंश Jivatman The प्रतिज्ञा on the other hand goes radically against S'ankara's views because it can be possible of fulfilment only when there is 'one' and 'all, and that 'one' is 'all' The difficulty arising from the Vedic passages teaching the निरवयवत्व of Brahman can well be answered on the principle laid down by Bâdarâyana in श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2 1 27 Thus the denial of the उत्पत्ति of the human soul cannot be worked out to prove that jiva is Brahman विभु *It cannot be taken to be the view of the author of the Sûtras*

The second argument of S'ankara is based on a passage from the छान्दोग्य (VI), अनेन जीवेन आत्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि Para Brahman's entrance is taught in this श्रुति hence says S'ankara, that the Jivâtman is the same as Para Brahman—विभु According to the reasoning of S'ankara, in the first place, there can be no प्रवेश, the परब्रह्मन् being व्यापक Nor can we interpret प्रवेश in the sense of संयोग, for Brahman being व्यापक inside and outside the सृष्टि, even without the declaration of प्रवेश Brahman could have developed names and forms With this श्रुति if we read 'द्वा सुपर्णा श्रुति teaching co existence of Brahman and Jiva, the sense

that can be made out is this, that the Supreme enters with the Jivâtman, and then develops names and forms The difficulties, presented by the अद्वैतश्रुतिs and व्यापकत्वश्रुतिs, can be answered by Bâdarâyana on the authority of 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2 1 27. Hence the argument of Para Brahman's प्रवेशश्रवण is not conclusive on the point of Jiva's विभुत्व.

The third argument of S ankara is तादात्म्योपदेश This argument is based on the passage of the छान्दोग्य which runs thus —'स एष अणिमा ऐतदात्म्यं इद सर्वं, तत् सत्य स आत्मा तत् त्वम् असि ' It is taught by Uddâlaka to his son S vetaketu. This argument is on the whole stronger than the two preceding ones But even here one cannot say that this तादात्म्योपदेश is in the sense of S ankara The तत्' of तत् त्वमसि as[1] Ranga Ramânuja remarks, refers to ऐतदात्म्य The Vedic passage has been spoken with a view to teach श्वेतकेतु 'the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one' With this end in view Uddâlaka teaches his son that इद सर्वं —this whole visible universe is ऐतदात्म्य—a प्रकार of सद् it is सत्य because सद् is its आत्मा, श्वेतकेतु thou art that—ऐतदात्म्य—, a प्रकार of सद्, तत् being a pronoun refers to the noun ऐतदात्म्य But apart from this, the fact remains that Jiva as such is not Brahman, then why does श्रुति say so ? To the Vaidika the letter of the Veda is all in all. Its authoritativeness cannot be questioned by him

According to S ankara 'तत् त्वम् असि is possible thus तत् refers to Brahman, freed from अविद्या and its products i.e. omniscience, omnipotence etc , while त्वम् refers to the human soul, freed from अविद्या and its adjuncts अल्पज्ञत्व, अणुत्व अंशत्व कर्तृत्व, etc Thus in both तत् and त्वम् a लाक्षणिक secondary sense is to be preferred in perfect disregard of the अभिधा—primary sense S ankara's preference for secondary

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If the reasoning above adopted is correct, then S'ankara's remark, 'तस्माद् दुर्ज्ञानत्वाभिप्रायमिदमणुत्ववचनमुपाध्यभिप्राय वा द्रष्टव्यम्', has no bearing whatever so far as the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa are concerned It also follows from what has been said above that S'ankara's interpretation of the next three Sutras 2 3 30 31 32 does not seem to bring out the view of the Sûtrakâra The Sûtrakâra nowhere suggests this बुद्धिसंयोग or उपाधिसंयोग The Sûtra, 'यावदात्मभावित्वाच्च न दोष तद्दर्शनात्,' is not very clear The objection why low हीन-Jiva is said to be the highest Brahman is set aside by saying that once the Brahmanhood of the Jivâtman becomes manifest, he continues for ever to experience Brahmatva and with it विभुत्व also It is well said —

'व्यापकत्वश्रुतिस्तस्य भगवत्त्वेन युज्यते।
आनन्दाद्याभिव्यक्तौ तु तत्र ब्रह्माण्डकोटय ।
प्रतीयेरन् परिच्छेदो व्यापकत्व च तस्य तत् ॥

Aṇu Bhaśya 2 3 30.

The Brahmanhood—विभुत्व etc, before the Jivâtman experiences ब्रह्मभाव, is latent in him, in the state of ब्रह्मत्व, विभुत्व, etc, develop in him on the analogy that पुंस्त्व which is *latent in a child develops in him when he attains puberty.* 'पुंस्त्वादिवत् तु अस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् 2 3 31 The next Sûtra confirms this view Hence the Jivatman according to *Bâdarâyaṇa is* अणु *and not* व्यापक *or* विभु *as S'ankara says*, the Jivâ man is spoken of as Brahman in a secondary sense so long as he is in संसारदशा but when he is in मुक्तिदशा, when *his* ब्रह्मत्व *becomes* प्रकट—*his* ब्रह्मत्वव्यपदेश *is* मुख्य वृत्त—in primary sense Thus it appears that S'ankara has clearly misunderstood the Sutra 2 3 29 Regarding this Dr Thibaut also observes 'Now, *in the first place*, nothing in context warrants the explanation of the first '*tu*' by *buddhi* And— which is more important—in the second place, it is more than *doubtful whether according*

to S'ankara's own system the qualities of the Buddhi such as pleasure, pain × × etc., can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the saṃsāra state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to S'ankara's system, is knowledge or intelligence, whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential, or, more strictly, unreal, false. (Vedanta Sûtra 1 page 55) Hence S'ankara is not right in turning the जीवाणुत्वबोधक Sûtras as belonging to पूर्वपक्ष.

The next adhikarana, consisting of Sûtras 33 to 39, establishes that the Jivâtman is a kartâ. In support of the Jivâtman's *kartritva*, the Sûtrakâra gives the following reasons —(1) शास्त्रार्थवत्त्व, (2) विहारोपदेश, (3) करणोपादान and (4) क्रियाव्यपदेश The 'च' in the Sûtra 2-3-36, 'व्यपदेशाच्च क्रियायां न चेन्निर्देशविपर्यय' ends the list of reasons given by the Sûtrakâra in support of the Jivâtman's *kartritva*. The next three Sûtras deal with the question how it is that Jiva who is a kartâ does sometimes good or bad to himself. The Sûtra says just as the eye sees pleasant as well as unpleasant objects, so the Jivâtman does actions which are sometimes beneficial or harmful to himself, because his powers are crippled, and he has no समाधि which helps one to perceive what is हित or अहित 'उपलब्धिवदनियम,' 'शक्तिविपर्ययात्', 'समाध्यभावाच्च,' 2-3-37-38-39. The 'च' in the last Sûtra, 'समाध्यभावाच्च' ends the list of reasons given for हिताहितकरण. After once referring the Sûtra 'उपलब्धिवदनियम' to हिताहितकरण-दोष, S'ankara's referring the next Sûtra 'शक्तिविपर्ययात्' to refute Buddhi's kartritva, and then again the last Sûtra समाध्यभावाच्च' to show that the Jivâtman is a kartâ, is rather forced. The propriety of 'च' comes in the way, and Bâdarayâna's reading 'समाध्यभावाच्च' instead of 'समाधिभावाच्च' is also a difficulty to meet which we have to strain ourselves to make out the sense.

The next Sûtra is 'यथा च तक्षोभयथा' 2 3 40 It is very important. The diversity in the interpretations of this Sûtra by different Bhâshyakâras has enhanced our interest in it. S'ankara in this Sûtra puts forth the view that the *kartritva* of the Jivâtman, established by Bâdarayâna in the previous adhikarana, is not Jivâtman's स्वाभाविक *kartritva* but उपाधिनिमित्त, the Jivâtman's *kartritva* is a product of nescience; as a matter of fact, the human soul is अकर्ता With this end in view, S'ankara proceeds to interpret the Sûtra thus —The 'च' in the Sûtra is used in the sense of 'तु,' and thereby it refutes the view, put forth in the previous adhikarana that Jivatman is a स्वाभाविककर्ता The Jivâtman's कर्तृत्व, according to S'ankara, is not स्वाभाविक in the sense that heat is स्वाभाविक in fire, on the contrary as in the case of तक्षा who busies himself with the axe and other tools in his hands, and feels pain, but afterwards goes home, lays aside his axe and other tools, and in his natural state rejoicing and at ease feels pleasure, so too the soul as long as it is affected by the duality founded on ignorance, is busied in the state of dreaming and waking and feels pain, but when it enters into itself to throw off weariness into the highest self, it is freed from the complexity of the organs of work, is not an agent and feels pleasure in the state of deep sleep, it is the same in the state of liberation where it is केवल, reposes and is happy after gloom of ignorance is driven away by the torch of knowledge. The simile of the carpenter is to be taken as follows — the carpenter is, in respect of various kinds of work such as fitting, etc , and with regard to certain tools such as his axe, etc , an agent, but not an agent so far as his body goes, so too the soul in its exertions with regard to the organs, *manas*, etc , is an agent, but not an agent with regard to his own self The soul, as opposed to the carpenter, has not like him, limbs with which it could take

up the organs, *manas*, etc., or lay them aside, as the carpenter with his hands takes up, and lays aside his tools.

Though this interpretation appears to have been worked out very ingeniously, it is nevertheless a forced one. How can it be for a moment supposed that Bâdarâyaṇa uses the 'च' in the sense of 'तु'? How can one convince the opponent that 'च' is used in the sense of 'तु'? It is more than probable that S'aṅkara is trying here to put forward a view that seems to have been never thought of by the Sûtrakâra. It is certain that this is not the view of the Sûtrakâra, and one cannot seriously dispute that S'aṅkara here is reading his own individual opinion into the Sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa. This opinion is strengthened by Dr. Deussen who, in his 'System of Vedânta' page 319, referring to S'aṅkara's taking 'च' in the sense of 'तु,' says thus:-'a remark which possibly hints at fundamental differences between Bâdarâyana and S'aṅkara.'

It is better to take the Sûtra as Râmânuja does, as a supplement to what has been said before. If the human soul were a स्वाभाविक कर्ता, as is taught in the preceding adhikaraṇa, then, says the opponent, he would always remain as such-कर्ता-and hence he would never be free from action. To such an objection this Sûtra furnishes an answer:-Just as a तक्षा even having with him an axe, etc., works or does not work at will, so the Jîvâtman even though possessed of organs of speech, etc., (वागादिकरणसंपन्न), at will works or does not work. Hence no अनिर्मोक्षप्रसंग.

Vallabha also considers this Sûtra to be a supplement to the theory of the Jîvâtman's कर्तृत्व propounded in the preceding Sûtras. According to him, the Jîvâtman is not only a *Kartâ* but a *Bhoktâ* also. It is not necessary, says [illegible]

does something, and enjoys it. Vallabha further says that कर्तृत्व by its very nature is not दुःखरूप—unpleasant; drinking milk, etc, is सुखरूप pleasant

In either case the view that the Jivâtman's कर्तृत्व is औपाधिक or आविद्यक, and that he is परमार्थत an अकर्ता is not accepted. Whether one accepts Râmânuja's or Vallabha's rendering, it does not matter much, both seem to be more natural than that of S'ankara.

It has been shown that S'ankara's rendering of the Sûtra, 'यथा च तक्षोभयथा' 2 3 40, is forced The Sûtra does not seem to consider the question whether the Jivatman's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभाविक or औपाधिक, but as Râmânuja remarks, this Sûtra teaches the कर्तृत्व or अकर्तृत्व of the Jivâtman at will, just as a carpenter works or takes rest at will. S'ankara cannot quote any Sûtra to prove the कर्तृत्व of the Jivâtman to be औपाधिक or आविद्यक This Sûtra cannot help him much If the Jivâtman's स्वाभाविक कर्तृत्व is to be questioned at all, it can be referred to be due to परब्रह्मन् on the authority of the next Sûtra, 'परात्तु तच्छ्रुते' 2-3 41, rather than to बुद्धि or उपाधि S ankara has, however, independently of the Sûtrakâra, advanced the following arguments against the Jivâtman's स्वाभाविक कर्तृत्व (1) If Jîva's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभाविक, then as अग्नि cannot be free from heat, so Jiva cannot be free from कर्तृत्व, hence अनिर्मोक्षप्रसंग (2) कर्तृत्व is दुःखरूप (3) मोक्षसिद्धि is referred to नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्त soul (4) Some श्रुति passages teach Jiva's कर्तृत्व to be आविद्यक For these reasons, says S'ankara, the Jivâtman is an अकर्ता

The first objection can be met by taking the interpretation of the Sûtra like Râmânuja. On the other hand, if बुद्धि's कर्तृत्व is insisted upon, then as बुद्धि is अचेतन, there can be no motive for भोगवाञ्छा, etc, hence कर्तृत्व would be नित्य Vallabha also advances the same arguments in different words He observes,—'न च सहजकर्तृत्वे

अनिर्मोक्षः, पराधीनकर्तृत्व एवैतदिति; सांख्यस्य तन्मतानुसारिणो वान्यस्य भ्रम एव, कर्तृत्वे न मुक्तिरिति, नपुंसक एवमुच्येतेति वाद्यवत्, निरिन्द्रियस्यैव समाधिरित्यपि, करणत्वेन बुद्धिवन्न केनापि दूष्यते, तस्मात् जीवस्य स्वाभाविकं कर्तृत्वम्, ध्यायतीव लेलायतीवेत्यपि परधर्मानुकरणम्। अयमप्येको धर्मः, स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योर्ब्रह्मव्यपदेशं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वविरुद्धं वदन् उपेक्ष्यः'. Again one fails to understand why S'ankara calls any sort of कर्तृत्व to be दुःखरूप. It depends on how one takes it. Considering कर्तृत्व to be दुःखरूप, imagining the existence of दुःख in आनन्दमय—all these go to suggest that S'aṅkara is influenced by deeply pessimistic leanings. When कर्तृत्व is taken in the light of the ब्रह्मविद्, when individual soul's कर्तृत्व is declared to be Brahman's, then there seems to be no valid objection. With great force does Vallabha observe in I-1-1:—'न च ब्रह्मरूपात्मविज्ञाने देहाद्यध्यासाभावेन कर्तृत्वाभावात् कर्मानधिकार इति वाच्यम्, निरध्यस्तैरेव देहादिभिः कर्मकरणसंभवात्, अत एव जीवन्मुक्तानां सर्वे व्यापाराः, तथाच स्मृतिः, 'नैव किञ्चित् करोमीति युक्तो मन्येत तत्त्ववित्, पश्यन् शृण्वन् स्पृशन् जिघ्रन् अश्नन् गच्छन् स्वपन् श्वसन्, प्रलपन् विसृजन् गृह्णन् उन्मिषन् निमिषन् अपि, इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्थेषु वर्तन्ते इति धारयन्, ब्रह्मण्याधाय कर्माणि संगं त्यक्त्वा करोति यः, लिप्यते न स पापेन पद्मपत्रमिवाम्भसा'. 'ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्म हविः ब्रह्माग्नौ ब्रह्मणा हुतं, ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकर्मसमाधिना'. These quotations from Geeta show how कर्मs are to be performed. They do not say that Jiva is an अकर्ता, but that he has to be a कर्ता with ब्रह्म by his side. The misery is due to अभिमान and not to कर्तृत्व. Hence Bâdarâyana teaches that Jiva's कर्तृत्व *is due to* पर-ब्रह्म.

The श्रुति passages can be explained otherwise. The quotation from छान्दोग्य does not teach कर्तृत्वाभाव, but that कर्तृत्व is due to आत्मन-ब्रह्म (7th प्रपाठक). Bâdarâyaṇa teaches the same in परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः 2-3-41. To add to all this, the Sûtrakâra *never suggests any of S'aṇkara's arguments*, but boldly goes on declaring Jiva's कर्तृत्व. Hence the most skilful advocate of S'aṅkara would fail on this point. Thus the Jivâtman's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभाविक.

If we follow S'ankara's reasoning, this दूषण of वैषम्य-नैर्घृण्य goes away. But then we have to cast aside the purport of all the Sûtras Hence Bâdarâyaṇa must have in his mind a view, which refutes this objection of वैषम्य, etc, and at the same time, is thoroughly consistent The difficulty can be solved in two ways —viz, (1) by referring this contradiction to Brahman's अचिन्त्यैश्वर्य and the letter of the Veda, the Veda teaches that Brahman gives fruits, it may be according to कर्म, or may not be, though giving fruits according to कर्म, Brahman is independent of कर्म, when Brahman gives fruits according to His sweet will, even then He is not liable to वैषम्य, etc, for Veda teaches so, (2) by taking the कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष not as जीवकृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष as all the आचार्य्स have done, but as पर—(ब्रह्म) कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष The advantage of taking the Sûtra this way is clear. We have not to bring in the word जीव from the drift of the प्रकरण, but from the Sutra just preceding According to this view, the whole सृष्टि becomes ब्रह्मप्रयत्न In आत्मकृते परिणामात् 1 4 26, it is taught that the सृष्टि is आत्मसृष्टि and आत्मकृति, in 2 1 33 'लोकवत्तु लीला कैवल्यम्', it is taught that this आत्मसृष्टि आत्मकृति is लीलाकैवल्यम्, in 2 3-43 'अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्', etc, it is taught that the Jivatman is an अंश of ब्रह्मन्, in पराभिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ 3 2 5, it is taught that the Jîvâtman's Brahmanhood is तिरोहित—has become latent—by the अभिध्यान of Brahman, and to Brahman are due bondage, etc Hence it appears that Brahman, for His own sport alone, out of His sweet will, develops Himself into Jada Jiva, and still remaining transcendent, determines that a particular Jivatman will do a particular action, and He will give him a particular fruit. So according to फलदानेच्छा, Brahman rules His अंशs, Jivas As अंशs they are अनन्य with ब्रह्म The human soul's position can be compared to an actor He has to play the part allotted to him in

ब्रह्मलीला; the happiness and misery trouble him so far as he forgets that his कर्तृत्व is Brahman's and not his own; in fact, happiness and misery are both creatures of Brahman, and cannot be said to be the criterions of deciding Brahman's partiality and cruelty; the moment the human soul realises that Brahman for His sport guides him to do this or that, he ceases to be miserable; his limited ideas of प्रियत्व vanish; he experiences 'साधूनां वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्'. Forgetting his own कर्तृत्व, and remembering Brahman's कर्तृत्व, the human soul ceases to be responsible for his so-called actions; he feels buoyant. Like Brahman, he sees in the लीला of Brahman आनन्द. The कर्तृत्व becomes thus a source of pleasure, आनन्द—and not a source of misery as S'ankara says. Brahman makes Jîva work according to His अभिध्यान and लीलार्थकृतप्रयत्न, otherwise His विहित and प्रतिषिद्ध would be purportless. The part allotted to Jîva by Brahman to play would be jeopardised. Thus this Jada-jîvâtmaka—Nâmarûpâtmaka—Srishti being आत्मपरिणाम-आत्मकृति, being Brahman's केवललीला, Brahman is not liable to the shortcomings of partiality and cruelty. The wording of the Sûtra, विहित-प्रतिषिद्ध—instead of विधिनिषेध—also helps us. In this way also, we have to deny in Jîva his अभिमान in कर्तृत्व, and emphasise that he is a creature guided by Brahman's will in all his actions. This seems to be the view of Bâdarâyana suggested from the Sûtras. With S'ankara we can deny Jîva's अभिमान in कर्तृत्व, but unlike him we prefer to refer all human activity to Brahman as source, and not to उपाधि बुद्धि, etc.

The section, consisting of Sûtras *2-3-43-53, deals with* the question of the relationship of the soul to Brahman. *According to* Bâdarâyana, *the* Jîvâtman *is the* अंश of Brahman; Brahman is अंशिन्, while the Jîvâtman is अंश. Like *master and servant, the human soul is not different from* Brahman, but like spark and fire, he is अनन्य with Brahman.

The Vedic mantra, पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि, and the Gita passage, 'ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूत. सनातनः,' teach that the Jivâtman is the अंश of Brahman. This is the view of the Sûtrakâra. However, S'aṇkara *does not like to accept this* view. Accordingly, S'ankara changes 'अंशः' into 'अंश इव'. To take अंश in the sense of 'अंश इव' is clearly modifying the view of Bâdarâyaṇa. Even though certain passages of the Upanishads declare Brahman to be निष्कल निरवयव, that does not justify us in rejecting the texts which teach the अंशत्व of the Jivâtman. Adopting the reasoning which Bâdarâyaṇa has worked out in 2-1-26-27—'कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा,' 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्', *the difficulty can be removed by accepting* Brahman's swarûpa to be निरवयव, and at the same time having अंशs. In a शब्दप्रमाणशास्त्र like this, reasoning as such has very little scope.

This view is not singular. In this view, Vallabha is with us when he observes -'ननु ब्रह्मणो निरवयवत्वात् कथं जीवस्यांशत्वमिति वाच्यम्, नहि ब्रह्म निरंशं सांशमिति वा क्वचिद् लोके सिद्धम्, वेदैकसमधिगम्यत्वात्, सा च श्रुति यथोपपद्यते तथा तदनुरोधेन वेदार्थविज्ञानार्थं युक्तिर्वक्तव्या, × × तत्रैषा युक्तिः—

विस्फुलिंगा इवाग्नेर्हि जडजीवा विनिर्गता ।
सर्वत पाणिपादान्तात् सर्वतोऽक्षिशिरोमुखात् ॥
निरिन्द्रियात् स्वरूपेण तादृशादिति निश्चय ।
सदंशेन जडा. पूर्वे चिदंशेनेतरे अपि ॥
अन्यधर्मतिरोभावान्मूलेच्छातोऽस्वतंत्रिण. ।

ब्रह्मवादे अंशपक्ष एव' 2-3-43. This seems to be a very fair view of interpreting Bâdarayaṇa's Sûtras. But in spite of what Bâdarâyaṇa and Vallabha might say, the fact remains that *this difficulty has been fruitful in producing numerous* theories as regards the relation of the human soul with Brahman. The very word अंश, though clearly meaning an अवयव, has been subjected to yield senses which, if not wrong, cannot be accepted to be correct, or at least cannot be *supposed to represent the true view of* Bâdarâyaṇa.

S'ankara has been honest in saying that he does not accept the theory that the Jîvâtman is अंश of Brahman, when he says that 'अंश' should be taken in the sense of 'अंश इव'. But other Âchâryas have worked, from the word 'अंश', a sense suitable to their views It need not be remarked that, according to Bâdarâyaṇa, अंश means a 'part'. The Vedic Mantra using the word 'पाद' also suggests the same thing Let us see what Bhâskara says. He remarks, 'अंशशब्द कारणवाची, यथा पटस्यांश तन्तुरिति', but this sense is not acceptable to him, and he remarks, 'तयोरिह ग्रहण न भवति, किन्तूपाध्यवच्छिन्नस्यानन्यभूतस्य वाचकोऽयमंशशब्द प्रयुक्तो यथाग्नेर्विस्फुलिङ्गस्य'. Thus, according to Bhâskara, अंश means उपाध्यवच्छिन्न अनन्यभूत निरवयव Brahman has अंश, the जीव, because the Vedic passage, 'यथाग्ने क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा', teaches so This अंश is भिन्नाभिन्न with Brahman, his अभिन्नत्व is स्वाभाविक, while भिन्नत्व is औपाधिक Bhâskara is right in remarking that the Jîvâtman is अंश of Brahman as spark is of fire, and that he is भिन्नाभिन्न because श्रुति and सूत्र support it, but he is wrong in saying that भिन्नत्व is औपाधिक, for the श्रुति passage quoted does not support it.

Râmânuja takes the word अंश in the sense of विशिष्टवस्त्वेकदेश, and so does S reekantha The relation between Brahman and the Jivâtman is that of विशेष्य and विशेषण

Nimbârka[1] takes अंश to mean शक्ति The Jîvâtman is a शक्ति of Brahman Hence, according to him the relation between the Jivâtman and Brahman is that of शक्ति and शक्तिमत्. S reekantha[2] also accepts this view

According to Madhva, अंशs[3] are different like sons and others, or non different like hands, feet, etc To the

1 अंशो हि शक्तिरूपो ग्राह्य 2 3 42 वेदान्तकौस्तुभ of S reenivâsa Nimbarka

2 Sir R Bhandarkar's Vaishnavism p 161

3 *Vide* Ramanuja s and S ree Kantha s Bhashyas on this Sutra and M adhva's Bhashya

formed कर्मठ actions To them the कर्माचरण was neither बंधरूप nor दुःखरूप nor आविद्यक, but a परकर्म—ब्रह्मकर्म They had a manifestation of ब्रह्म in कर्म 'कर्मसु ब्रह्माभिव्यक्ति' This seems to be the proper view of looking at the connection between the two Mîmânsâs, and it appears that Sânkara is perhaps driving at the same thing when he observes in 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' 1-1-4, 'न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं भवति, न च कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं भवति+++मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रत्यक्षं सबन्धहेतुः' So it follows, from what Bâdarâyana and S'ankara say, that देहाध्यासकर्तृत्व is a cause of misery, but then the कर्तृत्व without देहाध्यास—देहसबन्ध is not to be referred to अविद्या, बुद्धि or उपाधि as S'ankara says, but to Brahman—पर as Bâdarâyana says. Thus the performance of karmas, without देहाध्यास देहाभिमान, as ब्रह्मकर्म, produces in one ब्रह्माभिव्यक्ति in कर्म्स, and ब्रह्मज्ञान produces ब्रह्माभिव्यक्ति in ज्ञान The two Mîmânsâs thus help each other, and suggest the ideal of Brahman as ज्ञानक्रियाविशिष्ट, the क्रिया referring to सद्रूप, ज्ञान to चिद्रूप and the two together to आनन्दरूप, thus giving the full conception of सच्चिदानन्द ब्रह्मन This seems to be the view of Bâdarâyana, and we are unable to reconcile S'ankara's reasoning in 'तत्तु समन्वयात्', and the second interpretation of आनन्दमयाधिकरण with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana According to Bâdarâyana, the human soul can be free from misery, etc, only when he realises that he does not do anything, but Brahman *Para* does it—or makes him do it *Avidyâ* as such has no place in the system of Bâdarâyana

Then comes the Sûtra, 'आभास एव च'. This is read by Bhâskara as 'आभासा एव च' He rejects the reading of S'ankara with this remark —'आभासस्यावस्तुत्वाभ्युपगमादवस्तुन दशविपाण्कल्पस्याचेतनस्य कुतो बन्धो मोक्षो वा कर्माधिकारो वा। न च परमात्मन ससारित्वमस्तीत्युक्तं पुरस्तादतो नायं पाठ इति' Râmânuja wants to favour Bhâskara's reading, and renders it by हेत्वाभास. It matters little whether the Sûtra is read as 'आभास' or 'आभासा' From what has been said above, it is not possi-

ble that Bâdarâyana could have meant 'आभास' to refer to the Jivâtman's being a मिथ्या आभास of Brahman. Vallabha drives at the same thing, when he observes, 'ननु सच्चिदानन्दस्य ब्रह्मणोंश सच्चिदानन्द एव भवेदत कथ प्रवाहे प्रवेशो भगवतश्च सर्वकार्याणि तत्राह, आभास एव जीव, आनन्दांशस्य तिरोहितत्वात ×× न तु सर्वथा प्रतिबिम्बवन्मिथ्यात्व ×× अतो न मिथ्यात्वरूप आभासोत्र विवक्षित'.

Before concluding the जीवविचारणा, the Sûtra 1 4 22 may be considered S'ankara adopts the view of काशकृत्स्न — 'दर्शित तु पुरस्तात् काशकृत्स्नीयस्य पक्षस्य श्रुतिमत्त्वम् ×× काशकृत्स्नस्याचार्यस्याविकृत परमेश्वरो जीवो नान्य इति मतम्, आश्मरथ्यस्य तु यद्यपि जीवस्य परस्मादनन्यत्वमभिप्रेत तथापि प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिति सापेक्षत्वाभिधानात् कार्यकारणभाव कियानपि अभिप्रेत इति गम्यते, औडुलोमिपक्षे पुन स्पष्टमेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षौ भेदाभेदौ गम्येते, तत्र काशकृत्स्नीय मत श्रुत्यनुसारीति गम्यते, प्रतिपिपादयिषितार्थानुसारात् 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्य' S'ankara interprets काशकृत्स्नमत thus— 'अस्यैव परमात्मनोऽनेनापि विज्ञानात्मभावेनावस्थानादुपपन्नमिदमभेदेनोपक्रमणम्'. Râmânuja also takes काशकृत्स्न's view as सिद्धान्त view, and explains thus —'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् आत्मनोऽन्तर' इत्यादिना जीवात्मनि परमात्मन आत्मतया अवस्थिते Vallabha explains it thus —'भगवत एवावस्था जीव', but he takes काशकृत्स्न s view to be different from that of Bâdarâyana—'अवस्थया व्यवसायात् सिद्धान्ताद्विशेष' What ever may be said as regards the view of काशकृत्स्न it is certain that we cannot say with perfect confidence that it is the view of the Sûtrakara Bâdarâyana distinctly says that the Jiva is अज and hence to take काशकृत्स्न's view as that of Bâdarâyana, and to take it either in S ankara's sense or Râmânuja's sense is certainly a strain on the Sûtra When the scope of the वाक्यान्वयाधिकरण is considered, one sees that after establishing the ब्रह्मवाक्यत्व of मैत्रेयीब्राह्मण, Bâdarâyana quotes the opinions of these writers, viz, आश्मरथ्य, औडुलोमि and काशकृत्स्न, to show that according to their views also the ब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपादकत्व मैत्रेयीब्राह्मण is not बाधित Therefore it is not proper to work out Bâdarâyana's view that अविकृतब्रह्मन् is the same as जीव freed from अविद्या, etc, from काशकृत्स्न s view.

Hence the conclusion is that 'ब्रह्मैव अविद्याभ्रान्त जीव' is not the view of the Sûtrakâra, neither is the human soul a प्रतिबिम्ब nor an आभास of ब्रह्मन् in S'ankara's sense According to the Sûtrakara, the Jivâtman is अंश of Brahman as a spark of fire, *it is* अनन्य with Brahman, as अंश is with the अग्नि, still Brahman is अधिक, greater than the Jivâtman. The Jivâtman is a कर्ता inheriting his कर्तृत्व from Brahman He is नित्य He is अणु, but in the stage of ब्रह्मभाव, he experiences विभुत्व, etc , which *ever remain permanent, on* the analogy that the crown prince becomes the king It appears thus that Bâdarâyana accepts 'भेदसहिष्णुरभेद', and not S'ankara's absolute 'भेदासहिष्णुरभेद'. This conclusion is strengthened by the remark of Sir R Bhandarkar that S'ankara s system should be more fitly called 'Singularism', rather than Monism or Adwaitism *Vide* Vaishnavism, p 159

JAGAT.

The second Sûtra of Bâdarâyana gives the लक्षण of Brahman From this *definition of* Brahman we know that *according* to Bâdarâyana this universe is Brahman's कृति and परिणाम Brahman is both the material and the efficient *cause of the universe* It *is important to note* here that the definition of Brahman given by Bâdarâyana must be of the same Brahman whose investigation he has proposed to undertake in the first Sûtra 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा', that is, Brahman alone, pure and simple, whose investigation Bâdarâyana has undertaken, is the material as well as the efficient cause of this universe. Bâdarâyana again reverts to this question in 1 4 23 27. While refuting the Sânkhya's प्रकृतिकारणवाद, he elaborates his doctrine which he has expressed in brief before. The Sûtra 'प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्' 1-4 23 declares against the Sânkhya that Brahman is उपादान as well as

निमित्तकारण of the universe. The प्रतिज्ञा and दृष्टान्त of Uddâlaka naturally yield the same sense To support Brahman's कर्तृत्व and प्रकृतित्व, Bâdarâyana cites महान्‌s अभिध्या Brahman's ईक्षा, काम and बहुभवन support Brahman's उभयविधकारणत्व The श्रुति and स्मृति both teach that the universe has its प्रभव and प्रलय in Brahman This is also a reason why Brahman is both the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe The next Sûtra, 'आत्मकृते परिणामात् 1-4 26, throws much light on the system of Bâdarâyana Whether one takes 'आत्मकृते परिणामात्' as one Sûtra, or 'आत्मकृते' and 'परिणामात्' as two distinct Sûtras, the result is almost the same The Sûtra is based on a passage from the तैत्तिरीय 2 7. 'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत This passage suggests the कर्मत्व and कर्तृत्व of Brahman, 'आत्मानमिति कर्मत्वं स्वयमकुरुतेति कर्तृत्वम्' How can the 'पूर्वसिद्ध' *sat* Brahman be कर्तृ and कर्म ? The answer to this objection is 'परिणामात् The पूर्वसिद्ध *sat* आत्मा ब्रह्मन् developed itself into the universe Brahman is योनि Thus Brahman's प्रकृतित्व is प्रसिद्ध एव ब्रह्मण प्रकृतित्वं प्रसिद्धम् 1 4 27. Though Brahman is the material cause, it does not require a separate निमित्त as in the case of an earthen pot and a potter. In the world, one sees that the उपादान and निमित्त are always separate, but this rule has no bearing whatever here. The swarûpa of Brahman is to be learnt from Veda alone, and since Veda teaches that Brahman itself becomes the उपादान and निमित्त it should be accepted as such यत्पुनरिदमुक्तमीक्षापूर्वकं कर्तृत्वं निमित्तकारणेषु एव कुलालादिषु लोके दृष्टं नोपादानेष्वित्यादि, तत्प्रत्युच्यते न लोकवदिह भवितव्यम्, न ह्ययमनुमानगम्योऽर्थः, शब्दगम्यत्वात्त्वस्यार्थस्य यथाशब्दमिह भवितव्यम् शब्दश्चेक्षितुरीश्वरस्य प्रकृतित्वं प्रतिपादयतीत्यवोचाम' This is what S'ankara observes on 1 4 27. The interpretation of S ankara here is exactly in the spirit of Bâdarâyana Brahman with its ईक्षा develops itself into the universe and still remains transcendent Though the interpretation of S ankara on these Sûtras (1 4 23 27) is correct as it stands, the qualification which he has in his

mind and which he suggests by the use of the word 'ईश्वर' instead of Brahman, cannot be justified as legitimate. A Nimbârka writer *Keśavabhatta Kâshmîrin thus criticises* S'ankara:—'परमते तु तत्त्वं दुर्घटं, कार्यस्य कल्पितत्वांगीकारेण कुलालवदुपादानगोचरप्रयत्नचिकीर्षादिमत्त्वासम्भवात् × × दृष्टान्तासंभवादिति संक्षेपः. N. B. pp. 351-352. *The same writer then criticises* Râmânuja, 'केचित्तु चिदचिद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्मोपादानम् etc., pp. 352-353 N. B. Thus in order to emphasize अविकृतत्व of Brahman, Râmânuja and S'reekantha accepted चिदचिद्विशिष्टब्रह्मन् as उपादान, Bhâskara and Nimbârka accepted ब्रह्मन्'s शक्ति as उपादान, Madhva accepted प्रकृति to be the उपादान, Vijnanabhikshu *also accepted* प्रकृति *to be* the उपादान, the difference being that his प्रकृति is अविभक्त with Brahman, *and that it becomes the* उपादान under *the* उपष्टम्भ of Brahman, while ब्रह्मन् is only a साक्षिन्. Here it is quite clear that all these writers, though *modifying* the शुद्ध ब्रह्मन्'s उपादानता, do not reject it altogether. Now remain the two writers S'ankara and *Vallabha*. Their views are *entirely opposed. S'ankara by delegating Brahman's* उपादानता to the sphere of अविद्या rejects it, while Vallabha like *Bâdarâyana, following* strictly the letter of the Veda, accepts it out and out. In rejecting Brahman's उपादानता, S'*ankara* has to subject the whole body of the Vedânta Sûtras to a secondary sense. श्रुति teaches ब्रह्मपरिणाम and at the same time its अविकृतत्व. Bâdarâyana does not care for the objections based on तर्क if the letter of the श्रुति is strictly *followed*. This view is followed by Vallabha, who, like Bâdarâyana, gives greater weight to the word of the श्रुति *than to pure reason* शुष्क तर्क, when they *appear opposed to* each other. Other Achâryas have tried to follow Bâdarâyana with slight changes to satisfy reasons. It is only S'ankara who in rejecting 'शब्दबलेन विरोधपरिहार.' has chalked out lines of reasoning *which run in an entirely opposite direction*. Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar says the same in his recent book Vaishnavism etc., pp. 158-159, 160-161.

Drawing a distinction between Spinoza's Pantheism and Upanishad Pantheism he says—'Brahman is not exhausted in the world, but it exists separately also. But the objection to this view is that Brahman, being of the nature of spirit, is not like the body divisible into parts, so that one may become developed into the world and another remain outside, ×× This inconsistency is removed by Bâdarâyana in Brahmasûtras (2-1-26-27). The argument is that though the Upanishads state that the constituent cause of the world is Brahman, they at the same time affirm the existence of Brahman separately from the world. (Ch. U. III, 12 6 and VI, 3, 2) The two are inconsistent on the theory that Brahman is a spirit and not discerptible into parts Though they are thus inconsistent, they must both be accepted on the authority of the sacred texts, since the true nature of Brahman and the world is beyond the reach of human intellect This solution of the difficulty is inadmissible to non believers in the sacred texts, but it shows that Bâdarâyana does not agree with the latter part of Spinoza's definition of Pantheism, i e, according to him the sacred texts do not affirm that "God exists only as realised in the cosmos the cosmos exists only as a manifestation of God" The inconsistency pointed out by him is based on the impossible conception of Brahman's being divisible into parts But it will not arise if, instead of bringing in this conception, we suppose that in one aspect Brahman is the material or constituent cause of the world or realised in the world, and from another point of view it remains pure and becomes the object of contemplation and devotion. Whatever it may be, Bâdarayana's view appears to me to be correct, and the Pantheism of the Upanishads is not exactly the same as that formulated by Spinoza × × × ×

We have noticed above the manner in which Bâda

of the universe. Madhva, not accepting this, has failed to make out anything of the Brahma Sûtras. Sir R. Bhandârkar most accurately remarks, 'He denies his (Brahman's) being the material cause of the world. All the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana which set forth that doctrine have been interpreted by him in an entirely different way. Probably he would have set aside the Brahma Sûtras altogether, but he could not do so, since the work had acquired an uncontested authoritativeness as regards religious truth before his time He had therefore to show that his system did not go against the Brahma Sûtras and therefore accepted them and interpreted them in almost a fantastic manner. Texts from the Upanishads, too, which do not agree with his doctrines he treats similarly.' Vaishnavism S'aivism. p 58.

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of the universe Madhva, not accepting this, has failed to make out anything of the Brahma Sûtras Sir R Bhandârkar most accurately remarks, 'He denies his (Brahman's) being the material cause of the world All the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana which set forth that doctrine have been interpreted by him in an entirely different way Probably he would have set aside the Brahma Sûtras altogether but he could not do so, since the work had acquired an uncontested authoritativeness as regards religious truth before his time He had therefore to show that his system did not go against the Brahma Sutras and therefore accepted them and interpreted them in almost a fantastic manner Texts from the Upanishads, too, which *do not agree with his doctrines he treats similarly'* Vaishnavism S *aivism* p *58*

To a certain extent this remark of Sir R Bhandârkar applies to Vijnâna Bhikshu also The difference between Madhva and Bhikshu is this —Madhva wants to emphasize भक्त्युत्पादकब्रह्ममाहात्म्य, while Bhikshu is anxious to work out an अविरोध between the सांख्य, वैशेषिक योग and Vedanta etc an effort though praiseworthy, cannot be justified But the most important reason which led all the writers to modify the ब्रह्मकारणता of Bâdarâyana, is the fear of विकृति If Brahman were taken to be the material cause it would undergo change and consequently it would be अनित्य and cease to be Brahman नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्त To avoid this difficulty Sankara delegated Brahman's causality to अविद्या 'अविद्याकल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयेन ब्रह्म परिणामादिसर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते 2 1 27 Râmânuja for the same reason did not accept the ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणाम, and substituted चिदचिद्विशिष्टशरीर instead of pure Brahman of Bâdarâyana 'मृत्सुवर्णादिवद् ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणामस्तु नैवाभ्युपगम्यते, अविकारत्वनिर्दोषत्वादिश्रुते' 2 1 13 R B Anand Press II 23 Similar is the reasoning of Sreekantha Nimbârka and Bhâskara

for the same reason subsitute ब्रह्मशक्ति instead of Brahman, 'ब्रह्म स्वशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकार आत्मान परिणामयति' N. B. 347-57 परिणामो द्विविध, स्वरूपपरिणाम शक्तिविक्षेपलक्षणपरिणामश्च, ×× श्रीपुरुषोत्तम स्वात्मक-स्वाधिष्ठितनिजशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकार स्वात्मान परिणामयति' केशवभट्टकाश्मीरिन् & 'परिणामात् परिणामोऽत्र शक्तिविक्षेपरूपो, न तु स्वरूपपरिणामस्तस्मात् विकारसंभावना-वकाश इति' परपक्षगिरिवज्र p. 369. Thus according to Nimbârka writers, परिणाम is not Brahman's but its शक्ति s, the modification owing its existence to the fear of विकार. Similarly Bhâskara writes 'शक्तिविक्षेप कृतवान्' 1-4-25, p. 85 Bhâskara-Bhâshya

> 'अप्रच्युतस्वरूपस्य शक्तिविक्षेपलक्षण ।
> परिणामो यथा तन्तुनाभस्य पटतन्तुवत् ॥' 2-1-14.

'स हि स्वेच्छया स्वात्मान लोकहितार्थं परिणामयन् स्वशक्त्यनुसारेण परिणामयति' भास्करभाष्य 2 1 14 Thus Bhâskara also does not accept ब्रह्मपरिणाम Vijnânabhikshu for the same reason rejects Brahman's उपादानकारणता and substitutes अधिष्ठानकारणता of Brahman 'ब्रह्मणश्च स्वाविभक्तप्रकृत्याद्युपष्टम्भकत्व साक्षितामात्रेणेति जगत्कारणत्वे-ऽपि न ब्रह्मणो विकारित्व' भिक्षुभाष्य p 32 1 1 2 Madhva also for the same reason refuses to accept Brahman's उपादानकारणता. Vallabha only is an exception to this rule He accepts like Bâdarâyana that Brahman alone is the उपादानकारण Thus he accepts ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणाम In this he seems to be following Bâdarâyana as remarked by Sir R. Bhandârkar on pp 160 161, in Vaishnavism etc It has been shown above that according to Bâdarâyana, Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, in other words, this Jagat is ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम To this the Sânkhya raises an objection in 2 1-26 'कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्व शब्दकोपो वा' If Brahman were the material cause, then either there would be कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति, and hence मूलोच्छेद, or the निरवयवत्व-प्रतिपादक Vedic passages would have to be strained To this the answer furnished by the Sûtrakâra is very significant The Sûtrakâra says 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2 1-27 As श्रुति

not think, he would have proceeded to qualify the sense of the Sûtras after once explaining them accurately. And where S'aṅkara does not expressly qualify the sense of the Sûtra, his commentator does so. See भामती and [1]गोविन्दानन्द on [2]प्रकृत्यधिकरण. The Sankhya[3] begins by saying that as a rule cause and effect are similar, but since there is a dissimilarity between the cause Brahman which is चेतन, and the effect Jagat which is *jada*, Brahman cannot be the material cause of Jagat. To this Bâdarâyana replies that we do see an effect dissimilar to the cause, hence the objection does not stand. But here too we notice Bâdarâyana's tendency to reject independent reasoning and falling back upon the words of the श्रुति 'तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्' etc, 2-1-11.

The Sûtra 2-1-13 also is important. It deals with the question that even though the cause Brahman is the

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1. अत्र सूत्रे परिणामशब्दः कार्यमात्रपरः, न तु सत्यकार्यात्मकपरिणामपरः; 'तदनन्यत्वम्' इति विवर्तवादस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्। रत्नप्रभा. pp 341, 342 N. S. edition.

2. इयं चोपादानपरिणामादिभाषा न विकाराभिप्रायेणापि तु यथा सर्पस्योपादानं रज्जुरेवं ब्रह्म जगदुपादानं द्रष्टव्यम् etc, भामती pp. 342 343 N S edition.

3 In 2. 1. 4 'न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात्' S'ankara quotes a view of some one whom Govindânand calls एकदेशी thus —'योऽपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत श्रुत्वा जगतश्चेतनप्रकृतिकतां तद्बलेनैव समस्तं जगच्चेतनमवगमयिष्यामि, प्रकृतिरूपस्य विकारे अन्वयदर्शनात्, अविभावनं तु चैतन्यस्य परिणामविशेषाद् भविष्यति, यथा स्पष्टचैतन्यानामप्यात्मनां स्वापमूर्च्छाद्यवस्थासु चैतन्यं न विभाव्यते, एवं काष्ठलोष्ठादीनामपि चैतन्यं न विभावयिष्यते, एतस्मादेव च विभावितत्वाविभावितत्वकृताद्विशेषाद्रूपादिभावाभावाभ्यां च कार्यकारणानामात्मनां च चेतनत्वाविशेषेऽपि गुणप्रधानभावो न विरोत्स्यते, तथा च पार्थिवत्वाविशेषेऽपि मांससूपौदनादीनां प्रत्यात्मवर्तिनो विशेषात् परस्परवैलक्षण्यं भवत्येवमिहापि भविष्यति, प्रविभागप्रसिद्धिरप्यत एव न विरोत्स्यत इति। तेनापि कथंचिच्चेतनाचेतनत्वलक्षणं विलक्षणत्वं परिह्रियेत, शुद्ध्यशुद्धित्वलक्षणं तु विलक्षणत्वं नैव परिह्रियते'. In the 2 1 6, 'दृश्यते तु', S'ankara remarks on this view thus —योऽपि चेतनकारणश्रवणबलेनैव समस्तस्य जगतश्चेतनतामुत्प्रेक्षते तस्यापि 'विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च' इति चेतनाचेतनविभागश्रवणं विभावनाविभावनाभ्यां चैतन्यस्य शक्यत एव योजयितुम्'. Thus S'ankara supports the view of the एकदेशि. Who is this एकदेशिन्? Can this view be referred to Sir R. Bhandarkar's view about Vallabha 'The mysterious power which causes the differences by rendering certain qualities imperceptible.' Vaishnavism etc, p. 161.

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same, and the भोक्ता and भोग्य are अनन्य with Brahman, the भोक्ता does not become भोग्य nor भोग्य भोक्ता. This is a fact evidenced by our everyday experience. फेन, वीची, तरंग etc., though अनन्य with the समुद्र, there is no इतरेतरभावापत्ति. A ring, a necklace, though as gold ornaments are अनन्य with gold, the ring does not become the necklace, nor the necklace the ring. S'aṇkara, after once explaining the Sûtra accurately, adds 'यद्यपि भोक्ता न ब्रह्मणो विकारः, 'तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्' इति स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य कार्यानुप्रवेशेन भोक्तृत्वश्रवणात्, तथापि कार्यमनुप्रविष्टस्यास्त्युपाधिनिमित्तो विभाग आकाशस्येव घटाद्युपाधिनिमित्त इत्यतः परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणोनन्यत्वेपि उपपद्यते भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणो विभागः समुद्रतरंगादिन्यायेनेत्युक्तम्.' The instance of समुद्रतरंग is approved of by Bhâskara and others, but this latter addition is strongly criticised by Râmânuja. The wording of the Sûtra does not favour S'ankara's addition. Again, S'aṇkara wants to refer this Sûtra to व्यवहार, while the latter Sûtra refers to परमार्थ stage according to him. This distinction of व्यवहार and परमार्थ is not accepted by any other Âchârya, nor is it referred to by the Sûtrakâra. The wording of the Sûtra cannot unquestionably be taken to suggest S'aṇkara's distinction. The words 'स्याल्लोकवत्' merely refer to the everyday experience. The experience is so very common that the Sûtrakâra does not consider it even desirable to point to any particular instance to support his view. The view expressed by S'aṇkara that भोक्ता Jivâtman is the same as Brahman, the difference being caused by उपाधि, has been shown to be not countenanced by the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. In a sense, the Jivâtman is no विकार of Brahman, but an अंश. But the Sûtrakâra here wants to point out only this much, that though the Jada Jagat and the Chetana Jivâtman, both of them have their source in Brahman, still the Jada does not become Chetana, nor Chetana Jada. Hence the ब्रह्मकारणता is not open to any objection.

Then we come to the Sûtra 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14. This is one of the most important Sûtras in the *Brahmamimâmsâ. Except Madhva, all the Âchâryas* are unanimous in their referring this Sûtra to a passage from the 6th prapâthaka of the Chhândogya. Bhâskara says he has written a Bhâshya on the Chhândogya, but it is not available, hence we shall have to satisfy ourselves *with what he has observed on the question in his Brahma-*Sûtra-Bhâshya 2-1-14. When we look at the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa as a whole, it appears clear that *they fulfil* a double *function, viz.*, removing doubts that might arise through the aberrant genius of several Vedic thinkers, and at the same time *summarising the principal teachings* of the Upanishads. Thus the Sûtra 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14 has been written to set aside the doubt caused by words like आरंभण, नामधेय etc. Accordingly, the Sûtrakâra says that these words *mean* that cause and effect are अनन्य. It is to be noticed that the Sûtrakâra does not say that the *effect is the same as the* cause, but that they are अनन्य. From the word 'अनन्यत्वम्' one fails to work out the sense that *विकार has no existence.* 'न तु वस्तुवृत्तेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति'. Neither the श्रुति passage referred to, nor the wording of Sûtra lends support to what Saṇkara observes here:-'तस्माद्यथा घटकरकाद्याकाशानां महाकाशानन्यत्वं, यथा च मृगतृष्णिकोदकादीनामूषरादिभ्योनन्यत्वं दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्वात्, स्वरूपेणानुपाख्यत्वात्, एवमस्य भोग्यभोक्त्रादिप्रपञ्चजातस्य ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेणाभाव इति द्रष्टव्यम्' 2-1-14. This absolute negation of the existence of the प्रपञ्च as such is *very seriously criticised by* Bhâskara, Râmânuja, Vijnânabhikshu, Keśava Bhatta Kashmirin and Vallabha. *The text of the* Chhândogya here referred to is this:—'यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्'. *The meaning that* naturally suggests itself from the text is this:—The knowledge of one ball of earth gives knowledge of all that is made of earth, though there is a different name and also form

विकार–रूप (as Rangarâmânuja takes it), or though there is a difference of name and form, still all the things made of earth are earth, and as earth they are सत्य The passage cannot certainly be taken to mean that effects like pot etc. do not exist at all like the mirage, but that they exist in cause, they have no independent existence, the difference in name does not create a new object independent of the cause Rightly does Vallabha observe—'वाचारम्भण विकारो नामधेय मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमिति, तत्र विकारो वाङ्मात्रेणैवारभ्यते न वस्तुत इत्यर्थे प्रतिभाति, तथा च सति कस्य ब्रह्म कारण भवेत्? अत श्रुतिवाक्यस्यार्थमाह, आरम्भण-शब्दादिभ्य तदनन्यत्व प्रतीयते, कार्यस्य कारणानन्यत्व, न मिथ्यात्वम्।' The sage Uddâlaka wants to teach his son S'vetaketu 'the knowledge of all by the knowledge of one' Now the knowledge of 'all' is possible only when 'all' has existence and is अनन्य with one, then only the knowledge of 'one' can produce the knowledge of 'all' To explain this, the sage Uddâlaka gave three instances, from all of which the relation of cause and effect is suggested–that is–Uddâlaka means to say that the relation between the world and Brahman is the same that exists between the earthen pot and earth, Brahman is the cause and the world is the effect, the knowledge of cause Brahman produces the knowledge of effect the world, the reason being that they are अनन्य, as effect is अनन्य with the cause From this it is impossible to concede that the cause Brahman exists while the world is non existent, like mirage *The fact that the Upanishad gives three instances of earth, gold, and iron teaching the relation of cause and effect, and nowhere mentions, any of the instances viz* रज्जुसर्प, शुक्तिरजत *etc, which S'ankara so very zealously puts side by side with the above-mentioned ones, in his Bhâshya on the Chhândogya, as well as here, suggests a very strong inference against S'ankara that the Sûtrakâra has in his mind not the doctrine of* विवर्त *of S'ankara, but the doctrine of* परिणाम *of Brahman alone,*

and that the world is not an effect of illusion, but that of Brahman, the world is not a dream on a grand scale, but a real positive something which has its origination, existence and absorption in Brahman. True that in the Sûtra 'मायामात्रं तु कार्त्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्' 3 2 3, the Sûtrakâra distinctly says that the स्वप्नसृष्टि is मायामात्र, and whether we take 'माया' in the Bhâskara's sense of अर्थप्रत्ययशून्यत्व, or in Nimbârka's and Râmânuja's sense of आश्चर्यात्मकत्व, or in Vallabha's sense of सर्वभवनसामर्थ्य, or in S'ankara's sense of दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्व or अनिर्वचनीयत्व, the fact remains that according to the Sûtrakâra, the world is विधर्मि, from स्वप्न 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्', that the स्वप्नसृष्टि may be मायामात्र, but the ब्रह्मसृष्टि is not so, it is not मायामात्र but ब्रह्मरूप and ब्रह्मानन्य Bhâskara well observes in 3 2 3·—'ये पुनर्जागरितावस्थापि मायामात्रमित्याघोषयन्ति ते सूत्रकाराभिप्रायं नाशयन्तः श्रोत्रियजनं मोहयन्ति'. Again in 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्' 2-2 29 he observes to the same effect — ये तु बौद्धमतावलम्बिनो मायावादिनस्तेऽप्यनेन न्यायेन सूत्रकारेणैव निरस्ता वेदितव्याः, यदि बाह्योऽर्थो नाभिप्रेतः स्यात् किमर्थमिदं यतते सूत्रकार ?' etc The Sûtra 'नाभाव उपलब्धेः' (2 2 28) also suggests that according to the Sûtrakâra the world is not a nonentity. Thus though the world is not a nonentity, it does not follow that the Sutrakâra takes it to be a separate entity from Brahman and independent of it This is what he drives at, in the आरम्भणाधिकरण The श्रुति passage also reads 'मृत्तिका इति एव सत्यम्' and not 'मृत्तिकैव सत्या', and the Sûtrakâra also words the Sûtra as 'तदनन्यत्व' and not 'तन्मिथ्यात्व or 'तदेकत्व'. These facts also go against S'ankara's view of जगन्मिथ्यात्व, or जगन्मायिकत्व.

From this, it follows that the view of the Sûtrakâra is exactly similar to, if not actually the same, as S'ankara tries to refute in 2 1 14 —'नन्वनेकात्मकं ब्रह्म, यथा वृक्षोऽनेकशाखः एवमनेकशक्तिप्रवृत्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म अत एकत्वं नानात्वं चोभयमपि सत्यमेव, यथा वृक्ष इत्येकत्वं शाखा इति नानात्वं, यथा च समुद्रात्मनैकत्वं फेनतरङ्गाद्यात्मना नानात्वं, यथा च मृदात्मनैकत्वं घटशरावाद्यात्मना नानात्वं, तत्रैकत्वांशेन ज्ञानान्मोक्ष-

व्यवहार सेत्स्यति नानात्वांशेन तु कर्मकाण्डाश्रयौ लौकिकवैदिकव्यवहारौ सेत्स्यत इति, एव मृदादिदृष्टान्ता अनुरूपा भविष्यन्तीति' + + + 'ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रणयनात् परिणामवद् ब्रह्म शास्त्राभिमतमिति गम्यते, परिणामिनो हि मृदादयोर्था लोके समधिगता इति' The view expressed in these lines seems to be more in harmony with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana, than S'ankara's own view given in refutation of the same. His objection 'न हि एकस्य ब्रह्मण परिणामधर्मत्व तद्रहितत्व च शस्य प्रतिपत्तु, etc is also groundless in face of 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2-1-27. His other objections are met at length by Bhâskara, Râmânuja, Keśava Bhatta and Nimbârka, but space at our disposal forbids us from entering into the full discussion of the same here The श्रुति 'यत्र तु अस्य सर्वमात्मा एव अभूत् तत्केन किं पश्येत्' also teaches not 'सर्वाभाव' but 'आत्मन सर्वभाव In the stage of ब्रह्मभाव the सर्व does not cease to exist, but the consciousness that सर्व is a different entity from Brahman vanishes and the consciousness that Brahman alone is सर्व is generated. Against S'ankara's 'जगन्मिथ्यात्व Vijnâna-Bhikshu advances a queer but not unreasonable argument thus –'प्रपञ्चस्यात्यन्तमभावे यत्प्रमाणमारभणशब्दादिक तत् सन वा, आद्ये बाध , अन्त्ये हेत्वसिद्धि , तस्मात् सदसत्त्वविकल्पपराहतैरारभणशब्दादिभि प्रमाणै. प्रपचात्यन्ताभावो न सूत्रकारेणानुन्मत्तेन साधयितु शक्यते' p 281 भिक्षुभाष्य Cb. se Bhâskara also observes in 2-1-14 thus 'न हि सूत्रकार क्वचिन्मायाशब्द प्रायुक्, यत्र स्वप्नज्ञानान्मायामात्र तु कात्स्न्येन अनभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वादिति हि यत्रोक्त वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवदिति वैधर्म्यमुक्तम्, ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दमिति चारम्य प्रत्यधिकरण स्मृतिमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते सूत्रकारस्य, स्मृत्यनवकाशदोष इत्यारभ्य साख्यादुद्भावितदूषणोद्धाराय प्रत्यधिकरण प्रयासोनर्थक स्यात्', मायामात्रत्वे 'न वियदश्रुते'रिति चारम्य भूतानामुत्पत्त्यादिविचारोनर्थक स्यात्' × × × अपि च मायाशब्दमात्रेण कृत्स्नो वद मुमुक्षेय स्वर्गापवर्गलक्षण यथाभूत प्रत्याययन्नप्रमाणमसत्यमिति वा कल्पयितुमिति ज्ञानन प्रवर्तेन वेदार्थे यथा वेदैर्धूमशक्त्या यथा प्रवर्तन्तामिति' भा भा pp 99 100. One cannot but concede that the above-mentioned arguments of Bhâskara have much force Keśava Bhatta Kashmirin, Râmânuja and Purushottama have also said much against S'ankara All the writers on the Vedânta Sûtras, in some form or other, accept the परिणामवाद and जगत्सत्यत्व, and this

fact by itself is an almost certain indication that the Sûtrakâra has neither in his mind the doctrine of विवर्त nor मिथ्यात्व of the world. In his zeal for मायावाद S'ankara *forgets to what he is being drifted* when he remarks 'तदेवमविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्वं, न परमार्थत' etc. He himself feels conscious that Bâdarâyana's ब्रह्मविचार-प्रतिज्ञा and 'जन्माद्यस्य यत' are being put to a strain The Sûtras following in this अधिकरण also confirm the view expressed above. The Sûtra 2 1-15, S'ankara *reads also* as 'भावाचोपलब्धे' The explanation which follows this Sutra reading, according to S'ankara himself, confirms the view that the world is only an अवस्थान्तर of ब्रह्मन् as पट of तन्तुs, and as पट is अनन्य with तन्तुs, *so is the world with* Brahman. From this it is quite clear that *according to the view of* the Sûtrakâra as interpreted by S'ankara here, the 'अनन्यत्व' does not mean मिथ्यात्व of जगत्, but merely an अवस्थान्तरत्व. The next Sûtra 'सत्वाच्चावरस्य' also teaching the सद्रूपत्व of Jagat, confirms the अनन्यत्व existing between a cause and an effect The Sûtras 2-1-19 and 20 also confirm the *view* of अनन्यत्व expressed above. Difference in रूप and क्रिया does not produce a new substance, पट may be in a different form from the तन्तुs, प्राणs may perform different functions but still the पट is अनन्य with तन्तुs, and उदान, etc. are अनन्य with प्राणवायु 'ज्ञानक्रियाभेदात्सूत्रद्वयम्' A. B

The Sûtras 'उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि' and 'देवादिवदपि लोके' 2 1-24 25 deal with the question that Brahman does not need any external साधन By its own natural powers like gods it develops the universe out of itself The Sûtras 2 1-26-27 declare that as Veda teaches the अस्तित्व of अविकृतब्रह्मन् and ब्रह्मपरिणाम, there is no कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति or निरवयवत्वशब्दकोप The सृष्टि is in itself, its powers are wonderful. 'आत्मनि चैव विचित्राश्च हि'. The Sûtras 2 1 30 31 take up another similar question. 'सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्' 'विकरणत्वादिति चेत् तदुक्तम्'. Brahman is possess-

ed of all powers, and even though it has no organs, it creates the universe etc , the Veda teaches so. S'ankara's remark on सूत्र 'प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मण सर्वशक्तियोग सम्भवतीत्येतदप्य विद्याकल्पितरूपभेदोपन्यासेनोक्तमेव' is quite out of place The Sûtra kara declares the सर्वशक्तियोग of ब्रह्मन् as based on दर्शन, Veda, while S'ankara wants to refer it to अविद्या

Why should self-satisfied Brahman create this world when it has no प्रयोजन to fulfil? To this question an answer is furnished by 'लोकवत्तु लीला कैवल्यम्' 2 1–33 S'ankara very beautifully explains the Sûtra thus —यद्यपि अस्माकमियं जगद्बिम्बरचना गुरुतरसंरम्भेवाभाति, तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलैव केवलेयं, अपरिमित-शक्तित्वात्। यदि नाम लोके लीलास्वपि किञ्चित् सूक्ष्म प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्ष्येत तथापि नैवात्र किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितु शक्यते, आप्तकामश्रुते, नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तप्रवृत्तिर्वा, सृष्टि श्रुते सर्वज्ञश्रुतेश्च This is quite in the strain of the Sûtra kâra and we cannot understand why after this beautiful explanation, he thinks it necessary, practically against the Sûtrakâra, to add 'न चेयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुति, अविद्याकल्पित-नामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वाद् ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्चेत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यम्

The learned Sûtrakâra has dealt with the question that Brahman is the उपादान कारण, and though it is उपादान कारण it is without any sort of विकार, the विरोध being set aside by an implicit faith in the words of the texts of the Veda Now in 2-1 34-35-36, he deals with the question that even though [1] Brahman is the efficient cause, even though it is कर्तृ, it is not liable to the faults of partiality and cruelty as Brahman allots fruits according to the Karmas of the individual souls. The जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, hence this is possible

In the last Sûtra Bâdarâyana removes all contradictions by remarking that Brahman is सर्वधर्मयुक्त In the previous अधिकरण, he said that जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, hence it was possible for Brahman to allot fruits according to कर्मs of

1 This question is dealt at length in जीवविचारणा

the individual souls, but this directly goes against the श्रुति passage 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' which distinctly teaches the एकत्व and अद्वितीयत्व of Brahman To such a difficulty Bâdarâyana's answer is on the same principles which he has laid down in 2-1 27. The swarûpa of Brahman is such The प्रवाह may be अनादि, still ब्रह्मन् is एक and अद्वितीय, Brahman though giving fruits according to कर्मs is in dependent of it In short, it is possessed of all धर्मs, there is no contradiction as such

According to the reasoning of S'ankara, the explanation given by the Sûtrakâra in refutation of the वैषम्य नैर्घृण्य *is quite out of place According to him the विषमता* and निर्घृणता, the कर्तृत्व of Jivâtman and Paramâtman are all *creatures of अविद्या and with the removal of अविद्या, they* vanish into nothingness

To conclude, the Sûtrakâra holds that this world is an effect of Brahman, is real Brahman has, for its लीला केवल, without any other प्रयोजन, and without any organs or any external means, by the natural powers of itself, developed itself into the universe without itself undergoing any change The world is अनन्य with Brahman in all its three stages It has no existence independent of Brahman, but at the same time it is neither मिथ्या nor an absolute non entity. It is not a विवर्त of Brahman, but a real wilful परिणाम of Brahman It is आत्मकृति and आत्मपरिणाम or ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम शरीर, शक्ति, प्रकृति, परमाणु अविद्या, माया and others, have nothing to do with it so far as its primary cause is being investigated

LIBERATION.

The fourth chapter of the Brahma Sûtras deals with the question of liberation The first pâda deals with the question of जीवन्मुक्ति or liberation in life of the Brahmavid. The knowledge of Brahman puts an end to कर्मs good

and bad which have not begun to be enjoyed, 4 1 13 14 15 After the knowledge of Brahman is acquired, the कर्मs, which are then performed, do not touch the ब्रह्मविद् The body[1] of the ब्रह्मविद् continues to live so long as his आरब्धकर्मs are not ended, 4-1-19. When the body[2] falls away, he becomes joined with Brahman [3]Agnihotras etc, which are नित्यकर्मs, are to be performed by the ब्रह्मविद्, for they are useful in the acquirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान This is the general reasoning of the Sutrakâra, but this reasoning directly goes against that of S'ankara According to S'ankara कर्म, शरीर, everything is the creature of nescience By the ब्रह्मज्ञान, the अविद्या is destroyed, and when the अविद्या is destroyed, its effects *viz*, कर्म, शरीर etc, must also vanish, on the principle that effect and cause are अनन्य, and that in the absence of cause, the effect cannot exist So there comes in the impossibility of जीवन्मुक्ति, for, with the rise of विद्या the अविद्या with its effect शरीर etc, is destroyed, and the ब्रह्मविद् becomes Brahman at once If this position is not accepted as being contradicted by our experience, then two alternatives come in, *viz*, either the ब्रह्मज्ञान is not thoroughly obtained, in which case there is no जीवन्मुक्ति, or if ब्रह्मज्ञान is obtained, then body etc, which continue to exist after the नाश of अविद्या are not creatures of अविद्या From this it appears that the body etc, continue to exist even after the acquirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान, the difference being that, after ब्रह्मज्ञान, कर्म and its products शरीर etc, do not touch him (ब्रह्मविद्) The ब्रह्मविद् performs कर्मs, but these कर्मs are ब्रह्मकर्मs, and not his own. It is worthy of note that the Sûtrakâra says 'अश्लेष,' meaning thereby that कर्मs do not touch the ब्रह्मविद् He becomes असंग Thus though the ब्रह्मविद् is living and doing every-

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1. तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाघयोरश्लेषविनाशौ तद्व्यपदेशात् 4 1 13 इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु 4 1 14 अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः 4 1 15

2 भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वाथ संपद्यते 4 1 19

3 अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात् 4 1 16

thing, he is untouched by good or bad actions His existence is for the enjoyment of कर्मs begun to be enjoyed. This seems to be the view of the Sûtrakâra about जीवन्मुक्ति S'ankara himself remarks that this has reference to सगुणविद्या, in निर्गुणविद्या there is no need of mentioning this 'सगुणासु तावद्विद्यासु विद्यत एव विधानम्। तासु च वाक्यशेषे ऐश्वर्यप्राप्ति पाप निवृत्तिश्च विद्यावत उच्यते। तयोश्चाविवक्षाकारण नास्तीत्यत पाप्मप्रहाणपूर्वकैश्वर्यप्राप्ति स्तासां फलमिति निश्चीयते। निर्गुणायां तु विद्यायां यद्यपि विधानं नास्ति, तथाप्यकर्त्रात्मवोधात् कर्मप्रदाहसिद्धिः। 4 1-13

When the प्रारब्धकर्मs are ended by enjoyment by the body, that body of the Brahmavid falls away The second पाद describes the process by which the body is dissolved The उत्क्रान्ति of विद्वान् and अविद्वान् is common to a certain extent, of नाडीप्रवेश The विद्वान् then passes by शताधिका. 4-2 16 In 4-2 13, 'स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम्' S'ankara remarks –तस्माद्विद्विषये प्रासयो गत्युत्क्रान्त्यो विद्वद्विषये प्रतिषेध इत्येवमेव व्याख्येय, व्यपदेशार्थवत्त्वाय। न च ब्रह्मविद सर्वगतब्रह्मात्मभूतस्य प्रक्षीणकर्मण उत्क्रान्तिर्गतिर्वोपपद्यते, निमित्ताभावात्। 'अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते' इति चैवजातीयका श्रुतयो गत्युत्क्रान्त्योरभावं सूचयन्ति।'. The उत्क्रान्ति here spoken of by the Sûtrakâra is quite consistent with his arrangement. In the first पाद the Sûtrakâra describes the state of ब्रह्मविद् in life, in the second उत्क्रान्ति, in the third how and by which path he reaches Brahman (गति), and in the fourth the फल the ब्रह्मविद् enjoys after reaching Brahman. In this general arrangement the Sûtrakâra nowhere expressly says that the उत्क्रान्ति and गति have no reference to the ब्रह्मविद्. The question of सद्योमुक्ति is altogether different, which is possible only through the singular grace of Brahman. In the case of the favoured ब्रह्मविद्, there is no detention even for enjoying प्रारब्धकर्मs. His दायकर्मs are taken away by his sons, good कर्मs by his friends and bad ones by his enemies 'तस्य पुत्रा दायमुपयन्ति सुहृद साधुकृत्यां द्विषन्त पापकृत्याम्. Bâdarâyaṇa suggests this in 'अतोऽन्यापि ह्येकेषामुभयो' 4-1-17.

Thus through the grace of Brahman, the कर्मs are ended, and the ब्रह्मविद् at once enjoys Brahman. This is only a suggestion which is not possible to carry further than this All the आचार्यs refer to Jaimini and Bâdarâyaṇa by the word उभय, and refer the श्रुति passage to काम्यकर्मs. But the objection to this view as is pointed out by Vallabha is that Jaimini is not spoken of either before or after in this पाद 4-1, and that पापकृत्या cannot be काम्यविषय Whatever it may be, it seems almost impossible that Bâdarâyaṇa views the गतिश्रुति as belonging to अविद्वद्विषय In the third pâda of the fourth chapter after describing the stations through which the soul of the ब्रह्मविद् passes by the path of देवयान, Bâdarâyaṇa says that the ब्रह्मविद् reaches Brahman from where there is no return. In the same pâda Bâdarâyaṇa mentions two views—of [1] Bâdari who holds that the final goal to which the Brahmavid is said to reach is कार्य, and of [2] Jaimini who holds that the final goal to which the Brahmavid reaches is परब्रह्मन्, and not अनित्यकार्य S'aṅkara accepts the view of Bâdari and rejects that of Jaimini. In 'न च कार्ये प्रतिपत्त्यभिसन्धि' 4-3-14, S'aṅkara takes great pains to show that the गतिश्रुतिs are not to be accepted in their primary sense, but as referring to lower Brahman, they are to be finally rejected. The principal reasons which led S'aṅkara to reject the गतिश्रुतिs in their primary sense are expressed by him thus:—'न ह्यसत्यपि सम्भवे मुख्यस्यैवार्थस्य ग्रहणमिति कश्चिदाज्ञापयिता विद्यते। परविद्याप्रकरणेऽपि च तत्स्तुत्यर्थं विद्यान्तराश्रयगत्यनुकीर्तनमुपपद्यते, 'विष्वङ्ङन्या उत्क्रमणे भवन्ति' इतिवत्। 'प्रजापतेः सभां वेश्म प्रपद्ये' इति तु पूर्ववाक्यविच्छेदेन कार्येऽपि प्रतिपत्त्यभिसन्धिर्न विरुध्यते। सगुणेऽपि च ब्रह्मणि सर्वात्मत्वसंकीर्तनं 'सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः' इत्यादिवदवकल्पते। तस्मादपरब्रह्मविषया गतिश्रुतयः।' 4 3 14. S. B. N. S p 497. From this one sees that S'aṅkara's main difficulty consisted in the 'असम्भव' or विरोध between the गतिश्रुति and the व्यापकत्व of Brahman In the absence of सम्भव,

1. 4 3 7-11. 2 4 3 11 14.

says he, there is no reason why the गतिश्रुतिs should be accepted in their primary sense. His other explanations *viz.*, 'पार्येषि प्रतिप्रत्ययनिर्देशेपि विरुध्यते' and 'सगुणेपि मन्त्रणि × × आरभ्यते', are questions of plausibilities which stand or fail with the main argument. From what has been stated above it is important to note that S'ankara does not adduce any Sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa in support of his theory, and therefore the sustained reasoning that he has worked out for rejecting the गतिश्रुति loses all its force. Before we examine his argument in favour of the rejection of the गतिश्रुति and insistence of the निर्विशेषश्रुतिs, *let us advert* to the question of the अर्थभ्रम. It is admitted on all hands, that the गतिश्रुतिs, as they stand, do present a *contradiction* with the व्यापकत्व of Brahman. But on this ground alone, it would not be proper to reject the गतिश्रुतिs. With this we have to bear in mind what the learned Sûtrakâra has said about Brahman and the letter of the Veda. As a faithful interpreter of the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa, one has to abide by his reasoning and conclusion. The position *would be the same which he assumed in 2-1-26-27, 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् ।'.* The difficulty put forth by S'ankara arises only *when unlike the Sûtrakâra one fails to put an implicit* faith in the letter of the Veda. In the शब्दप्रमाणशास्त्र as is written by the Sûtrakâra, one is surprised, why S'ankara tries to modify and correct not only the clear sense of the श्रुतिs, but that of the Sûtras also. The result of this is often unpleasant when one sees that S'ankara's modified interpretation not only goes against the wording of the Sûtras, but directly contradicts what he himself has just said [1]before. In this connection, *Bhâskara rightly defines the* position of the Sûtrakâra in

1. Second interpretation of आनन्दमयाधिकरण Second interpretations in 2-1-27, 2-1-29, are instances out of many.

his Bhâshya on page 238, 4-3-13, thus:—'उभयात्मकं तद्वस्तु + + न चास्माकमर्थवादत्वकल्पना, यथाश्रुतार्थग्रहणे किं नामानुपपन्नम्. Thus Bhâskara sees no difficulty in accepting गतिश्रुतिs in their primary sense and व्यापकत्व of Brahman. Vallabha's position is also similar. According to him the गतिश्रुति has no contradiction with the व्यापकत्व of Brahman, for both are taught by the Vedas, and that Brahman's swarûpa is such as would admit the possibility of both the alternatives. Vallabha's commentator also observes on page 1368:-'किञ्च, तैरपि कचिद् गौणः शब्दो दृष्ट इति नैतावता शब्दप्रमाणकेर्थे गौणी कल्पना न्याय्या।'. (अ. भा. प्रकाश B. S. S.). On the question of गतिश्रुति Râmânuja, Nimbârka, Madhva, Vallabha, S'reekantha and Bhâskara are all at one, and this seems to be a strong ground to hold that the Sûtrakâra had never in his mind the difficulty of 'असंभव' between the गतिश्रुति and the व्यापकत्व. The Sûtrakâra's attitude is the one declared by Vallabha in 1-1-4, 'विरुद्धसर्वधर्माश्रयत्वं तु ब्रह्मणो भूषणाय'. It follows therefore, that S'ankara's interpretation of the गतिश्रुतिs in the लाक्षणिक sense is not viewed by any other commentator with favour, and we cannot but think that here also S'ankara is not faithful to the Sûtrakâra.

S'ankara has however paid very serious attention to this question. The following are the arguments advanced by him in 4-3-14-S. B. N. S. pp. 497-502:—

(1) Brahman is व्यापक.
(2) Brahman is निर्विशेष.
(3) Jiva is अविद्योपाधिपरिच्छिन्न.
(4) गतिश्रुतिs refer to अपरब्रह्मन.
(5) No गति is spoken of in परविद्या.
(6) The distinction between पर and अपर ब्रह्मन् is based on the श्रुति passages.
(7) गमन is due to बुद्ध्युपाधि.
(8) Jaimini's view is mentioned by the Sûtrakâra later for the development of intellect (प्रज्ञाविकास).

The first objection is met by Bhâskara and Vallabha by showing the possibility of गमन as being due to भोगजनक प्रारब्ध. 'तत्र गतंभोगनिमित्तं संप्राप्तनिमित्तमिति निमित्तगमन्येवेत्यदोष.' says Bhâskara in 4-3-13. 'न च व्यापकत्वं गन्तव्यत्वे बाधकं, प्रारब्धभोगं विना तत्प्राप्त्यसम्भवात्, यदा यत्र तद्भोगसमाप्तिस्तदा तत्र तत्प्राप्तेर्निष्प्रत्यूहत्वात्' says Vallabha in 4-3-14.

The second and third objections are answered by what has been said before in reference to Brahman and the human Soul.

It has been shown that the Sûtrakâra does not hold the distinction between पर and अपरब्रह्मन्, hence the fourth and sixth objections are answered. This question has been exhaustively treated by Vallabha's commentator on pages 1362 to 1365. A. B P. B. S. S., and by Bhâskara in 4-3-13; and but for want of space we should have [1]quoted the same in full here.

The fifth objection is dealt with by Bhâskara thus:— 'न चास्माभिरियं गतिः कल्पिता, श्रुतयोऽत्र प्रमाणम्, परविद्यासु गतयो दृश्यन्ते'. 4-3-13. Then he quotes from छान्दोग्य, प्रश्न, कठवल्ली, ऐतरेय, गीता, पुराण and वाजसनेय, to support his view that there is गमन in परविद्या.

The tendency of the Sûtrakâra is to accept the श्रुतिs always in their primary sense, hence गमन is in the primary sense, and not in a secondary sense, as due to उपाधि. Thus the 7th objection is answered.

The last objection is certainly very weak. One does not understand why the Sûtrakâra should put his doctrine in the mouth of Bâdari, why he should place the सिद्धान्त view first and पूर्वपक्ष view after it. S'ankara says that it is done with a view to develop intellect प्रज्ञा. True, but since this is a solitary unusual circumstance, one must be thoroughly convinced before he accepts S'ankara's

1. See Appendix. A.

view. It appears that S'aṇkara's interpretation though fairly correct so far the Sûtras are concerned, becomes altogether opposed to the view of the Sûtrakâra the moment S'aṇkara's interpretation is viewed in the light of his 'Esoteric doctrine' in the words of Dr. Deussen. Once it is shown that there is real ब्रह्मगमन, the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana become quite consistent. The holy words 'अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्', teaching the non-return of those who have reached Brahman, cannot with justice be referred to a secondary hypothetical sense, for an ultimate rejection. That Bâdarâyaṇa should begin and end with Sûtras which can on no account be reconciled with S'aṇkara's reasoning, leads one to suppose that there is a flaw in S'aṇkara's reasoning so far as his faithfulness to the Sûtrakâra is concerned. Râmânuja and Nimbârka have clearly an advantage over S'ankara in this, that their views evolve from the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa with less difficulty. When the Sûtras and S'ankara's commentary dealing with his पर विद्या are compared, one cannot but honestly admit that there is a clear contradiction between the two. Sûtras, viewed in the light of S'aṇkara's esoteric doctrine, lose all their force in their criticisms of Sâṇkhya, Kâṇâda and other systems. Thus, it is not right with S'aṇkara to deprive the गतिश्रुतिs of their primary significance, for, it is a view not favoured by Bâdarâyaṇa, or at least we are not in a position to support it from the Sûtras.

Having established in the third पाद that the Brahmavid reaches Brahman, or rather is [1]led there, the fourth पाद describes the mode of his enjoyment there. After reaching Brahman, the Brahmavid gets [2]आविर्भाव, but all the same [3]he is अविभक्त with Brahman. For the sake of enjoyment, he becomes manifest in a new form which, though अविभक्त

1. अप्रतीकालंबनान्नयतीति बादरायण उभयथादोषात् तत्क्रतुश्च 4-3-15. 2. सम्पद्याविर्भावः स्वेन शब्दात् 4-4-1. 3. अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात् 4-4-4.

with Brahman, is [1]ब्राह्म according to Jaimini, [2]चिद्रूप according to Audulomi, while उभयरूप according to [3]Bâdarâyaṇa; there is no विरोध between Jaimini's and Audulomi's views, as both are possible according to Bâdarâyaṇa. Being अविभक्त with Brahman the Brahmvid derives everything by Brahman's [4]संकल्प. Like Brahman he is [5]अनन्याधिपति. There is a difference of opinion between the views of Bâdari and Jaimini, the [6]former believes in the absence of शरीर etc., of the ब्रह्मविद्, while the [7]latter believes in the presence of शरीर etc., on the authority of Chh. U. 7-26-2, [8]while Bâdarâyaṇa believes in both the views, (उभयविधम्). With these शरीर etc., the Brahmavid *enjoys* भोग. The [9]*absence of* भोग *spoken of in* श्रुति *has reference to* स्वाप्यय, *and* श्रुति*s* teaching भोग refer to संपत्ति. The [10]ऐश्वर्य of the Brahmavid *is limited to the extent that he cannot like* Brahman create Jagat. His [11]ऐश्वर्य is eternal. With [12]Brahman the Brahmavid *by* ब्राह्म *form enjoys eternally*. He [13]does *not return to* Sansâra.

This seems to be the general outline of the mode in which the Brahmavid enjoys in *the Brahmaloka. The* Brahmaloka is eternal. *In this there is a general agreement among* Râmânuja, *Nimbârka and Vallabha.* The Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa *stand naturally* reconciled with the above view. *There is no suggestion in these Sûtras of the ideal of* Moksha *which S'aṇkara mentions in 1-1-4.*

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1. ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः 4-4-5. 2. चिति तन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः 4-4-9. 3. एवमुपन्यासात्पूर्वभावादविरोधं बादरायणः 4-4-7. 4. संकल्पादेव तु तच्छ्रुतेः 4-4-8. 5. अत एव चानन्याधिपतिः 4-4-9. 6. अभावं बादरिराह ह्येवम् 4-4-10. 7. भावं जैमिनिर्विकल्पामननात् 4-4-11. 8. द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं बादरायणोऽतः 4-4-12. 9. स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि 4-4-16. 10. जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च 4-4-17. 11. विकारावर्ति च तथा हि स्थितिमाह 4-4-19. 12. भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च 4-4-21. 13. अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिः शब्दात् 4-4-22.

'इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थनित्यं, व्योमवत्सर्वव्यापि, सर्वविक्रियारहितं, नित्यतृप्तं, निरवयवं, स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावम्, यत्र धर्माधर्मौ सह कार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तेते, तदेतदशरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम्'. "As may be seen from this passage, the conception of Liberation contains the same characteristics as serve, as a rule, to define Brahman; and indeed, Brahman and the state of liberation are identical terms; for liberation is nothing else than the becoming one with Brahman, or rather, since the identity of the Soul with Brahman has always subsisted and has only been hidden from it by an illusion, liberation is nothing else but the awakening of the consciousness that our own self is identical with Brahman. Accordingly, in liberation there is no question of becoming which does not already exist, but only of the attainment of the knowledge of what has existed from all eternity. It is because of this, that liberation is not accomplished through any sort of work, nor through moral improvement, but by knowledge alone." System of Vedânta. p. 401. It is absolutely clear that this reasoning cannot be traced to any Sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa. S'aṇkara's conception of Liberation has much in common with that of the Sâṇkhya. The highest aim of the Sâṇkhya[1] is to free himself from the प्रकृति, so the greatest aim of a S'âṇkara is to free himself from the अविद्या. With the destruction of अविद्या, its creatures *viz.*, his Jîvatva, his ब्रह्मप्राप्ति, everything vanishes, and he remains what he was, *viz.*, Brahman, the subject of all negations except existence. That this view is foreign to the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa can be seen from the summary of the Sûtras given above. S'aṇkara's attempts to force up his doctrines in औडुलोमि and Bâdari suggest his departure from the lines of the Sûtrakâra. His attempt to reconcile Audulomi's view with that of Jaimini on the authority

1. *Vide* S'aṇkhya Kârika 62–68. and Vâchaspatimis'ra's तत्त्वकौमुदी.

of Bâdarâyaṇa in 4-4-7, 'एवमुपन्यासात्पूर्वभावादविरोधम् बादरायणः' results in a contradiction. He says:—'एवमपि पारमार्थिकचैतन्यमात्रस्वरूपाभ्युपगमेऽपि व्यवहारापेक्षया पूर्वस्यापि उपन्यासादिभ्योऽवगतस्य ब्राह्मैश्वर्यरूपस्याप्रत्याख्यानादविरोधं बादरायण आचार्यो मन्यते'. The contradiction arises from the fact that there come in ऐश्वर्य, etc., creatures of Ignorance after the Ignorance is destroyed. Govindânanda thus puts it 'अखण्डचिन्मात्रज्ञानान्मुक्तस्याज्ञानाभावात् कुत आज्ञानिकधर्मयोग इति'. *Vide* also अणुभाष्यप्रकाश pp. 1396–1401. The liberation in the sense of Bâdarâyaṇa is not merely the end of miseries, but also the attainment of ever-lasting bliss.

CONCLUSION.

From what has been said before, it follows that the Sûtrakâra's conception of Brahman is at great variance with that of S'aṅkara. As Dr. Thibaut observes:—'They do not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman, that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Iśwara in S'aṅkara's sense.' Vedanta Sûtras. I. p. 100. According to the Sûtrakâra, the Brahman is possessed of all attributes, and all wonderful powers. By its very *swarûpa, it is possessed of all contradictory attributes.* The negative vedic passages like 'नेति नेति' deny in Brahman all the earthly attributes, while those like 'सर्वकामः' etc., affirm in Brahman all divine attributes. Thus Brahman is उभयलिंग as is accepted by Vallabha and Nimbârka. The absolute negation of all attributes, and describing Brahman as निर्विशेष, is a view which does not find any expression in the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. The subject of negation in negative Vedic passages has reference to what is non-Brahman as is remarked by the author of Bhâshya-Prakâśa. B. S. S. p. 953. 'अतोऽन्यनिषेधो यो वर्तते स सर्वं ब्रह्मणोऽन्यन्निर्दिश्यैतत् निषेधति, न तु सर्वं मिथ्याह्न्त्येति सुधीभिरवधेयम्'. Neither is Brahman devoid of all attributes. 'अतो विशेषाणां नास्त्यत्रापि इ

निर्विशेषमात्राभ्युपगन्तॄणामेवास्ततेति बोध्यम्'. Aṇu. B. P. p. 948. This Brahman which is spoken of in the Upanishads as 'नेति नेति' or as 'सर्वकाम' is an independent कर्तृ. It is Sad-Chid-Ânanda. For the sake of sport alone it develops itself into the universe, but unlike the Pantheism of Spinoza, as is shown by Sir Râmakṛishna Bhandârkar, it is not exhausted into the universe, but remains transcendent. Residing in the heart, it becomes अन्तर्यामिन्, and existing outside, though 'agamya', becomes 'gamya' by meditation and devotion, when it likes. It is the fountain-source from which all activity, all intelligence, all joy proceed. It is Brahman which evolves names and forms, and makes अव्याकृत व्याकृत. The universe with its immense diversity has its source in Brahman. The human souls have their source in Brahman. The Brahman of the Sûtras is not only a personal God, but it is one of its phases. Brahman is *avyakta* when one tries to find Him by means of intellect alone, but becomes व्यक्त through meditation and devotion. The innermost soul of the human souls is Brahman, hence it is to be meditated upon as the आत्मन्. 4-1-3. The infinite[2] variety is united in the Brahman. Sages like Vâmadeva, in the stage of Brahma-Bhâva, have experienced this *Sarvatva.* Brahman is अनुस्यूत in the universe by Sad, Chid, and Ânanda. It follows from this, that the author of the Sûtras follows a process quite opposite to that of S'aṇkara's, in working out his Pantheism. He does not deny everything of Brahman, but unlike S'aṇkara, affirms everything of Brahman.

In the case of the human soul also, the view of the Sûtrakâra is opposed to that of S'aṇkara. As Dr. Thibaut puts it, the Sûtras 'do not, with S'aṇkara, proclaim the abso-

1. आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च। 2 तत्र सर्वेषां सर्वभावे सर्वानन्त्यप्रसंगाद् सर्वमिकमेवेति वक्तव्यम्। Aṇu Bhâshya B. S. S. p. 262. 1-1-29.

lute identity of the individual and the highest Self.' Introduction to Vedânta Sûtra I. p. 100. According to the Sûtrakâra, the human soul springs out of Brahman as spark out of fire. It is atomic. It is part-अंश of Brahman, and as the अंश of अंशिन् Brahman, it is अनन्य with it. It is Kaitṛi and Bhoktṛi, *but its activity has its source in* Brahman. In the stage of Brahmabhâva it experiences विभुत्व, etc., with its Aṇutva. It is neither an आभास nor a प्रतिबिंब of Brahman. It is not a creature of nescience, nor is it the same as Brahman differentiated by अविद्या. It is not a non-entity but a real entity.

As regards the universe also, Bâdarâyaṇa and S'aṇkara are opposed. As Dr. Thibaut puts it:—'They do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world.' *According to the Sûtrakâra, the universe* has for its material and efficient cause Brahman alone. Though Brahman alone is the material cause, it does not undergo any change while developing itself into the universe. As efficient cause Brahman is neither cruel nor unjust. The world is अनन्य with *Brahman, in the sense that the effect is* अनन्य *with the cause. As the effect exists in the cause in all* the three stages of origination, existence and absorption, similarly the universe, in all its three stages, exists in Brahman, and is अनन्य with it. It is a real development of Avikṛita Brahman. The Sûtrakâra does not, like *S'aṇkara maintain that the universe is a dream on a* grand scale. He does not hold that the universe is a figment of nescience. The universe has for its cause Brahman, still there is an infinite variety in effects. The creation of the universe is a Kevala Lîlâ of Brahman and not a Mâyâ.

From the description given of the path leading to Brahman, and the mode of enjoyment of ऐश्वर्य in the

fourth Adhyâya, the conception of Moksha, according to the Sûtrakâra, is different from that of S'aṇkara. It is a stage attained by a gradual course of spiritual development, and not a stage which has existed at all times, but which is concealed through अविद्या, and which is revealed by the destruction of अविद्या.

From the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa like 'आत्मकृते परिणामात्', we distinctly understand that the Sûtrakâra favours the परिणामवाद and not the विवर्तवाद of S'aṇkara. In this respect, as is shown before by a quotation from Sir R. Bhandârkar's Vaishnavism etc., Vallabha's ब्रह्मपरिणाम is the one approved of by the Sûtrakâra. It should not be supposed that thereby either of them accepts the proposition that Brahman thereby undergoes any विकार. According to both of them, Brahman's causality and transcendency are both possible. In all the instances given by the Sûtrakâra, and in the older Upanishads, nowhere do we find any instance given, which S'aṇkara so very often quotes to support his doctrine of विवर्त. This fact suggests a very strong inference against him. Where the श्रुति gives the instance of मृद् and घट, S'aṇkara tries to incorporate शुक्ति and रजत. *Vide* छान्दोग्यभाष्य. VI.

There is again a distinction to be drawn as to the attitude of the Sûtrakâra and S'aṇkara towards other systems. S'aṇkara's attitude to the पूर्वमीमांसा seems to be very hostile, while Râmânuja and Bhâskara look upon both the Mîmânsâs as forming one S'âstra. Upavarsha, whose view, Bhâskara follows, is said to have written one Bhâshya on the two Mîmânsâs. *Vide* भास्करभाष्य p. 6. and अणुभाष्यप्रकाश. p. 47. According to S'aṇkara, nothing remains to be done in the stage of ब्रह्मात्मावगति. 'तस्माज्ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते'. S. B. 1-1-4. p. 18. This absolute rejection of कर्म cannot be traced to any

Sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa. In 4-1-16, the नित्यकर्मs like अग्निहोत्र etc., are to be performed by the Brahmavid. This would go to show that the Brahmavid has not to reject the performance of कर्मs, but the mode of performance is different. Again in 3-4-26, 'सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्', the absolute disregard of कर्म is not accepted. It cannot be taken that the two Mîmânsâs form one S'âstra, but the mutual helpfulness cannot be denied. *Vide* Aṇu Bhâshya p. 42, and pp. 110 to 114. *Vide* also 3-3-1-25 Sûtras.

While meeting the Sâṇkhyas, Kâṇâdas, and the Bauddhas, S'aṇkara follows the Sûtrakâra in maintaining the strict reality of the universe, and the causality of Brahman; but once that is done, he rejects the same view, consigning it to अविद्या. S'aṇkara has been rightly and repeatedly charged with these contradictions by his opponents.

From what has been said above, we come to the conclusion that S'aṇkara's esoteric doctrine, *viz.*, the Mâyâvâda is the development of the Sâṇkhya and Buddhistic tenets, blended with misinterpretations of the passage of the Brihadâraṇyaka Upanishad, referring to the creation of the dreaming soul on the lines of Gaudapâda, and it has nothing to do with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. After showing numerous contradictions in the system of S'aṇkara from his Bhâshya, Col. Jacob remarks:—'To me, therefore, it seems impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिन्s, or some similar school, were in possession of the field in S'aṇkara's time, and that his own mind was so saturated with their doctrines as to be unable to shake them off even when propounding an antagonistic system.' Vedânta-Sâra. Intro. p. 9. This suggestion of Col. Jacob is as original as it is true. If we take S'aṇkara's Bhâshya, and do away with those portions which superim-

pose his doctrine of अविद्या, from what is left of his commentary, a general system, representing Bâdarâyana's view, can fairly be worked out Vallabha's Aṇu Bhâshya seems to answer the above description When we read Col Jacob's remark with the observations of Sir R Bhandârkar, pp 160–161 Vaishṇavism etc, the inevitable conclusion one comes to is this, that Bâdarâyaṇa represents in his Sûtras a system which corresponds with one which Vallabha propounds in his Bhâshya, viz, 'The development of Purushottama into the world and at the same time his transcendency' p 161 Vaishnavism That S ankara himself was conscious of such a doctrine can be seen from his Bhâshya in passages like ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रणयनात् परिणामवद् ब्रह्म शास्त्रस्याभिमतम् 2 1 14 यदूक्त स्वरूपोपमर्दमन्तरेण कस्यचित्कूटस्थस्य वस्तुन कारणत्वानुपपत्तेरभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्भवितुमर्हतीति तद् दुरुक्तम्, स्थिरस्वभावानामेव सुवर्णादीना प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानाना रुचकादिकार्यकारणभावदर्शनात्' 2 2 26 p. 246 Thus while dealing with Sâṇkhya, Bauddha and others, he puts forth Bâdarâyaṇa's doctrine, but that being done, he rejects Bâdarâyana s view, and puts forth his own Hence the conclusion is that Bâdarâyaṇa and S aṇkara both hold different if not opposed, views Rao Bahâdur Rangâcharya has published a book, called सर्वसिद्धान्तसंग्रह of S aṇkarâcharya This book is different from that of Madhava's The noteworthy feature of Rangacharya's book is that fourteen *matas* are mentioned there, the last two of which refer to Vedavyâsa and Vedânta And though this view of Vedavyâsa purports to be based on the Mahâbhârata, there is a significant fact that S aṇkarâchârya, the author of the book, drew a distinction between the two views Other writers also refer to two views of Vedânta which go to show that Bâdarâyaṇa and S ankara hold different views In the Tâtparya Tika of the न्यायसूत्र, 4 1 19, a reference to the two views is thus made — मा भूदयं नामरूपप्रपच शून्यतोपादान,

अपि तु ब्रह्मोपादानो भविष्यति, ब्रह्मैव प्रपञ्चरूपेण परिणमते मृत्तिकेव घटशरावोदंचनादिभावेन, न च एवं नित्यत्वव्याघातः, परिणामेऽपि तत्त्वानपायात् तल्लक्षणत्वाच नित्यतायाः, यदाह यस्मिन् तत्त्वं न विहन्यते, तदपि नित्यमित्येकं दर्शनम्', 'अपरं च ब्रह्मैव अनाद्यविद्योपधानाभेदात् नामरूपप्रपंचभेदेन विवर्तते मुखमिव एकमनेकमणि, कृपाणादर्शभेदान्नैकविधं प्रतिबिंबभेदेनेति, तत् एतद् दर्शनद्वयम्'. It is quite clear from this quotation that even Naiyâyikas had to draw a distinction between the ब्रह्मपरिणाम of Bâdarâyaṇa and विवर्तवाद of S'aṅkara. Moreover, S'aṅkara's preference for the views of Bâdari, Kâśakritsna and Audulomi, suggests the inference that S'aṅkara had in his mind a system different from that of the Sûtrakâra. To add to this, S'aṅkara's own statement, at the close of the introduction of his अध्यासभाष्य, suggests the same conclusion, as is pointed out by R. B. Rangâcharya, 'that the aim of S'aṅkarâchârya was to try to evolve what he himself took to be the teachings of the Upanishads out of the Vedânta Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa-that is, to put into the Sûtras what he himself understood to be the teachings of the Upanishads,' and not what Bâdarâyaṇa understood them to be. 'यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः'. 'Even orthodox Advaitins seem to accept this view in a general sort of way, and there is a stanza attributed to Madhusûdana Sarasvati which gives a notably clever expression to it. The stanza is:—

न स्तौमि तं व्यासमशेषमर्थं सम्यङ् न सूत्रैरपि यो बबन्ध ।
विनापि तैः संग्रथिताखिलार्थं तं शंकरं नौमि सुरेश्वरार्यम् ॥

It is evident from this that it is granted by some Advaitins themselves, that the Vedânta Sûtras of Vyâsa are not responsible for the whole philosophy of S'aṅkarâchârya: and one need not therefore be surprised when one sees them occasionally making a distinction between the *Sûtrakâra mata* and the *Bhâshyakâra mata*. The distinction between a *Vyâsa mata* and a *Vedânta mata* as

brought out in the Sarva-Siddhânta-Sangraha clearly confirms the position of Dr Thibaut as to what kind of Vedânta it is, that is really represented by the Vedânta Sûtras' Introduction to S S of Rangâchârya pp 16-17. From this it appears that so far as the Sûtras of Bâdarâ yana are concerned, S'aṇkara's claim to be the faithful expositor is very weak

The question as to whether Bâdarâyana's or S'aṇ kara's teachings stand nearer to the Upanishads, though to the orthodox it appears at the first sight absurd, is ra ther very interesting Gough, Deussen and Thibaut have declared in S ankara's favour Our subject forbids us from entering into this question, but certainly we cannot concede that the question is settled The views of Gough and Deussen are not entitled to as much weight as that of Thibaut, since the former two do not seem to have looked to anything except S aṇkara's interpretations, while the latter had the advantage of being familiar with a powerful critic of S'aṇkara viz, Râmânuja Hence let us hear what he says on p 124 of his Introduction to Vedânta Sûtras I. 'S'aṇkara's method (of higher and lower Brahman) thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to different stages of historical developments, to recognize clearly existing differences which other systematisers are intent on obliterating And there has yet to be made a further and even more important admission in favour of his system. It is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of the other Vedantic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction made by S aṇkara between Brahman and Isvara is known to the Upanishads, but

we must now admit that if, for the purpose of determining the nature of the highest being, a choice had to be made between those texts which represent Brahman as nirguna and those which ascribe to it personal *attributes*, S'ankara *is right in giving preference to texts of the former kind.* × × × The older Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little stress upon personal attributes of the Highest Being, and hence, S'ankara is right in so far as he assigns to his hypostatized personal Îśvara a lower place than to his absolute Brahman That he also faithfully represents the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads' × × 'If so, the philosophy of S ankara would on the whole stand nearer *to the teaching* of the Upanishads than the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana.' p 126. This may be or may not be, much can be said on [1]both sides, but there is one thing which needs be pointed out here, and it this For the purpose of determining the Highest Being, Bâdarâyana or any Vaidika Âchârya would not like to make a choice between the two

1 Compare Jayagopala's introduction to his तैत्तिरीयभाष्य — तत्र तावदुपनिषदोऽनेकविधाः, काश्चन केवलपूर्णपुरुषोत्तमप्राप्तिसाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, काश्चन केवलपुरुषोत्तमस्वरूपप्रतिपादिका, यथा गोपालतापिनीकृष्णोपनिषदादयः । काश्चन पूर्णपुरुषोत्तमस्वरूपतत्प्राप्तियोग्यतासम्पादकाक्षरब्रह्मज्ञानविषयीभूताक्षरब्रह्मस्वरूपस्य पुरुषोत्तमेन सह सर्वकामभोगरूपफलस्य च प्रतिपादिकाः, यथा तैत्तिरीयोपनिषन्मुण्डकोपनिषदादयः । काश्चन केवलविभूतिनिरूपणप्राप्तिसाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा वासुदेवोपनिषन्नारायणोपनिषदादयः । काश्चन केवलाक्षरब्रह्मप्राप्तिसाधनप्रतिपादिका, यथा बृहदारण्यकछान्दोग्योपनिषदादयः । काश्चन मुक्तिसाधनीभूतभक्तिज्ञानाङ्गसत्यसर्ववैराग्ययोगसांख्यादिप्रतिपादिका, यथा संन्यासोपनिषदारुणेयोपनिषत्कण्ठश्रुत्युपनिषद्ब्रह्मोपनिषदद्वैताख्योपनिषदात्मशान्त्युपनिषदमृतबिन्दूपनिषत्तेजोबिन्दूपनिषद्योगशिखोपनिषद्योगतत्त्वोपनिषदादयः । काश्चन भक्तिज्ञानसाधनश्रवणादितत्साधनशरीरादीनामाधिभौतिकाध्यात्मिकाधिदैविकदुःखनिवारकसाधनप्रतिपादिका, यथा गरुडोपनिषदादयः । *Vide* also Sir R. Bhandarkar's remark —The opinion expressed by some *eminent scholars that the burden of the Upanishad teaching is* the illusive character of the world and the reality of the one soul only is manifestly wrong and I may even say, is indicative of an uncritical judgment. As stated in the text the Upanishads from the very nature of the compilations cannot but be expected to teach not one, but many systems of doctrine. Vaisnavism p 2, note 2

sorts of Vedic passages, but he would refer them both to Brahman, or, in the words of Vallabha, the Sûtrakâra's position would be this —"तथा चास्थूलादिगुणयुक्त एवाविक्रियमाण एवात्मान करोतीति वेदान्तार्थे सगतो भवति, विरुद्धसर्वधर्माश्रयत्व तु ब्रह्मणो भूषणाय A. B p 121. If Bâdarâyana were to accept a position like this, his Brahman would be capable of amalgamating more heterogeneous material than S'ankara's higher and lower Brahman put together Preference and giving prominence to one sort of Vedic passages results in rejection and ignoring of others, and to believers in the infallible wisdom and eternity of the Vedas, such a one sided preference would be fatal to his claim to be called a Vaidika The duty of the Vaidika is to interpret the sense of Veda and not to subordinate one to the other 'आम्नातस्यार्थं प्रतिपत्तु प्रभवामो नाम्नात पर्यनुयोक्तुम् ।' 1 4 3 p 150. S B (text N S P). 'नहि वेदवाक्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्व कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्त प्रतिपत्तुं, प्रमाणत्वाविशेषात् । 3 2 15 p p. 357. S B text. Thus according to S'ankara also, the authoritativeness of Saguna and Nirguna Vedic passages is equal, and so far as the learned Sûtrakâra accepts both sorts of श्रुतिs and refers them both to his Highest Being, Brahman, his interpretation must with justice be preferred to that of either S ankara who gives prominence to Nirguna श्रुतिs, or Râmânuja, Madhva, and others, who put forth only Saguna श्रुतिs In this respect Bâdarâyana is followed by Vallabha alone Hence, except in reference to Vallabha, Dr Thibaut would not be quite wrong in saying that S'ankara by accepting two Brahmans [illegible]

baut's claim that S'ankara's system would stand nearer to the Upanishads than that of Bâdarâyana cannot be accepted as unchallenged, since Bâdarâyana's mode of interpretation and harmonising the conflicting Vedic

passages is better than that of S'aṇkara, since Bâdarâyaṇa unlike S'aṇkara bears in mind the प्रमाणाविशेषत्व of different Vedic passages as shown above, and does not prefer the one to the other, but accepts them all as carrying equal authority and deserving equal prominence.

Thus disagreeing with Thibaut in accepting that S'aṇkara is a better exponent of the Upanishads than Bâdarâyaṇa, we must admit that S'aṇkara's system might have had its representatives in Bâdari, Kâśakṛitsna and to a certain extent in Audulomi. If the towering *personality of Bâdarâyaṇa,* with his *irresistible* and hitherto unquestioned authority were to be ignored from the field, then a chain of tradition of S'aṇkara's system can be maintained from Bâdari to Gaudapâda, Govinda and S'aṇkara, and with this reservation Gough's position would not be wrong. It may be, as pointed out by Bhâskara,[1] that S'aṇkara's system was *independent of the Sûtras, and that by the force of his* powerful genius he attempted to superimpose his system on the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. No other commentator has tried to correct or modify the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa, while S'aṇkara's commentator[2] actually lays down the rule that where सूत्रs conflict with the Veda, they are to be misinterpreted. This is possible only if Sankaras understood that there was a difference in the *interpretation of* the Upanishads between Bâdarâyaṇa and themselves.

The spirit of S'aṇkara's system is certainly pessimistic. His imagining the existence of [3]दुःख in the आनन्दमय, his declaring that [4]activity is दुःखरूप, and a preference for the

1. सूत्राभिप्रायसंवृत्या स्वाभिप्रायप्रकाशनात् ।
व्याख्यातं यैरिदं शास्त्रं व्याख्येयं तन्निवृत्तये । भ. भा. P. 1.

2. वेदसूत्रयोर्विरोधे 'गुणे त्वन्याय्यकल्पना' इति न्यायाद्वेदानुसारेण सूत्राणि नेतव्यानि । भामती S. B. N. S. 1-1-19. P. P. 128, 129.

3. अपि च आनन्दमयस्य दुःखित्वमपि श्रूयते etc., 1-1-19. p. 41. S. B.

4. 'कर्तृत्वस्य दुःखरूपत्वात्' 2-3-40. S. B. p. 192.

negative श्रुतिs, tend to the same conclusion. His rejection of आनन्दमय's Brahmanhood, and imagining the existence of misery in it have been the subject of an almost bitter remark[1] of Vallabha's commentator. From the way in which he defines his conception of Brahman, by negativing everything of it except its existence, and declaring Brahman to be अविषय, he makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish his system from Buddhism, and it appears that his system has evolved in a transition period when the *Buddhistic doctrine of Void was being driven* out of the field.

'धाम्ना स्वेन सदा निरस्तकुहकं सत्यं परं धीमहि ।"


Appendix A.

तेन यतः प्रश्नोपनिषद्वाक्यात् परापरे द्वे ब्रह्मणी अङ्गीकृत्य, यदविद्याकृतनामरूपादिविशेषप्रतिषेधेनास्थूलादिशब्दैर्ब्रह्मोपदिश्यते तत् परम्, यत्पुनर्नामरूपविशेषाणां केनचिद्विशिष्टमुपासनयोपदिश्यते 'मनोमयः प्राणशरीर' इत्यादिशब्दैस्तदपरमिति प्रतिपादितम्। तत्र किं मानम्? न तावदस्थूलादिवाक्यम्, मनोमयवाक्यं च। तत्र परापरशब्दयोरश्रवणात्। आद्ये अक्षरशब्देनैव लक्ष्यनिर्देशात्। यदि च मुण्डके 'अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यत' इत्यक्षरविद्यायां परत्वश्रावणात् तद्विषयस्याक्षरस्य परत्वमिष्यते। बाढम्। तदा पुरुषस्य ततोऽपि परत्वमेव द्रष्टव्यम्। 'दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स बाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः, अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः पर' इति तत्रैव श्रावणात्। न च तस्य यावद्विशेषशून्यत्वम्। तदग्रे 'एतस्माज्जायत प्राण' इति मन्त्रेण तत एव सृष्टेः श्रावणात्। 'अग्निर्मूर्धे'त्यादिभिस्तद्रूपोपन्यासाच्च। नाप्यक्षरस्य तथात्वम्। अस्थूलादिश्रावणोत्तरं प्रशासनस्य वेदयत्वद्रष्टृत्वादीनां आकाशोपादानत्वस्य च श्रावणेन, मुण्डकेपि 'यत्तदद्रेश्य'मित्याद्युक्त्वा 'यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ती' त्यादिजगदुपादानत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादीनां श्रावणेन यावद्विशेषशून्यताया वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्। अत एव वाक्यान्तरेष्वपि द्रष्टव्यम्। सर्वत्र एकस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यत्वात्। अत एव श्वेताश्वतरेपि 'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः,' 'यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्व'मित्यादीन् नानाधर्मबोधकानेव मन्त्रानुक्त्वा 'निष्कलं निष्क्रिय'मित्युक्तम्। 'स वा एष महानज आत्मे'त्यत्रापि शारीरब्राह्मणे, 'अन्नादो वसुदान इति सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशान' इत्यादयो धर्मा उक्ताः। 'स वा एष नेति नेती'त्युक्त्वा, 'अगृह्यो न हि गृह्यते, अशीर्यो न हि शीर्यते, असङ्गोऽसितो न सज्जते न व्यथत इत्ये'वं निषेधो विहितो, न तु यावद्धर्मपरत्वेनेति द्रष्टव्यम्। अतो यत्रोत्कर्षस्य विश्रान्तिः, अक्षराद्वा यदुत्कृष्टं तदेव परमिति मन्तव्यम्। उक्तमुण्डकश्रुतेः। 'अव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गति' रिति काठकश्रुतेः। 'अम्भस्यपार' इत्युपक्रम्य, 'अत. परं नान्यदणीयसं हि परात् परं यन्महतो महान्त'मिति तैत्तिरीयश्रुतेश्च। पुरुषस्य च विरुद्धधर्माश्रयत्वमेतास्वेव प्रतिपादितम्। एतदेव परत्वम्। गीतासु च 'अव्यक्तोऽक्षर इत्युक्तस्तमाहुः परमां गतिम्, यं प्राप्य न निवर्तन्ते तद्धाम परमं मम। पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यये'ति। 'द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च, क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते। उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः, यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः। यस्मात् क्षरमतीतोहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः, अतोस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तम' इति तदुपबृंहणात्। अत एव, 'न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते' इत्यादिषु तस्य समाभ्यधिकनिषेधोऽपि युज्यते। न च पुरुषोत्तमाक्षरयोः परापरभावाङ्गीकारे अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः। गणितागणितानन्दत्वधर्मभेदेपि वस्त्वभेदेन द्वैताभावे तदभावात्। अभिनादिवदद्वैत-

धीयमानज्ञानविषयस्य ब्रह्मण पूर्वम्, न तत्र चक्षुर्गच्छतीत्यादिना यावत्करणागम्यताया उक्तत्वात्तस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षादिरूपताया वक्तुमशक्यत्वादुपासनारूपत्व एव पर्यवसानेन तद्विषयस्य परस्याप्यपरत्वापत्तेश्च । नाप्युपशान्तत्वाभावात् । सर्वत्र परस्य ब्रह्मण एकत्वेन तस्य च विरुद्धधर्माधारताया उपपादितत्वेन तदभावस्यैवाभावात् । एतेनैव अवचनेनैव प्रोवाचेत्यनेनापि प्रत्यवस्थानमयुक्तम् । तत्राप्युपशान्तत्वस्यैवोक्तत्वात् । लौकिकयावद्धर्मराहित्येनैव तत्सिद्धेश्च । एवं'मिन्द्रो मायाभि'रित्यादिवाक्यानामप्युभय लिङ्गाद्यधिकरणविचार एव विचारितत्वान्न तैरपि प्रत्यवस्थानावकाश । **अतः परविद्यासूक्तानामन्यत्राप्युक्तानां परब्रह्मधर्माणाममनाविधकत्वादलौकिकैर्नानागुणैर्युक्तमप्युपास्यरूप नापरब्रह्मरूपमिति नौपाधिकम् ।** × × × × × × × ×

किञ्च, तैरपि क्वचिद्गौण शब्दो दृष्ट इति नैतावता शब्दप्रमाणकेर्थे गौणी न्याय्या, सर्वत्रानाश्वासप्रसङ्गादिति । 'तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशा'दिति सूत्रव्याख्याने यदुक्त तदपि विस्मृतम् । अथवा, 'ईक्षतिसूत्रावतारणे वेदान्तवाक्येभ्य एव युक्त्याभासवाक्याभासावष्टम्भा सांख्यादिवादिन उत्तिष्ठन्ते । तत्र पदवाक्यप्रमाणज्ञेन आचार्येण वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मावगतिपरत्वप्रदर्शनाय वाक्याभासयुक्त्याभासप्रतिपत्तय पूर्वपक्षीकृत्य निराक्रियन्त इति कथनालक्षणा विरहय्य वेदान्तव्याख्यानमाचार्यस्यैव सम्मतम्, नास्माकमिति बोधितमिति प्रभुचरणैर्दिक्पदप्रयोगेण ज्ञापितम् ॥ p p. 1362—1368. Anu Bhâshya Prakâśa.

Mr. Mulchandra Tulsidas Teliwala,
B. A., LL. B.



Born, 23rd September, 1887. *Left this Earth, 26th June, 1927.*

MR. MULCHANDRA TULSIDAS TELIWALA B.A., LL.B.

The winner of the Bombay University prize for the foregoing essay passed away on 26th June 1927, at the early age of thirty-nine, and thus the life of a brilliant young man, wholly devoted to the cause of the uplift of पुष्टिमार्ग, suddenly came to an end. A short sketch is given here, depicting his life-work, and showing under what difficult circumstances, majority of Indian scholars have to work. He was born on 23rd September 1887 (Aso Sud 7, 1943) in the ancient and holy city of Bhṛgu-cutchha or Broach situated on the right bank of the Narmada. It was here that king Bali performed his दशाश्वमेध, and gave Lord वामन three steps of earth. It is the abode from most ancient times of Bhargava and other Brahmins well-versed in कर्मकाण्ड. Further up the river are situated the holy places of व्यासाश्रम and शुक्लतीर्थ, the abodes of व्यास and शुक्लनारायण. He was born in a very rich and famous family of विशामोढ वैश्य. The caste being a very small one, his grand-father Mr. Lalbhai was not married till he was about 55 years old. He went to the pilgrimage of श्रीनाथद्वार and कांकरोली, and at कांकरोली, गोस्वामी श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी, (who flourished later than his namesake the writer of प्रकाश on अणुभाष्य) gave him a blessing that he would have two sons. He replied that he was unmarried and there was no chance of marriage at that age, but the गुरु smiled and asked him to go home. The वरदान came to be true, he married and he had two sons. The family business of cotton also prospered, and their firm had agents at Palej, Miyagaum and other places, and a branch at Bombay. A marriage of a member of the family was performed at

Gulalwady in the 3rd Bhoiwada, Bombay, with great pomp, and large vessels were given in gift by the family to Gulalwady, which even now may be traced Their prosperity increased, and the cellars of their house were filled with silver bars But when God shows special favour to any one, he takes away the burden of wealth, and it happened so in this case A year before the birth of Mulchandra there came a sudden crash, there was a heavy loss and all the money vanished On account of worldly worries and troubles with which his parents were surrounded, Mulchandra inherited a very poor lean physical body At any time of life his weight was not more than 72 lbs, but this slender body contained a spirit which was dauntless not ruffled by any outward show or pomp, and could easily spurn wealth, of which his family had more than enough till his birth His early years were spent in playfulness and he was accustomed to run on the city walls and swim in the river But he was always the top boy in his class His memory was so sharp that he could easily remember what he read once He was the pet of his teachers The light jovial nature of this pigmy monitor commanded willing obedience from the strongest, tallest and most mischievous boy in the class After passing his Matriculation Examination in 1905 he joined the Wilson College for further studies In the College hostel he picked up some knowledge of singing and music from his Deccani friends He graduated B A with वेदान्त as his optional subject in 1909, and he was a favourite student of Mr Bhadkamkar, Professor of Sanskrit In the absence of any other calling he took up government service as a teacher in the Elphinstone High School, Bombay Thence he was selected for the Training College with a scholarship of Rs 50 per month, and this gave him an opportu

nity to read up the course for LL. B. For some time, he lived with Mr. Khimji Cooverji at Walkeshwar, as a tutor to his son.

The first वैष्णवपरिषद् met at Baroda in 1906, the second at Patan in 1907, and the third at Nandurbar in 1909. After this, पुष्टिभक्तिसुधा the well-known monthly magazine was started, and though he was a student, his constant and powerful contributions marked by his independent thinking and fearless expression created a stir in the वैष्णव world. Mr. Maganlal Ganpatram Shastri, the founder of the Parishad and the Magazine, found in him a young, able and resourceful co-worker. The fourth session of the परिषद् was held at Surat in 1910, and there also he attracted great attention.

He passed his final LL. B. in 1914, and in all probabilities it appeared that he would begin practice at Broach, as the same was his native place, but all were surprised when he took a High Court Sanad and came to settle in Bombay. The reason which led him to this decision without consulting any one, is as under:—

From infancy, he often got dreams in which he found himself flying in the air, and some dreams were suggestive of future events. While at Broach, one early morning before leaving the bed, he got a dream in which he saw श्रीनाथजी, the स्वरूप in the Broach temple, swinging in पलना and smiling at him. He got up with great joy, and after प्रात नित्यकर्म he went for दर्शन. He was greatly delighted to have the same दर्शन there, not in dream, but in reality. There was पलनामनोरथ and the स्वरूप was adorned in the same वस्त्रालङ्कार as he had seen in the dream, and there was the same joyful, smiling look. While he was returning home, Mr. Jaikisandas, a life-long friend of Teliwala family, called him at his shop, congratulated him

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He passed his final LL B in 1914, and in all probabilities it appeared that he would begin practice at Broach, as the same was his native place, but all were surprised when he took a High Court Sanad and came to settle in Bombay The reason which led him to this decision without consulting any one, is as under —

From infancy, he often got dreams in which he found himself flying in the air, and some dreams were suggestive of future events While at Broach, one early morning before leaving the bed, he got a dream in which he saw श्रीनाथजी, the स्वरूप in the Broach temple, swinging in पलना and smiling at him He got up with great joy, and after प्रात नित्यकर्म he went for दर्शन He was greatly delighted to have the same दर्शन there, not in dream, but in reality. There was पलनामनोरथ and the स्वरूप was adorned in the same वस्त्रालङ्कार as he had seen in the dream, and there was the same joyful, smiling look While he was returning home, Mr Jaikisandas, a life long friend of Toliwala family, called him at his shop, congratulated him

on his passing the 2nd LL. B. examination, advised him to practise in the Bombay High Court, and gave him Rs. 500 required for taking out a Sanad. Mulchandra saw God's hand in all this and without waiting to consult any one, he came to Bombay, took the Sanad, and began practice. *He* shared the chamber of the late Mr. Kashidas Narayandas Dalal who was the sub-tenant of Mr. Bhailal and who was the *Secretary of Pandit* Gattulâlâji's संस्था. *He helped* Mr. *Kashidas in preparing* the annual टिप्पणी, *and from that time* Mr. *Kashidas took* a liking for him. He allowed him full access to the Library manuscripts fully appreciating his great erudition and learning, and finally got him appointed a trustee of the संस्था along with the late Shet Tribhovandas Vurjivandas J. P. The reader will thus see that but for वरदान to his grand-father, the जन्म of Mulchandra was impossible, that at the time of his birth, the worldly wealth was all taken away by way of अनुग्रह, the suggestion and facility to settle in Bombay was all due to the Almighty's helping hand, and finally the greatest convenience for his life-work, *viz* the possession of an excellent manuscript library of the सम्प्रदाय was provided for him by God; and but for divine help, not one of these series of important events could have been brought about by his own efforts. The astrologer of his family predicted from his कुण्डली that *he would perform a great* and memorable यज्ञ, and *after more* than half of his valuable publications were out, Mulchandra himself understood the meaning of this यज्ञ, and whenever there were difficulties in his work on account of illness or want of funds or want of manuscripts, he prayed to God, and the prayers were in many cases heard and difficulties solved.



Long before this, Mr Maganlal Shastri had begun to utilise the वैष्णव परिषद् fund for getting manuscripts copied from प. गट्टूलालजी's library in consultation with Mulchandra, but the fund was small, and the work was stopped after some time. In December 1914, Mr. Maganlal Shastri was transferred to the Deccan College, Poona, and he had to leave Bombay in January 1915. The daily Katha Mandli at the Khakhar Building came to a stop, and thereupon at the request of his friends, Mulchandra began reading अणुभाष्य and निबन्ध, every night. The Bombay University prescribed for गुरुगोकुलजी शाला वेदान्त prize for 1915 the following essay—'Discuss how far शंकराचार्य truly represents the view of the author of the ब्रह्मसूत्रs'. Mulchandra had gone through the प्रकाश of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी about four or five times, and with his powerful memory he had materials enough for the required discussion. He thought of writing the essay just a month before it was due and with the wonderful concentration of mind that he possessed, he wrote it out and gave it on the last due date. The language, the outer garment he had no time to correct or adorn, but the thought is so deep, the discussion so balanced, the judgment so impartial, that it is difficult to find fault anywhere, while the comparative method and the wide knowledge that he had gathered from प्रकाश having been fully utilised here must have compelled admiration of his examiners The prize was divided between him and Mr. Kurtkoti The essay is published and is very widely read Scholars like Dr Bhandarkar, Dr Thibeau, and many other Orientalists have long ago come to the conclusion that शंकर's interpretation of ब्रह्मसूत्रs does not represent बादरायण's views, but they had not before them अणुभाष्य and प्रकाश, and so they thought that शंकर *had, however*, well succeeded in making a समन्वय of all important उपनिषदs If this view were correct, शंकर would be wiser

than बादरायण. We have no doubt that a wide knowledge of अणुभाष्य, प्रकाश and रश्मि would dispel this view. Copies of the Essay were sent to many scholars and many have praised it, and some have expressed their inability to *pronounce any judgment as they had not studied the various* भाष्यs *by the comparative method.*

In about 1915, at the *request* of Mr. Tribhovandas of Nadiad to translate सेवाफल, he began collecting साहित्य on it, and at first collected twelve Teekas, some in हस्ताक्षर of authors themselves. Such a collection was never to be found before in any one library or with any one गोस्वामी or ordinary वैष्णव, and he thought of publishing them. Mr. Tribhovandas had no funds for this work, so Mulchandra approached श्रीजीवनलालजी of पोरबंदर *for the same. He immediately consented and sent Rs. 500 for the publication.* The work was begun at once, and the first volume of his memorable series was published in December 1916. It established his reputation in the पुष्टिसंप्रदाय. So many commentaries were never thought of before by any one, much less seen, and now they had them before their eyes all collected, beautifully printed, and with a *lucid introduction in Sanskrit. Three more commentaries were* subsequently traced and published along with जलभेद. In this प्रकरणग्रन्थ, श्रीवल्लभाचार्य gives a brief and clear idea of the three sorts of realisations, according to one's अधिकार i. e. (1) अलौकिक सामर्थ्य, by which a भक्त obtains a vision of God, and enjoys indescribable bliss with Him, as is revealed in the श्रुति 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता; (२) सायुज्य, *as is stated in* 'ततो मां तत्त्वतो ज्ञात्वा विशते तदनन्तरम्'; and (३) वैकुण्ठादिषु सेवोपयोगिदेह, as is stated in यो यदंश स तं भजेत्. It also describes the three hindrances in the path of realisation, उद्वेग, प्रतिबन्ध and भोग, and various means to remove them. In spite of the विवरण, and the fifteen commentaries, the ग्रन्थ is difficult to under-

of its फल, a description of आनन्दमय ब्रह्मन् and अन्नमय, प्राणमय, मनोमय and विज्ञानमय पुरुषाः. Though श्रीवल्लभाचार्य had no time to write भाष्यs on various उपनिषद्s, he clearly distinguished ब्रह्मवाद from मायावाद and other वादs, and chalked out a clear line; श्रीविठ्ठलेश्वर showed by his writings how to progress on the line, and श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी and श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी have done much by giving the meanings of various उपनिषद्s, whenever they got opportunities, specially in प्रकाश and रश्मि. It is the duty of साम्प्रदायिक scholars to collect all the passages and compose उपनिषद् भाष्यs on these lines. श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी has also written complete भाष्यs on some उपनिषद्s, and it is our duty to find them out and publish them. भक्तिवर्धिनी is another प्रकरणग्रन्थ published by him with fourteen commentaries. In order to make भक्तिबीज दृढ, a man should stay at home (not to leave गृहस्थाश्रम) and worship God with पूजा, श्रवण etc., without caring for व्यावृत्ति if possible, and always engage his mind in श्रवण etc., in such a way that he should gradually get प्रेम, आसक्ति and व्यसन, towards God. By प्रेम, the attachment to the world vanishes, by आसक्ति he gets अरुचि towards गृह and गृहस्थानां बाधकत्वं अनात्मत्वं च भासते, by व्यसन in कृष्ण, he becomes कृतार्थ, having followed the उपदेश in मन्मनाभव मद्भक्तो etc. Even after reaching this stage, he should be very careful and live in the company of other भक्तs engaging himself in सेवा or कथा till he lives. सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली is another प्रकरणग्रन्थ published by him with nine commentaries. The सिद्धान्त in a nut-shell is कृष्णसेवा. सेवा is तत्प्रवणं चेतः, and its साधन is again तनुजावित्तजासेवा. The चित्त thus becomes तन्मय in कृष्ण, संसारदुःख vanishes and ब्रह्मबोध is the result. कृष्ण is परब्रह्म, अक्षरब्रह्म has two forms, the second one being जगत्, which is neither मायिक, nor सगुण nor कार्य, as represented by various schools of philosophy, but तदेवैतत् प्रकारेण भवतीति श्रुतेर्मतम्. Just as the water of the Ganges is आधिभौतिक गंगा, the power of the Ganges to give a worshipper भोग and मोक्ष is आध्यात्मिक and the देवी गंगा is आधिदैविक, so are जगत्, अक्षरब्रह्म and कृष्ण.

Hence it is no wonder that कृष्ण could show the whole जगत् to यशोदा in His mouth जीव is अक्षरात्मक and अणु in essence, and not by उपाधि It becomes संसारी by उपाधि of अविद्या When अविद्या is removed by प्रपत्ति, जीव knows its true nature of being ब्रह्मांश, and worships कृष्ण as stated in यो यदंश स तं भजेत् or gets सायुज्य as stated in विशते तदनन्तरम्

सिद्धान्तरहस्य is another important प्रकरणग्रन्थ published by him with eleven commentaries He published with it the much-abused and misinterpreted ब्रह्मसम्बन्धमन्त्र, and wrote a long and considered introduction in English, so that those who care to know the truth and nothing but the truth about the पुष्टिसम्प्रदाय may know it at a glance, and prejudices caused by rumours may be removed This ग्रन्थ teaches us that by establishing सम्बन्ध with ब्रह्म, all our दोषs are removed, that in all कार्यs all things should be dedicated to God, that we should reject all things not dedicated to God, and that we should lead the life of a servant of God

That जीवs are essentially of three different kinds is taught by श्रीवल्लभाचार्य in पुष्टिप्रवाहमर्यादा which is published with four commentaries 'इच्छामात्रेण मनसा प्रवाह सृष्टवान् हरि । वचसा वेदमार्गं हि पुष्टिं कायेन निश्चय ।' In प्रवाह, फल is only जायस्व, म्रियस्व, in वैदिक मर्यादामार्ग, फल is स्वर्गमोक्षादिरूप, and in पुष्टिमार्ग, फल is कायेन, आनन्दमात्रकरपादमुखोदरादिरूपेण पुष्टिजीवs are created for रूपसेवा of God, which सेवा is otherwise impossible In स्वरूप, अवतार, लिङ्ग and गुण there is no difference between पुष्टिजीव and God Among मिश्रजीवs, पुष्टपुष्ट are सर्वज्ञ, like नारद and ऋषभ, पुष्टिप्रवाहमिश्र are क्रियारत like श्रुतदेव and निमि, पुष्टिमर्यादामिश्र are गुणज्ञ like भीष्म भगवान् is the फल of पुष्टजीव, प्रकट or manifest in भक्तहृदय and in लीलास्थान वृन्दावन &c नवरत्न is another प्रकरणग्रन्थ published with five commentaries It teaches that a भक्त who has devoted himself to the service of God should give up all anxieties arising from any cause whatever, should remember that he is merely a servant of God, who is merciful, he should always keep his चित्त in सेवा and live peacefully, removing

चित्तोद्वेग, he should give up चिन्ता, thinking that whatever God does, is His लीला; thus he should stay on uttering श्रीकृष्णः शरणं मम.

पत्रावलम्बन, the challenge affixed to the door of काशीविश्वेश्वर at Benares by श्रीवल्लभाचार्य, is published by him with the commentary of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी. It is one of the most difficult ग्रन्थs on वेदान्त we ever met with. वेदान्ताधिकरणमाला is a very clear and beautiful analysis by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी of all the अधिकरणs. The माला of the Fourth अध्याय was re-written by श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी, as he could not get it. Mulchandra could fortunately trace a single manuscript in the Bhandarkar Research Institute, and published it together with गोपेश्वरजी's. भावप्रकाशिका ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्ति which he published is composed by the master-minds श्रीकृष्णचन्द्रजी and श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी. श्रुतिरहस्य contains the स्तुति of श्रीवल्लभाचार्य with quotations from वेद of his अग्निस्वरूप. शृंगाररसमण्डन, स्फुरत्कृष्णप्रेमामृत, मधुराष्टक, प्रेमामृत, परिवृढाष्टक, रसाब्धि, मनोवृत्त and हृदयवृत्त are the प्रमेय group of ग्रन्थs published by him. The full significance of रसो वै सः cannot be understood unless one studies (1) तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद् (2) रसनिष्पत्तिप्रकार given by श्रीवल्लभाचार्य in वेणुगीत and elaborately explained by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी, (3) श्रुति passages quoted and explained in रासपञ्चाध्यायी, (4) आनन्दमयाधिकरण, लिङ्गभूयस्त्वाधिकरण and फलाध्याय, (5) the synthetical view of श्रीमद्भागवत given in भागवतार्थनिबन्ध, and the various passages scattered in सुबोधिनी explaining the meanings of परब्रह्म, अक्षरब्रह्म, आत्मा and रस. If the ultimate reality were only अस्थूलम्, अनणु, अह्रस्व, अदीर्घ &c., and nothing more, it is a question why the Vedas selected for describing it the word ब्रह्म derived from बृंह् to grow or increase, आत्मा derived from अत् to spread, and रस derived from रस् to taste. All the three words are positive, and signify growth like that of a वृक्ष, spreading like that of a पट, and sport or लीला like that of a नट, respectively. The words themselves exclude the idea of a mere विवर्त, which is an illusion of the mind,

and they inherently imply परिणाम, nay, स्वरूपपरिणाम The श्रुति 'पूर्णमद पूर्णमिद' also explains that though the जगत् proceeds from ब्रह्म, ब्रह्म remains पूर्ण as before श्रीमद्वल्लभाचार्य has explained भागवत in detail, giving the meaning (1) of the whole भागवतशास्त्र, (2) of each स्कंध (3) of each प्रकरण (4) of each अध्याय and (5 6, 7) of each वाक्य पद and अक्षर, thus giving a synthetical view of the whole, and he states that a man who understands भागवत thoroughly becomes मुक्त Fortunately the greater part of his commentary सुबोधिनी on भागवत has been published The first three स्कन्ध्स have been already published and Mulchandra himself has published फलप्रकरण (दशमस्कन्ध पूर्वार्धे २६–३२) with all the available साहित्य on it, and he has also published दशमउत्तरार्धे (१–२१) The work of completing दशम स्कन्ध is in hand, and it will soon be in the hands of the reader The depth and grandeur of श्रीवल्लभाचार्य s teachings will be known to the world only when these works are studied

Sometimes four or five works were in the press at the same time, and his countenance was full of joy, if on some उत्सव day he could publish them all together

His first marriage took place at Ujjain in 1911 12, and he was blessed with a wife who was very pious, spending about two hours every morning in religious observances, highly devoted to her husband, and had a strong and healthy constitution Mulchandra's mother also was called from Broach, and all lived in Bombay. His income being very limited, they had to live an extremely frugal life, devoid of all luxuries such as tea, vegetables and milk, but it was peaceful and contented His first son was born in 1914, and a daughter was born in 1915 But even this little happiness did not last long His daughter died, followed by his wife who died at Broach from fever incident on delivery in Diwali, *viz*, about October 1917, and Mulchandra and his son were

put to great difficulties for daily food. There were no means to engage a cook, or a servant to take care of the son. When the father went to court at 11 A. M. after locking the room, the son passed his time somehow with the neighbours, *and if the father did not return at 6 P. M.*, the lonely son would sit in front of the door with a stream of tears flowing from his eyes down the cheeks, and with constant sobs which no amount of persuasion could check. When ultimately he did arrive, *the* boy *would fly into his arms, and would not leave him even in bed and till* next day's fateful hour 11 A. M. One source of his little income was some small commissions which were given to him by the Chief Judge of the Bombay Small Causes Court, who appreciated his value, thereby showing his great regard for him, for his *sterling character* and *great* learning. For this work, pleaders asked him to fix time after 5-30 P. M., which this junior Mulchandra did, but after some bitter experiences of the above nature, he avoided engagements *after 5-30* p. m. *It was under such difficulties* that the life-work of Mulchandra was done.

In 1919 (Vaishakh 1975) he went to श्रीनाथद्वार and कांकरोली at the time of यज्ञोपवीत ceremony of श्रीव्रजभूषणजी son of श्रीबालकृष्णलालजी. *He had with him a company of friends* including उत्सवलाल, चन्दुलाल, and others. With their help, he saw the libraries of कोटा and gathered important information from manuscripts from all possible sources. He also saw the Nathadwara Library. The library of श्रीविट्ठलेशजी, the second house in which श्रीहरिरायजी and योगिगोपेश्वरजी flourished, could not be seen, though many efforts were made, and it still remains to be seen with a view to find out *all the* ग्रन्थs *of* श्रीहरिरायजी and श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी. *It* was at *the* time of this trip that the publication of श्रीटिप्पणीजी was undertaken, and the circumstances under which it was done, and the important discovery of the पाण्डु draft in the

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हस्ताक्षर of श्रीगुसांइजी which it led to, are fully described in the introduction of श्रीटिप्पणीजी. His second marriage took place at Surat in 1920, in दशामोढ caste. The dowry was fixed at about Rs. 750, but Mulchandra could ill afford this cash and he got a loan from a friend without asking for it. श्रीव्रजरत्नलालजी of Surat graced the marriage procession by his presence. His second wife has two sons and a daughter.

In 1917, his friend उत्सवलाल invited Mulchandra to Anand, and told him in the course of conversation that he had seen रश्मि at Surat. Mulchandra sent him to Surat to fetch it, which he did. It was a portion found in a very bad condition, and since then Mulchandra tried to collect रश्मि manuscripts from all sources, and one of his great desires was to be able to publish भाष्य प्रकाश and रश्मि together. Through the help of श्रीगोकुलनाथजी of बडामंदिर, Bombay, he succeeded in arranging in May 1925 to get funds from the Gordhandas Soondardas Trust administered by Sheth Lalji Naranji and others, and curtailed all other activities, so that he might be able to devote his undivided attention to the publication of this great work. He was able to publish only three volumes consisting of the First, Second and Third Padas of the Third अध्याय before his death.*

In 1927, Shree Tikâyat Maharaja Shree Gordhanlalji and Lālbāvā Shree Dâmodarlālji invited him to श्रीनाथद्वार and he went there accompanied by his friends Messrs. Jamnadas Kanji, Gordhandas Pragji and Hiralal Mulji. He was shown a few pages of the 3rd अध्याय

* After his death, the work is continued by us; the Fourth Páda of the Third अध्याय is published, the First Páda of the Fourth अध्याय is already printed, and the Second Páda of the Fourth अध्याय is in the press.

tion of the first two सूत्र of the Fourth अध्याय is subsequently added by *श्रीगुसांइजी*. A *minute inspection of the* manuscript left no doubt in Mulchandra's mind that the author of the work was श्रीगुसांइजी himself.

He had a *very wonderful genius for research.* His creative faculty, powerful imagination, extremely retentive memory and a deep alround knowledge of the Sāmpradāyika Gāthās helped this aptitude for research to such an extent that he compelled old worn-out manuscripts to speak out, to whom they belonged, from whom they were stolen, when they were written, in whose hand-writing they were and other special details about each of them, with a quickness and preciseness which would win the admiration of even the hero of a detective novel. We would give an instance and narrate the facts in his own words·—

"નવ પુસ્તકના આધારે શ્રીટિપ્પણીજીનું શોધન કરી અમે મુદ્રણકાર્યમાં ફલપ્રકરણના પ્રથમાધ્યાયના અન્તભાગપર્યન્ત આવ્યા. 'क्रिया सर्वापि सैवात्र' એ સુબોધિનીકારિકાનું વ્યાખ્યાન કંઈક વિલક્ષણ લાગ્યું. આથી શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજીકૃત તત્પ્રકાશ જોયો. આ પ્રકાશ પણ શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજીનો નિજ શ્રીહસ્તાક્ષરે લખેલો અમારે ત્યાં વિરાજે છે. તે જોતાં નીચેની પંક્તિ વાંચવામાં આવી:— 'अत्र कारिकाव्याख्यानं टिप्पणीपुस्तकेषु दृश्यते तद् पाण्डुलिखने नास्तीति श्रीगोकुलनाथानां तद् प्रतिभाति, लेखरीत्यापि तथेति च।' અહિં કારિકાવ્યાખ્યાનનું દર્શન ટિપ્પણીપુસ્તકોમાં થાય છે, પાંડુલિખનમાં નથી, તેથી શ્રીગોકુલનાથજીનું તે હોય એમ લાગે છે, લેખરીતથી પણ તેમજ ભાસે છે. એ કારિકાવ્યાખ્યાન શ્રીગોકુલનાથજીનું છે એમ શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી કહે છે તે વાતને એ જ કારિકાવ્યાખ્યાનનું સ્વતંત્ર પુસ્તક જે અમારી પાસે વિદ્યમાન છે તે પુષ્ટિ આપે છે. તે પુસ્તકમાં આ પ્રકારે લખેલું છે:—श्रीश्रीवल्लभो जयति। दशमना अध्याय २६ ने समाप्ते श्रीआचार्यजीनी कारिका ५॥ छे, ते मध्ये पहेली कारिका जे 'क्रिया सर्वापि सैवात्र परं कामो न क्रियते। तासां कामस्य संपूर्तिर्निष्कामेनेति तास्तथा ॥ १ ॥ श्रीजीकृत एह लिखन.' આના પછી મુદ્રિત શ્રીટિપ્પણીજીમાં વિદ્યમાન સંસ્કૃત વ્યાખ્યાન અક્ષરશઃ આદ્યન્ત લખેલું છે. શ્રીગોકુલેશના અન્તરંગ સેવકો એઓશ્રીને પુરુષોત્તમભાવથી શ્રીજીસંજ્ઞાથી વ્યવહારે છે. આથી શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજીનું કથન કે આ વ્યાખ્યાન શ્રીગોકુલનાથજીનું છે તે સુદૃઢ થાય છે. આ તો અપ્રસ્તુત પ્રસંગ થયો, પરંતુ આ શ્રીપુરષોત્તમજીની પંક્તિથી અન્ય વાર્તા સ્ફુરી. આ લેખથી

Its substance is —Having corrected the press copy of श्रीटिप्पणीजी with the help of nine manuscripts, we came to the end of the first अध्याय of फलप्रकरण The explanation of किया सर्वापि सैवात्र seemed strange to us, therefore we referred to श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी's प्रकाश on it We have got a copy of it in his own handwriting Therein we read the following line —"The explanation of कारिकाs is seen in टिप्पणी manuscripts, but it is not in the rough draft therefore it appears to have been written by श्रीगोकुलनाथजी, the style of writing also leads to the same conclusion" This opinion of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी is supported by another manuscript of कारिकाव्याख्यान which is with us The following is found written in that manuscript —"At the end of the 26th अध्याय there are five and a half कारिकाs of श्रीआचार्यजी, the first of which is क्रियासर्वापि etc This writing is composed by श्रीजी" This is followed by the explanation given in टिप्पणी manuscripts This line of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी led to another line of thought,

i. e., that the 'rough draft' must be of श्रीटिप्पणीजी, and it must be in *श्रीबालकृष्णजी's मंदिर as श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी lived at Surat.* Led by these inferences, we wrote a letter to श्रीव्रजरत्नजी about it who searched his Library, but he could not get the rough draft, and wrote to us accordingly. But this reply could not satisfy our inner self, and we thought of *going to Surat for it. We went there on Aso sud 13,* and requested श्रीव्रजरत्नजी to show us the हस्ताक्षर deposited in सेवा. The Maharaja kindly granted our request, and the next morning–the Rasotsava day, we were overjoyed to have the दर्शन of श्रीटिप्पणीजी in the handwriting of श्रीगुसांईजी himself, *referred to as rough draft by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी.*

Besides tracing the original of टिप्पणी, some of the other important results of this genius for research which has put the whole Sampradaya in great obligation to him might be summed up as under:—

2. भरुची वैष्णवs *give the date of श्रीमद्वल्लभाचार्य's* birth as 1529, and not 1535, and the place of birth as चोडाघाम and not चंपारण्य. Mulchandra got an old manuscript of कल्लोल from these भरुचीs, in which one old श्लोक (about 3rd or 4th) about नामकरण or ordinary matter was deleted, and the श्लोक specially mentioning date and place was substituted, scratching out the old one. There was not the slightest necessity of scratching out the old श्लोक but the writer purposely did it with an ulterior motive. The manuscript was returned, and since then it is not produced by वैष्णव उत्सवलाल भरुची though repeatedly demanded. From the time we saw the mss., we were convinced about the interpolation, thus leaving no doubt that the date given by भरुचीs 1529 is *not correct, as also the place चोडाघाम.*

3. Very little was known to the सम्प्रदाय about श्रीकृष्णचंद्रजी. It was he who pointed out the deep obligation under which श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी was to his गुरु for adopting the comparative method of writing, to unearth and publish

as an appendix to Vol. III of भाष्यप्रकाशरश्मि, कृष्णचन्द्रजी's टीका on गुणोपसंहारपाद, and to draw attention to the different इतिश्री's in the भावप्रकाशिकावृत्ति showing which portion was written by श्रीकृष्णचन्द्रजी himself and which was collected, set right or written by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी.

4. It was he who obtained the Fourth अध्याय of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी's अधिकरणमाला from the Bhandârkar Research Institute, and published it. योगी श्रीगोपेश्वरजी could not get it, and so he wrote out the Fourth अध्याय himself, which also has been printed as an appendix, thus facilitating a comparison between the writings of two master-minds.

5. A copy of some portion of बृहद्भाष्य was found many years ago, and published in पुष्टिभक्तिसुधा. It was well-known then to every student that this contained words, phrases and sentences which were also found in प्रकाश and वृत्ति. The portion was published for what it was worth for the information of the public. The matter rested there for several years. Two or three years ago, Mulchandra got a rough draft* of the same portion of the बृहद्भाष्य, and he had no difficulty in tracing it to रामकृष्णभट्ट, the learned शास्त्री of काशीस्थ श्रीगिरिधरजी, and the टीकाकार of श्रुतिरहस्य. In the introduction to भाष्यप्रकाशरश्मि ३-१-१ published in samvat 1982, Mulchandra wrote on p. 12 as under:—"In conclusion we ought not to omit reference to one work which passes in the name of श्रीमद्भाष्य of S'ri Vallabhâchârya. Some passages of the जिज्ञासाधिकरण and the First Pada of the Third Adhyâya and 11 Sutras of the Second Pada have been seen by us. The portion from the Third Adhyâya has been published by us in the monthly Pushti-Bhakti-Sudhâ. From the style, this seems to be a clumsy attempt of a writer of recent times. All copies seen by us are new. The style is such as leaves

* The draft is with us at present.

B

little doubt in our minds as to the spurious nature of this production." Notwithstanding this, Mr. Jethalal Shah, who has recently published अनुवाद of १-२ अध्यायs writes in his introduction on p. 9, "...સદ્ગત તેલીવાલા એવું માને છે કે શ્રીવલ્લભાચાર્યે બ્રહ્મસૂત્ર ઉપર બે ભાષ્ય રચ્યાં હતાં...તેના પુરાવા તરીકે પુષ્ટિભક્તિસુધાના વર્ષ ૬ માં પ્રકટ થયલા લખાણને રજુ કરે છે અને તે પ્રકટ થયલું લખાણ તે "શ્રીમદ્ભાષ્ય અગર બૃહદ્ભાષ્ય" છે." To attribute to Teliwala what he deliberately considered "spurious" is misrepresenting a departed scholar, misleading oneself and misleading the public. His conclusion which he puts in bold type on p. 16., "પાછળથી કૃષ્ણચન્દ્રજીએ બૃહદ્ભાષ્ય રચ્યું હશે" is also due to ignorance. To say that अणुभाष्य derives its name from the अणुत्व of जीव is absurd, because the जिज्ञासा is not जीवजिज्ञासा, but ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, and the अणुभाष्य is not जीवसूत्राणुभाष्य, but ब्रह्मसूत्राणुभाष्य. The present requirements of the सम्प्रदाय are not arguments based on antiquated opinions, but investigation and research which would throw more light on the सम्प्रदाय.

6. It was he who identified a manuscript of सुबोधिनी now at Dabhoi, as originally belonging to श्रीदामोदरलालजी, son of श्रीगिरिधरजी, the eldest son of श्रीगुसांइजी. The additions made by श्रीगुसांइजी to सुबोधिनी are put into brackets in this manuscript. While reading सुबोधिनी, it was found difficult to establish any connection between some sentences, which difficulty is removed by श्रीगुसांइजी's additions being thus separated. The तामसफलप्रकरण is published from this manuscript, by Mulchandra.

7. The idea of collecting all the टीकाs on षोडशग्रन्थs and publishing them together was his, he successfully carried it out, and helped चीमनशास्त्री and हरिकृष्णशास्त्री with manuscripts to complete the series.

8. He collected टीकाs of श्रीगुसांइजी on सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली and pointed out that श्रीगुसांइजी had made additions to the टीका at least four times.

9. It was he who first found out that श्रीव्रजराजजी of the first house wrote his टीकाs and sent them to his गुरु श्रीवल्लभजी of the fifth house who made many changes in them. The copies made from the original became known as श्रीव्रजराजजी's टीकाs, and those that were altered became known as श्रीवल्लभजी's टीकाs.

10. He went to श्रीनाथद्वार, identified the Fourth अध्याय of भाष्य as written out wholly by श्रीगुसांइजी, in which second interpretation of first two सूत्रs is subsequently added, thus conclusively showing that the whole was written by श्रीगुसांइजी.

11. He found out फलप्रकरणप्रकाश in the हस्ताक्षर of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी and published the same.

12. He collected two copies of भाष्यप्रकाश, first in श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी's own hand and got and identified a subsequent copy of प्रकाश in which additions and alterations were made by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी. He adopted for publication the final copy of प्रकाश and hence we find differences in the readings of the प्रकाश in रश्मि, as रश्मिकार श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी had got only the first copy of प्रकाश with him.

13. He threw new light on श्रीगुसांइजी's life, which is published in रश्मि Vol. IV and विद्वन्मण्डन with dates as traced by him.

14. He found out that the सुवर्णमेखला that श्रीवल्लभाचार्यजी presented was not to श्रीविट्ठलनाथजी of पंढरपुर, but it was to श्रीविट्ठलनाथजी of विजयनगर, where there was a temple of श्रीविट्ठलनाथजी.

15. He obtained from श्रीव्रजरत्नलालजी of सुरत the will of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी and published the same.

16. He collected and published several स्वतन्त्रलेखs in पुष्टिभक्तिसुधा and वेणुनाद.

17. He laboured hard and succeeded in collecting रश्मि, the monumental work of श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी and with the help of श्रीगोकुलनाथजी of बडा मन्दिर, Bombay, he arranged for publication of the same.

On account of his wide knowledge about the history of the सम्प्रदाय together with a clear perception of the facts of the case put before him, he was consulted by गोस्वामिस in their cases, and his services were ulitised by S'ri Gokulnathji of Bombay and his son S'ri Krishnajivanji in Madras and Dharangaon cases, in both of which they succeeded, and also by Shri Gopeshwarji who also won his case at Madras.

Again, if there was an attack against the पुष्टिसम्प्रदाय and his presence was required at any place, he never refused, but started immediately. He had thus to go to सिहोर (near Indore), Mehemdabad, Patan, Savali and other places.

The necessity of a Research Institute for the सम्प्रदाय was recognised through the efforts of Mulchandra by Shri Tikayat Maharaja of Nathadwara, and Shri Vallabhacharyaji, son of S'ri Devakinandanji offered him a decent block of four rooms in Chandrabag, and Mulchandra went to live there in Chaitra of 1983. But God willed it otherwise. He fell ill, went to Broach during the Summer vacation in the High Court, and when he returned in June 1927, he had not thoroughly recovered. He was attacked with unbearable neuralgic pain in the head on 18th June 1927, and he passed away on 26th June 1927.

Though he died young, his abilities as a great Scholar were recognised by Oriental scholars as well as Sampradayika scholars. Mr. Woodroffe, Mr. Keith, the late Mr. Tansukhram Mansukhram Tripathi, Anant Shastri of Shanti Niketan, Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Bal Shastri and Nandkishore Shastri, all acknowledged his scholarship. Mr. Tansukhram was always *delighted* with his conversation, and gave him from his vast collection whatever manuscript or book was requir-

ed by him. Mr. Keshav Harshad Dhruva was so much delighted to read his introduction of स्नेहमुद्रा that he came to see him, and expressed a desire to read with him शास्त्रादि works, and दयारामनो अक्षरदेह was entrusted to him by Mr. Govardhanram's brother to make suitable changes for the second edition.

The guiding principle of his life was 'अतोऽन्यदार्तम्' a phrase in the अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मण of बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद्, meaning 'Everything else except God is painful.' He was born tired with the world, for which he had a deep-rooted disgust, and he had realised from very early age that real आनन्द was in आनन्दमय भगवान् only. There was therefore a touch of cynicism in his words, which were mildly sarcastic even when talking with men most highly placed in life, and a sort of non-attachment in all his worldly deeds. But his spirit was always young, buoyant and playful, and one enjoyed innocent, slightly mischievous joy in his company.

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The guiding principle of his life was 'अतोन्यदार्तम्' a phrase in the अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मण of बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद्, meaning 'Everything else except God is painful.' He was born tired with the world, for which he had a deep-rooted disgust, and he had realised from very early age that real आनन्द was in आनन्दमय भगवान् only. There was therefore a touch of cynicism in his words, which were mildly sarcastic even when talking with men most highly placed in life, and a sort of non-attachment in all his worldly deeds. But his spirit was always young, buoyant and playful, and one enjoyed innocent, slightly mischievous joy in his company.

He had a very noble heart. Many Brahmins and friends came to him for recommendation-letters or support, and he did whatever he could for them. We were sometimes even puzzled to see how he could help one who had done him wrong or abused him. The whole of the Nirnaya Sagar Press, the Proprietor, Manager, Shastri, and compositors, all loved him, and they feel a void in their daily life without his cheerful presence. The compositors would whisper in your ears how he had helped them, and allowed their pro-notes passed to him for advances to be time-barred. It was due to this nobility that he freely acknowledged whatever help he received in his work by way of money, manuscripts or co-operation. This leads us to note another important trait of his which was complete आश्रय, *viz.*, willing dependence on the will and wisdom of the Lord, at all times,

however critical and in all matters, however important. His mind was therefore always at ease, and he was never oppressed with burden or weight on his head for anything whatever. "भगवदिच्छा सर्वत्र मूल्म्, न बुद्ध्यादिदोषाः शङ्कनीयाः ।" सु. ११. १. १८. This was ingrained in him, and hence under most trying circumstances, he was most light-hearted.

This आश्रय resulted in other important traits, *viz.*, अभय, स्वमान and निःस्वार्थ, fearlessness, self-respect and self-sacrifice. Though he had nothing, he seemed to possess everything; he could talk straight to a king on equal footing, and while engaged in सम्प्रदायसाहित्यसेवा, in his small room, he acted like a happy king, surrounded by co-working companions all merry-making, sometimes sitting two on broken chairs, or comfortably couched on the broad handles of a broken easy-chair. The chairs were sometimes discarded and heaped out of the room near the door, for making room for men. His children cried and ran to him to escape the wrath of the mother, and insisted on sitting on his table, full of old manuscripts, or in his lap, while he was deciphering some knotty passage in an old manuscript. The mother of the children perhaps silently cursed the man for his neglect of the house and its inmates, and even expressed her disapprobation in sharp significant words. This was all well as it was, because it was God's will, which is always best, and the *work of comparing and correcting manuscripts, sometimes* five, sometimes ten at a time, went on till midnight with the help of a jewel-lamp in the middle. गोस्वामी श्रीव्रजरत्नलालजी of Surat, as well as most prominent personages and वैष्णवs from Kathiawad, Sind, Calcutta, Nainital and Madras saw him in this room. The difference between the small room and the great man, who was doing the abstruse work of deciphering and publishing old manuscripts was patent to all.

This आश्रय and धैर्य resulting from it kept him always collected, though there was the greatest cause for losing one's temper. If there was a caste-dinner at his place, and there was none to work and no invitations were sent, he was calm; if there was a procession, and no band was available, he was calm; if people did not pay the money due to him, it was God's will; if members of the family were laid up with illness, if he was unjustly attacked in news-papers, he was not the least disturbed. He went on quietly with his self-imposed work, with a concentration of mind and with a non-attachment to surroundings (असंग) simply marvellous. This concentration continued even in sleep, and then naturally he got dreams. His little room was filled with hallowed light (so he said and we fully believe him) and he saw, (at any rate he believed he saw) at one time श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी and at other times other great persons or भक्त. When he woke next morning after such a dream, there was a joyous smile on his face which was unmistakable, and the writer can never forget the innocent smile on his face on the morning of the last day of his life on this Earth, the 26th June, which clearly showed that he had some दर्शन in dream.

His sudden death was a great loss to the सम्प्रदाय, and the hearts of almost all वैष्णव were moved by this great loss. Two telegrams were received from गोस्वामी श्रीगोवर्धनलालजी तिलकायित, one to take care of his wife and children, and the other to hold a meeting to which he promised to send his representative. A similar telegram was received from लालबाबा श्रीदामोदरलालजी to the same effect, and many others followed in quick succession. A meeting was immediately held in Bada Mandir, Bombay, and गोस्वामी श्रीगोकुलनाथजी announced Rs. 500 as his subscription to the fund for a memorial to be raised after him. Mr. Ranchhoddas Patwari also subscribed Rs. 251. Meetings

were also held at Ahmedabad, Dabhoi, Sankheda, Mangrol and a dozen other places, and a grand meeting was held in Bombay on 24th July 1927 in Mulji Jetha Market Hall under the presidentship of the Hon'able Mr. Justice Krishnalal Mohanlal Jhaveri. Goswami S'ri Gokulnathji moved the first resolution as under:—

"वेदान्तना सुप्रसिद्ध गुजराती विद्वान् अने पुष्टिमार्गीय वैष्णव संप्रदायना साहित्यप्रकाशक सद्गत वैष्णव मूलचन्द्र तुलसीदास तेलीवाला बी. ए., एलएल. बी., एम. आर. ए. एस., वकील, हाइकोर्टना, जेठ वद १२ ने रविवार ता. २६ मी जुन १९२७ नी रात्रिए थयला अकाल अवसान बद्दल मुंबईना आचार्योनी, वैष्णवोनी अने सद्गतना मित्रोनी तेमज वखाणनाराओनी आ सभा पोतानो अत्यंत खेद प्रदर्शित करे छे, अने तेमना अवसानथी समस्त गुजरातने, अने विशेषतः पुष्टिसम्प्रदायने गयली मोटी खोटनी दिलगीरी साथे नोंध लेछे, अने सद्गतना कुटुंब उपर आवी पडेली आ अणधारी आपत्तिमां तेमना प्रति पोतानी दिलसोजी दर्शावे छे."

This resolution was seconded in suitable language by Goswami S'ri Ranchhodlalji, son of S'ri Jivanlalji of Porebunder, and supported by Mr. Hanumanprasad M. A., the representative specially sent to Bombay from S'ri Nathadwar by S'ri Govardhanlalji Tilakayit Maharaja and his son S'ri Damodarlalji. He read in the Meeting the letter of condolence sent by His Holiness S'ri Govardhanlalji and gave Rs. 1001 for a suitable memorial. The second resolution was moved by Sheth Lalji Naranji and seconded by Rao Saheb Harjiwan Valji as under:—

सद्गत रा. मूलचन्द्र तुलसीदास तेलीवालाए अतिशय परिश्रम सहीने प्राचीन दुष्प्राप्य साम्प्रदायिक संस्कृत साहित्यने सर्वांग सुंदर प्रकारे प्रसिद्ध करीने आपणने जे ऋणमां मुक्यां छे, ते ऋणमांथी कांईक अंशे मुक्त थवाने तेमनुं योग्य स्मारक उभुं करवाने तथा तेमना कुटुंबना शिक्षणादि सर्व प्रकारक संरक्षणनो प्रबंध करवाने तेमने आ बंने बाबतनी सर्व व्यवस्था कुल सत्तासाथे करवाने नीचेना सभ्योनी पोतानी संख्यामां वधारो करवानी सत्तासाथे कमिटि नीमवानो आ सभा ठराव करे छे.

Decent sums were announced for the memorial and a representative committee appointed to collect funds.

SELECT OPINIONS.

'Discuss how far S'ankarâchârya truly represents the view of the Author of Brahmasûtras.'

A masterly essay, criticism sober, unbiassed and scholarly. Should be carefully studied by all the students of the Brahmasûtra.

—Modern Review for September, 1918.

This is an able and scholarly dessertation on the well-known subject of the correctness of S'ankara's interpretation of the Brahmasûtras of Bâdarâyana .. . .It must however be said to the author's credit that he sets out the views of other Bhâshyakâras like Râmânuja, Shrîkantha, Nimbârka, and Bhâskara in various places, and his exposition of the difficulties to which Sankarâchârya is reduced by his desire to get the nirgunavâda out of the Sûtras, must be convincing to all except those who are pronounced in their 'nirvis'eshatvâgraha "

—*Indian Review for November, 1918*

It is scholarly and shows marks of deep study and thinking

—Dr. S K Belvalkar, M A , Ph D ,
Prof of Sanskrit, Deccan College, Poona.

I have found it very interesting reading, and you have well developed the points on which you rely as showing the differences between Sankara and Bâdarâyana The discussion has brought to my mind a question to which I have elsewhere alluded, namely whether it is not better to hold to two apparently contradictory affirmations, leaving spiritual experience to realise rather than to neglect one at the cost of other.

—Sir John Woodroffe—Judge, Calcutta High Court.

श्रीमद्वल्लभाचार्याखण्डशुद्धाद्वैतब्रह्मवादोपयुक्तेषु संस्कृतमुद्रितपुस्तकेषु

केषाञ्चिन्नामानि	मूल्यं मार्गव्ययरहितम्। रु.	आ.	पै.
१. गायत्रीभाष्यम्।	०	४	०
२. तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्भाष्यम्।	१	०	०
३. छान्दोग्यप्रथमाध्यायभाष्यम्।	०	८	०
४. माण्डूक्योपनिषद्दीपिका।	०	८	०
५. नृसिंहोत्तरतापिनीदीपिका।	०	८	०
६. श्रीमद्भगवद्गीता तत्त्वदीपादिसहिता।	०	१२	०
७. ,, अमृततरङ्गिणीसहिता।	२	०	०
८. शाण्डिल्यभक्तिसूत्रभाष्यम्।	०	८	०
९. जैमिनिसूत्रभावार्थपादभाष्यं सविवरणम्।	०	८	०
१०. ब्रह्मसूत्रपाठः पाठान्तरसहितः।	०	४	०
११. श्रीमद्ब्रह्मसूत्राणुभाष्यं मूलमात्रम्।	३	०	०
१२. ,, सप्रकाशम्।	२२	८	०
१३. ,, त्रिसूत्रीसाहित्यमात्रम्।	२	०	०
१४. ,, पाठकशास्त्रिटीकायुतम्।	६	४	०
१५. ,, सप्रदीपं स्तवकद्वयात्मकम्।	३	०	०
१६. ,, सप्रकाशरश्मि-तृतीयाध्याय।	४	०	०
१६. अ. ,, ,, चतुर्थाध्यायप्रथमद्वितीयपादौ।	१	८	०
१७. ब्रह्मसूत्रभावप्रकाशिकावृत्तिः।	३	०	०
१८. ,, मरीचिकावृत्तिः।	२	०	०
१९. अधिकरणमाला।	१	०	०
२०. अधिकरणसङ्ग्रहः।	०	४	०
२१. श्रीभागवतं सुबोधिनीसहितम्। प्रथमस्कंधः।	४	०	०
२२. ,, ,, प्रकाशः।	१	०	०
२३. ,, ,, द्वितीयस्कन्धः।	२	०	०
२४. ,, ,, तृतीयस्कन्धः सप्रकाशः।	६	०	०
२५. ,, ,, दशमस्कन्धजन्मप्रकरणं सप्रकाशम्।	४	८	०
२६. ,, ,, ,, सर्वसाहित्यसहितम्।	५	०	०
२७. ,, ,, फलप्रकरणं लेखसहितम्।	३	०	०
२८. ,, ,, प्रकाशः।	१	०	०
२९. ,, ,, योजना।	०	८	०
३०. ,, ,, दशमस्कंधाष्टादशाध्यायः (वेणुगीतम्) सर्वसाहित्यसहितः।	१	०	०

	रु.	आ.	पै.
३१. श्रीमद्भागवतम् । सुबोधिनीसहितम् । दशमस्कन्ध-उत्तरार्धे प्रथममध्यायसप्तकं सलेखम् ।	२	०	०
३२. ,, ,, द्वितीय ,, ,, ।	२	०	०
३३. ,, ,, तृतीय ,, ,, ।	२	०	०
३४. ,, ,, वेदस्तुतिसूक्ष्मटीका ।	०	८	०
३५. श्रीदशमस्कन्धटिप्पणी ।	२	०	०
३६. तत्त्वदीपनिबन्धः सप्रकाशः ।	३	०	०
३७. ,, ,, सप्रकाशावरणभङ्गः प्रकरणद्वयमात्रम् ।	७	८	०
३८. ,, ,, भागवतार्थप्रकरणे स्कन्धद्वयार्थः ।	१	०	०
३९. श्रीमद्भागवतं बालप्रबोधिनीसहितम् ।	२५	०	०
४०. पत्रावलम्बनं सविवरणम् ।	१	०	०
४१. श्रीयमुनाष्टकं सर्वटीकोपेतम् ।	१	०	०
४२. बालबोधः ,, ।	१	०	०
४३. सिद्धान्तमुक्तावलिः ,, ।	१	०	०
४४. पुष्टिप्रवाहमर्यादा ,, ।	१	०	०
४५. सिद्धान्तरहस्यम् । ,, ।	१	०	०
४६. नवरत्नम् । ,, ।	१	०	०
४७. अन्तःकरणप्रबोधः ,, ।	१	१	०
४८. विवेकधैर्याश्रयः ,, ।	१	०	०
४९. कृष्णाश्रयः ,, ।	१	०	०
५०. चतुःश्लोकी ,, ।	१	०	०
५१. भक्तिवर्धिनी ,, ।	१	०	०
५२. पञ्चपद्यानि जलभेदश्च ।	१	०	०
५३. सन्न्यासनिर्णयः ,, ।	२	०	०
५४. निरोधलक्षणं ,, ।	१	०	०
५५. सेवाफलम् ,, ।	१	०	०
५६. पुरुषोत्तमनामसहस्रं चन्द्रिकायुतम् ।	१	०	०
५७ त्रिविधनामावलिः सटीका ।	१	०	०
५८. मधुराष्टकम् सटीकम् ।	अमूल्यम्		
५९. प्रेमामृतं परिवृढाष्टकं च ,, ।	१	०	०
६०. सार्धश्लोकत्रयी शिक्षा सटीका ।	१	०	०
६१. विद्वन्मण्डनं मूलमात्रम् ।	१	०	०
६२. ,, सत्सुवर्णसूत्रम् ।	३	०	०
६३. ,, सर्वटीकोपेतम् ।	५	०	०
६४. शृङ्गाररसमण्डनम् ।	२	०	०
६५. श्रीसर्वोत्तमस्तोत्रं टीकात्रययुतम् ।	०	८	०
६६. श्रीवल्लभाष्टकम् ,, त्रय ,, ।	०	८	०
६७. सौन्दर्यपद्यम् सटीकम् ।	०	८	०

	रु.	आ.	पै
६८. भक्तिहंसः सटीकः ।	१	०	८
६९. ,, हेतुनिर्णयः ,, ।	१	०	८
७०. वृत्रासुरचतुःश्लोकी ,, ।	१	०	०
७१. नामरत्नस्तोत्रम् ,, ।	१	०	०
७२. ब्रह्मवादः ।	०	८	०
७३. प्रस्थानरत्नाकरः ।	१	०	०
७४. वादावलिः ।	२	०	०
७५. भागवतशङ्कानिरासवादः ।	०	४	०
७६. उत्सवप्रतान ।	२	०	०
७७. द्रव्यशुद्धिः ।	२	०	०
७८. निर्णयार्णवः ।	०	८	०
७९. सेवाकौमुदी ।	०	८	०
८०. अशौचनिर्णयः ।	०	४	०
८१. भक्तिमार्तण्डः ।	३	०	०
८२. ऊर्ध्वपुण्ड्रमार्तण्डः ।	०	४	०
८३. शुद्धाद्वैतमार्तण्डः सिद्धान्तप्रदीपसहितः ।	२	०	०
८४. सप्रकाश शुद्धाद्वैतमार्तण्डः प्रमेयरत्नार्णवश्च ।	२	८	०
८५. श्रुतिरहस्यम् ।	२	०	०
८६. सत्सिद्धान्तमार्तण्डः ।	६	०	०
८७. प्राभञ्जनः ।	३	०	०
८८. ,, मारुतशक्तियुतः ।	६	०	०
८९. वेदान्तचिंतामणिः ।	२	०	०
९०. श्रीवल्लभस्तुतिरत्नावलिः ।	१	०	०
९१. साम्प्रदायिकबृहत्स्तोत्रसरित्सागरः ।	५	०	०
९२. श्रीमद्वल्लभाचार्यचरितम् ।	०	२	०
९३. रसाब्धिमहाकाव्यम् ।	१	०	०
९४. मनोदूतम्-हृदयदूत च । गुर्जरानुवादसमेतम् ।	१	०	०
९५ श्रीमद्गोपालपूर्वतापिन्युपनिषद्	१	८	०
96. An Examination of S'ankara's refutation of the Samkhya system ...	2	0	0
97. Discuss how far S'ankara truly represents the view of the author of the Brahma Sutras.	0	12	0

पंडित गट्टूलालजीनी पाठशाला केथिड्रलस्ट्रीट भूलेश्वर
मुंबई नं० २